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Abstract: 
SME support organisations and promotion policies are best understood as elements of 
the architecture of national and / or regional socio-economic regulation in 
contemporary capitalism. Their role in each specific instance, however, cannot be 
determined a priori but must be identified through a concrete analysis of each 
concrete situation, taking into account the composition, internal contradictions and 
strategies of the ruling social bloc underpinning the system of institutional 
compromises that constitutes the basis of a specific instance of regulation, as well as 
of those socio-economic interests that are opposed to the political project of the ruling 
bloc. 
This study focuses on the rise and fall of an SME support organisation in the context 
of dependent development characterised by a dual-economy: on the one hand, a 
dominant modern sector composed almost entirely of export-oriented subsidiaries of 
transnational groups and, on the other, a traditional sector, made up largely of micro- 
enterprises catering for the local market. The setting is a post-colonial one, micro- 
state Malta after the Second World War with special attention to the periods of 
Labour government 1971-87 and 1996-98, mainly at the point when the 
developmentalist project and the peripheral Fordist accumulation model that made it 
possible were in a state of crisis. The case study unfolds against the background of a 
sustained theoretical discussion of the relevance of regulation theory today and a 
survey of 41 SME support organisations and national policies in 9 countries carried 
out by the author, which survey identifies a clear if complex relationship between 
resurgence of SME support policies and Fordist crisis. 
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction: Setting and scope 
1.1 The concrete setting: Malta, a post-colonial microstate and a dependent 
peripheral economy 
I have the pleasure to state that to date amongst the industrial operators [... ] 
in Malta, we have GEC and Hawker Siddeley [... ]. So the results we have 
achieved have encouraged me to come here once again and to take the 
opportunity to explain to the people whom we want to be associated with us, 
and want is underlined, about what is going on and what we hope to achieve 
in the very near future in the economic and political field. [... ] I think it is 
sufficient for me to tell you that because we have a government in which the 
unions genuinely participate in the programming of the economy [... ] we have 
hardly any industrial strikes at all and we are not likely to have any. [... ] 
Since I have been here last time we have been able to bring some order in the 
jungle of conditions which previously existed with regard to leave. [... ] We 
have also been able to make very fundamental changes in public holidays. 
We are a Roman Catholic country and, as you know, we had many holidays in 
the past. 
These have now been cut down to much fewer than what the Italians aspired to 
do this year or perhaps next year. [... ] and for the first time after five years, 
instead of giving a flat wage increase - we have been doing that for five 
years, Malta has been giving a flat wage increase to all workers irrespective 
of their salary - [... ] we dared to give a percentage increase of 2% for an 
increase in production [... ]. We are now in the process of reforming tertiary 
education so that we can increase the number and the efficiency of our middle 
management, engineers and so on. 
From a talk by then Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff 
to members of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 
London, 8 December 1977, the second in nine months. 
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Malta -a British colony until 1964 and, as of 2004, a member of the European 
Union 
- is a small archipelago totalling a mere 316 square 
kilometres lying around 100 
kilometres south of Sicily. Surrendered to the British Army in 1800 by the French 
garrison left behind by Napoleon on his way to Egypt, a state of affairs regularised by 
the 1814 Treaty of Paris, Malta continued to be a British military base until 1979, 
fifteen years after it was granted independence within the Commonwealth and three 
years after it was proclaimed a Republic. 
According to a detailed report on the 1813 plague by Dr. W. H. Burrell, Principal 
Medical Officer of the British Army in Malta, the total population was then estimated 
at 111,000.1 The census of 1947, the first after the Second World War, returned a 
population of 305,991. The 1967 population census, the first one after independence, 
gave a total of 314,216. At present it is estimated that around 404,350 Maltese and 
foreigners live in Malta, 17 per cent of which are 14 years old and younger and 14 per 
cent are 65 and older. Annual population growth rate between 1990 and 2005 
averaged 0.74 per cent and life expectancy at birth stood at 81.4 and 77.7 per cent for 
females and males respectively. Malta ranks 32 "d according to the UNDP Human 
Development Index (UNDP: 2006), at the bottom of the high scorers' category. 
Malta has no mineral resources except limestone used for construction; oil and gas 
exploration on land and offshore has been going on since the late 50s with no concrete 
results to date; a significant part of its water requirement is met from energy-intensive 
processing of sea water (reverse osmosis). GDP per inhabitant at current market 
prices stood at $US 14,067 in 2005. GDP per capita in PPS in the same year 
represented 70.4 per cent of the EU-25 average. The economy grew by 2.9 per cent in 
2006, marginally below the 2005 rate, driven principally by net export growth 
reflecting a strong performance in electronics, pharmaceuticals, fisheries and' rapid 
1 General Board of Health, Second report on quarantine, Appendix V. " Report of Dr. W. H. Burrell on 
the plague of Malta in 1813, London 1854; for background see also Bonnici, W. "Inspector of 
Hospitals Ralph Green and the plague in Malta of 1813" Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 
1998,144(1): 40-5. The small size of the Maltese Islands and its role as an important military base 
made frequent and detailed audits of population size, structure and growth, health, civil status, gainful 
employment and unemployment, emigration and immigration, travel, shipping movements, trade, 
manufacture, government finances, workings of government departments, housing stock and vital 
provisions, education and crime, both possible and critical for its orderly governance. This tradition of 
statistical production facilitated development planning and national economic management in the 
second half of the 20`h century. 
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expansion in the remote gaming business. Exports of goods and services totaled 
Lml. 64 billion in 2006. Tourism generated LmO. 42 billion in 2006, a 1.2 per cent 
drop from the previous year. Around 66 per cent of tourists originate from the UK, 
Germany, Italy and France, with the UK market on its own accounting for 39 per cent 
of the total. 
Export led industrialisation fuelled by foreign investment and technology (Sklair's 
ELIFFIT path, 1989) was by far the most dynamic contributor to economic growth 
and development from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, with incoming foreign direct 
investment peaking in the 1970s. The strategic foundations for this path were laid as 
early as the mid-50s, with a report by the then Oxford economists Balogh and Seers 
(1955) to then Labour prime minister Dom Mintoff 2, wherein the authors argued for 
the necessity and the possibility of export-led industrialisation (as there was no 
significant home market) and for foreign direct investment (given the indifference of 
Maltese entrepreneurs, traditionally merchant capitalists, towards direct investment in 
production). 
The early experiences of Hungarian born Thomas (later Lord) Balogh -a Keynes 
protege in his younger days, economic advisor to his close friend Harold Wilson and 
Minister of State at the Department of Energy when Tony Benn was in charge there in 
Wilson's second government - in Malta, Australia, India and Jamaica certainly 
impacted on his contributions to the shaping of the British Labour Party's policies 
towards the Commonwealth, developing countries, and his input on Britain's foreign 
economic policy generally (Davies 1963 and Toye 2000). Seers's acute awareness of 
the irreducibility of geopolitical specificities in the shaping of policy as well as the 
need to integrate the socio-political into development economics owed much, 
according to Ingham (1989), to his work in Ghana and Malta. Balogh and Seers' 
analysis and proposals for Malta were embedded in the parallel perspectives of 
2 Born in 1917, Mintoff is an architect and civil engineer, having studied at the universities of Malta 
and, as a Rhodes Scholar, at Oxford. He was General Secretary of the Labour Party in 1936-37, 
member of the Council of Government and Executive Council in 1945-47, deputy prime minister and 
minister for works and reconstruction between 1947 and 1949 when the Labour party split. A minority, including the leader and then prime minister Paul Boffa, left the party. Mintoff was elected leader, a 
position he held until 1984. He become Prime Minister in 1955 but resigned in 1958 to lead the 
opposition until 1971 when he became prime minister, a post he held until 1984. Further details in 
Appendix II. 
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Malta's eventual `integration' with Britain, a project supported by Labour in both 
countries but opposed in Malta by the Nationalist party and the Church, and the run- 
down of British bases, by far the most important employers. Although the 
`integration' project was eventually dropped, this did not impact conceptually on the 
viability of the Balogh and Seers' industrial development strategy and, although 
industrialisation played a central role in the development policy of the Maltese Labour 
party but only a marginal one for the Nationalist party, no Maltese government has 
since substantially deviated from the path signposted by the two British economists. 
Following the abortive project in 1956 to integrate Malta with the United Kingdom, 
the country was finally granted independence within the Commonwealth on 21 
September 1964. Immediately upon its election in 1971, the Labour government 
renegotiated the terms for continued British use of military installations. Under a new 
non-renewable seven-year agreement (1972-1979), Britain agreed to pay substantially 
higher annual rent for the bases. Other NATO countries wishing to use its facilities 
would have to deal directly and bilaterally with Malta. Additionally it would receive 
economic aid from other NATO powers, principally Italy. In exchange, Malta 
committed itself to exclude Warsaw Pact armed forces from its territory. On 13 
December 1974, Malta became a Republic within the Commonwealth and on 31 
March 1979, as agreed, the last British serviceperson left the islands: It was the 
Maltese government's declared intention that it would, in the seven years countdown 
to the closure of the bases, promote the development of productive economic 
activities with the objective of freeing itself by the end of first quarter 1979 from the 
necessity of hiring out parts of the national territory for military use to foreign 
powers. 
The results were significant. Of the 6,040 persons employed with the British Services 
in 1971 - out of a total of 78,570 persons in employment and a total Maltese 
population of 301,715 - there were only 1,645 left in 1978 and none by the second 
quarter of 1979. Emigration, which had begun with just over 1,000 in 1946, had 
climbed to over 11,000 in 1954. During the first (pre-Independence) Labour 
government of 1955-1958, the annual level of emigration had been brought down to 
below the 4,000 mark where it remained until 1962. It then climbed sharply to almost 
9,000 in Independence year 1964, to descend slowly to a level below 3,000 in the 
4 
period 1968-1971. With the massive redundancies following the final run-down of 
British presence in Malta, emigration crept up to 4,189 in 1974 to fall sharply to 1,624 
the year after; in the same year the number of returned migrants soared by almost 453 
per cent over the previous year to stand at 2,957 and overtaking the number of 
emigrants by 82 per cent; in 1979, the year the British bases closed and the last 
remaining Maltese employees of the bases were made redundant, the number of 
returned migrants exceeded that of emigrants by almost 76 per cent. 
3 
The number of gainfully employed stood at 99,110 in 1971 out of a total Maltese 
population of 301,715 (32.9 per cent), rising to 119,262 in 1979 when the total 
Maltese population numbered 322,535 (37 per cent). In 1971 there were 20,662 
persons employed in manufacturing and 34,486 in 1979. Total exports increased by 
more than nine times between the coming to power of the first post-Independence 
Mintoff government in 1971 and the closure of foreign (British) bases in 1979: they 
stood at Lm 15,117,000, of which 93.9 per cent were manufactured goods, in 1971 and 
rose to Lm136,830,000, of which 97.8 per cent were manufactures, in 1979. 
Table la: Enterprises and employment in manufacturing, quarrying and 
construction 1971,1979 














300 + Total 
1971 Enterprises 1,928 351 181 149 46 27 11 11 2,704 
% 71.3 13.0 6.7 5.5 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.4 100 
1979 Enterprises 1,660 150 118 105 51 37 11 15 2,147 
% 77.3 7.0 5.5 4.9 2.4 1.7 0.5 0.7 100 
Variance Enterprises (268) (201) (63) (44) 5 10 0 4 (557) 
% (13.9) (57.3) (34.8) (29.5) 10.9 37.0 0 36.4 (20.6) 
Source: Abstract of Statistics 1972, Valletta: Central Office of Statistics, p. 143; Abstract of Statistics 
1983, Valletta: Central Office of Statistics, p. 152. 
3 Part of this shift is due to changes in the definitions of migrants for statistical purposes. 
4 From 1947 to August 1971, the Malta Pound was pegged at par with the British Pound Sterling. 
Between 25 August and 10 September 1971, the Malta Lira was set at a premium of 5 per cent over the 
Pound. This was reduced to 2.5 per cent between 11 September and the end of June 1971. As of 1 July 
1971 to 2005, the value of the Malta Lira was determined by a trade-weighted basket of currencies. 
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As illustrated in Table la, in 1971, out of 2,704 establishments in manufacturing, 
quarrying and construction, 71.3 per cent employed 5 persons or less, while 1.8 per 
cent had a workforce larger than 100. Eight years later, out of 2,147 establishments, 
77.3 per cent employed 5 persons or less, while the segment of enterprises employing 
more than 100 persons grew to 2.9 per cent. In absolute terms, the number of 
establishments employing 100 and more increased by 28.6 per cent from 49 in 1971 
to 63 in 1979, although the total number of establishments decreased by 20.6 per cent 
from 2,704 to 2,147. On the other hand, the major drop was registered in the 
relatively medium-sized enterprises (from 727 to 425), while the number of self- 
employed and micro enterprises also dropped in absolute terms (from 1,927 to 1,669) 
despite the overall increase of the category as a percentage of the total number of 
enterprises. 
As will be observed in detail in Chapter 3.0 (The Fordist regulation context, the 
object of investigation and the main theses), `satellite companies' - as wholly- 
owned subsidiaries of multinational companies were referred to in early annual 
reports of the Malta Development Corporation (henceforth MDC)5 - were attracted to 
Malta well before Labour's electoral victory in 1971. Indeed, at least two of them 
(Malta Rubber Ltd. of the UK's Dowty Group producing O-rings and Bluebell Ltd of 
North Carolina's Bluebell, manufacturing denim garments) started operations in 
Malta even before the birth of the MDC, whose first annual report announced that the 
"... Board approved projects sponsored by Maltese, American, British, Italian, 
German and Canadian interests. To Malta Rubber Ltd. (Dowry Group) and Bluebell 
Ltd. can now be added other firms with an international reputation including Plessey 
Ltd., GKN Ltd., South Wales Switchgear Ltd. (subsidiary of Aberdare Holdings) and 
Klinger Manufacturing Co. Ltd. " (MDC 1968: 5). 
In fact, it was in the wake of their report, 1959 Governor Major-General Sir Robert 
Laycock promulgated the Island's first incentives' package, the Aids to Industry 
Ordinance6, the principal provisions of which (fiscal incentives, exemption from 
Set up by an Act of Parliament in 1967. 
6"To encourage the establishment or development of industrial undertakings and to make provision for 
various aids thereto", January 1,1959. 
http: //docs. justice. gov. mt/lom/legislation/en lish/le vol 4/chaptl59. pdf 
6 
customs' duties on imported raw materials, parts and components for outward 
processing as well as on all industrial capital goods, highly subsidised factory space in 
government owned industrial estates, grants) were generally kept (with several 
adjusting amendments and with the exception of grants which were removed for a 
number of years and then re-introduced) until EU accession in 2004 (or, by special 
derogation, up to 2008 in the case of some tax incentives) at which point most of them 
had to be scrapped inasmuch as they were incompatible with EU state-aid rules. The 
1988 Industrial Development Act superseded the 1959 Ordinance but did not 
substantially alter its provisions. It is only with the Business Promotion Act of 2000, 
that the responsible minister was empowered to abolish existing incentives to the 
extent that these were EU-incompatible and to do so at the opportune time without 
recourse to parliament. 
Before 1971, satellite operations were isolated instances of medium to large-scale 
industrial production in a sea of micro and small enterprises. The emphasis, prior to 
the change of government in 1971, was not on attracting mainly or exclusively large 
foreign projects. "In terms of the directives from Government in force before October 
1971, the Corporation was expected to assist both small and large units and the range 
of employment in aided industries varied from 30 firms employing ten persons or less, 
to five firms employing 351 persons or over. " (MDC 1971: 15). 
As if to distance themselves from the previous government, the authors of the 1971 
MDC report note that, although Nationalist government directives had made no 
distinction between small (local market oriented) and large (export oriented) projects, 
the Board had in any case taken the initiative of "employing a more selective 
approach in the approval of projects, particularly tying financial assistance to export 
performance" (MDC 1971: 2). It was, however, the new Labour government that 
directed MDC to go for large, export oriented projects: "With the change of 
Government in mid-1971 it became necessary to adopt a new policy which purports to 
identify products which can be manufactured profitably in Malta by large industrial 
concerns; the assistance provided would be by way of equity participation, customs 
duty exemption, subsidised factories, availability of trainable labour and access to 
growing markets in Europe and Africa" (MDC 1971: 2). 
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More explicitly: "The new Administration reviewed the industrial incentives policy 
and, on 7`h October 1971 issued new directives designed towards the attraction to 
Malta of the larger type of industrial units capable of carrying on production without 
the need of financial assistance and tax holidays. As a result of the new incentives, 
the Corporation's Research Unit has been preparing feasibility studies in sufficient 
detail to encourage promoters to avail themselves of the abundance of existing labour 
skills, and of adaptable and trainable labour force which would considerably cut 
down their costs of production as experienced in their own countries" (MDC 1971: 
5). 
This trend, with its clearly articulated preference for large export-oriented (and 
therefore almost always foreign-owned) projects, characterised the directives given to 
MDC by all three Labour governments between 1971 and 1987. It contrasts sharply 
with the widespread and politically effective fiction propagated by the Nationalist 
opposition and later Nationalist governments, that Labour was inward and import- 
substitution oriented, whereas the Nationalist Party was outward and export-oriented. 
This issue will be revisited in Chapter 3.0. Meanwhile, however, the reader is 
directed to Chapter 5.0 (A survey of SME-support organisations in the context of 
different variants of national Fordism) of this study to the observation that - as 
evidenced by the replies of German respondent organisation to the survey 
questionnaire - some stakeholders in Germany "are highly critical of German social- 
democratic government, which they claim gives more importance to larger 
enterprises" (see Chapter 5.0). That European parties of the Left are, when in 
government, accused of favouring large industrial enterprises is not surprising and fits 
in well with the historical profile of European Fordist-Keynesian socio-economic 
regulation. The same resentment against Labour's preference for large export- 
oriented enterprises earned it criticism from SMEs seeking assistance from MDC in 
the 1970s and 1980s and from the General Retailers and Traders Union (henceforth 
GRTU) during the short-lived Labour administration of 1996-1998 as explained in 
Chapter 6.0 (Stakes and stakeholders: The case of Malta's Institute for the 
Promotion of Small Enterprise). 
In his above quoted speech of December 1977 to the CBI in London, Mintoff insisted 
on "the stability of the reforms" Labour governments of 1971 and 1976 had "been 
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able to introduce" (Mintoff 1977). This stability was the result of a carefully 
constructed Fordist equilibrium. On one hand there was a relentless drive to enhance 
productivity through labour-cost-competitiveness by means of measures such as 
increasing the number of statutory working days a year, discouraging sick-leave and 
absenteeism, practically eliminating loss of working time through industrial action by 
co-opting the largest trade union - the General Workers' Union - in government and 
promoting workers' self-management in public sector enterprises such as the 
Dockyard. On the other hand, there was the implementation of a robust social 
programme aimed at rendering the development process more endurable for the 
working class and at containing the inevitable social tensions that such a process 
inevitably entails. The national minimum wage and the annual statutory bonus, both 
of which were introduced in the last quarter of 1974 (see Table lb), together with a 
children's allowance for the first 3 children under 16 years of age (rising from 
Lml. 00 weekly in 1974 when it was introduced to Lm5.80 in 1980), social assistance 
benefits (rising from a maximum weekly payment of Lm3.77,5 to a household of 5 
persons in 1971 to Lm18.49 in 1980) and a non-contributory old age pension (rising 
from a maximum weekly rate of Lm 3.75 for a married couple in 1971 to Lm18.30 in 
1980), constituted the material foundations of the social equilibrium referred to above. 
Table 1b: National minimum wage and statutory bonus (Lm weekly rates) 1974- 
1980 
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977 1978 1979 1979 1980 1980 
Minimum 
wage 












Bonus 0.38,5 0.69,2 0.92,3 1.15,4 1.15,4 1.38,5 1,53.8 1.53,8 1.76,9 1.76,9 
Total 10.38,5 12.69,2 14.17,3 15.90,4 17.03,4 18.76,5 20.41,8 21.41,8 23.64,9 24,64.9 
Source: Economic Survey 1980, Valletta: Economic Division, Office of the Prime Minister. p. 81 
That this Fordist social equilibrium `worked' well for at least a decade and made 
Malta attractive to multinationals seeking a location in which to establish peripheral 
extensions of their workbenches, is evident from data on gross and net output, wages 
and salaries and exports. Whereas gross output grew by 527 per cent between 1971 
and 1982, net output increased by 551 per cent. Wages and salaries grew faster than 
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both - by 594 per cent. Expenditure on materials and fuel grew by 499 per cent. Per 
capita wages and salaries in manufacturing industry expanded by 469%. Gross 
output per capita grew by 414 per cent and net output per capita by 434%. Domestic 
exports of industrial goods and manufactures grew by 944 per cent. Given that the 
overwhelming bulk of these were produced by foreign-controlled operations - Brincat 
(2006) estimates that the proportion of exports to total production was 70 per cent in 
1971 and 82 per cent in 1986 - the growth in exports can be safely taken as a proxy 
for the level or degree of engagement of transnational capital in the Maltese economy. 
The fact that wages and salaries grew faster than net output as a whole (of which they, 
along with profits, are the major component), at total and per capita levels, indicates 
that the earnings of labour grew faster than those of capital. The fact that exports 
continued to grow suggests that the expansion in economic activity was sufficient to 
accommodate both labour and the foreign direct investor, thus maintaining Malta's 
attractiveness for transnational capital. This is clear evidence of the success of the 
Fordist socio-economic regulation system that facilitated, or indeed made possible, 
the vigorous peripheral accumulation Malta experienced in the 1970s and 1980s -a 
system that has been in crisis since then but whose inertia continues to be felt to this 
day. 
Upon these foundations, the Labour governments of 1971 to 1987 (as the Fordist 
institutional intermediary between the working class and - mainly foreign - capital) 
constructed the institutional and ideological superstructure necessary to carry the 
weight of the ponderous Fordist edifice. The social and political efficacy of this 
superstructure was sufficient to enable the edifice to withstand sixteen years of stress. 
On one hand, this was caused by exogenous factors such as relations with Britain and 
NATO before the signature of the renewed bases agreement and the `acceptance' of 
Malta's neutrality and non-alignment, the Mediterranean issue at the Helsinki 
conference on European security and cooperation, international terrorism, the clash 
with Libya over the `median line' between the two states and, last but not least, the 
oil-price shocks. 
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On the other hand, there were internal contradictions. On the forefront was the 
irreducible contraposition of labour and capital within the Fordist `compromise' and 
the opposition towards Labour's Fordist promotion of export-led foreign-direct- 
investment-driven capitalist development (Sklair's ELIFFIT path, 1988) from the side 
of a conservative social bloc. This conservative alliance was made up of the 
traditional merchant capitalists, a broad range of self-employed, the rural small- 
holding tenant, together with land and immovable property owners including the 
Catholic Church. 
The social and political efficacy of this institutional and ideological superstructure 
was increasingly less adequate in the 1980s. That the Labour Party obtained a 
minority of votes at the 1981 elections and succeeded in clinging on to power thanks 
only to an electoral system that made it possible for a party to win a majority of seats 
in parliament with a minority of votes, was a clear sign that the Fordist system of 
socio-economic regulation set up to make possible peripheral accumulation in a 
former colonial fortress economy, was no longer adequate to its tasks. 
The "guiding fiction" (as used in Shumway 1991) of the peripheral-capitalist socio- 
economic regulation system that the Maltese Labour Party had so fervently 
championed and that Labour governments had so ably engineered, as an almost 
`socialist' `third way', as - in Mintoff's words -a "real mixed economy" ("in other 
words, " he explained in 1977, "we don't have a communist economy or a purely 
socialist economy"'), no longer mobilised its traditional working class base of mass 
support (Mintoff 1977). Moreover, it further alienated the floating middle classes - 
including the self-employed and the owner-managers of small and medium enterprise 
(henceforth SMEs) - sectors that Labour needed to stay in government. Without an 
effectively hegemonic culture that moulds and is in turn moulded by identity (Hall 
7 From the already quoted London speech of 8 December 1977. The author is in possession of a 
photostatic copy of the uncorrected transcription taken from a tape recording of the proceedings of the 
event, sent by the Malta Development Corporation's London representative E. S. Taylor to the 
Corporation's chairman Joseph Cassar, successful vintner and wine merchant, chairman of the 
Marsovin group, as well as a personal friend of Dom Mintoff, on 19 December 1977. Mintoff, in his 
speech, refers to Cassar, who also attended the meeting and addressed the audience, as living proof that 
Malta was not "a communist economy or a purely socialist economy. I suppose my friend on my left is 
sufficient evidence of that". The changing fortunes of the appellation `socialist' in the vocabulary of 
the Malta Labour Party deserve a separate study. 
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1997), a crisis of regulation had become inevitable. As a matter of fact, Labour was 
swept away from office at the 1987 elections. 
1.2 The theoretical scope of the study: Origins, structure and crisis of the 
Fordist socio-economic regulation system under the conditions of peripheral 
accumulation 
The success obtained during this period of conversion from a fortress economy into 
what has been very aptly referred to as one national export-processing zone (Brincat 
2006), would not have been possible without an effective mode of socio-economic 
regulation. Firstly, this mode prevented the project from floundering under the weight 
of its own contradictions, and, secondly, it mobilised (in the sense of Germani 1965, 
1981) Maltese society, especially the working class, to support the conditions 
necessary for export-led, foreign-direct-investment-driven, dependent, peripheral 
development. 
This mode of regulation corresponds to what is referred to as `Fordist' in the classic 
formulation by Gramsci (1934,1975: 2139-2140) and in the sociological and 
political-economic literature, especially that of the regulationist variant of Fordist 
theory (see Aglietta 1979, Lipietz 1987, Jessop 1997). More specifically it would 
appear to correspond to the type of socio-economic regulatory mechanism that has 
been referred to as `peripheral Fordist' (Peck and Tickell 1994: 286,287). This study 
provides a regulationist reading of the Maltese case as well as an occasion to revisit 
critically the regulationist paradigm and, specifically, the - as yet theoretically crude 
notion - of a peripheral Fordism. 
In Chapter 2.0 (Origins, structure and crisis of peripheral Fordism in Malta), 
after dealing briefly with the practical and theoretical implications of Malta's micro- 
characteristics (supplemented by the illustration of the main political players in 
Appendix II), we engage critically and systematically with `peripheral Fordism' as a 
conceptual tool with a view to enhancing its concrete analytical usefulness when used 
to come to grips with concrete situations in the periphery of the capitalist world 
economy. The following paragraphs limit themselves to introduce those key 
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theoretical issues that highlight the relevance of this case study on Malta for the 
further development of regulation theory, as well as the theoretical terms of reference 
of the case study itself. 
With roots traceable back to the end of World War I, the Maltese experience began in 
the 1950s, flourished in the 1970s and entered into crisis in the early 1980s. This 
critical phase is, in a sense, still ongoing. In this author's view, attempts to grasp the 
specificity of socio-economic regulation in this globally critical phase of the Fordist 
mechanism in terms of something called post-Fordism, have, to date, been empirically 
and epistemologically unsatisfactory, regardless of the chronological and 
geographical scope of the attempt. 
Post-Fordism appears to be understood as that period which follows chronologically 
fast in the heels of Fordism's floruit epoch. It is characterised by lineages that are 
partly extrapolated from features of often geographically circumscribed regions that 
do not appear to `fit' into the classic Fordist paradigm, and partly a reflection of the 
authors' own ideological inclinations, say an idealist or Polanyist predilection for a 
downsized world (see Vella 2006) without Big States and Big Corporations. It 
appears to be an ideological construction reeking with nostalgia for an early 
capitalism dominated by small entrepreneurs, typical of the individualist world-view 
of the petty bourgeoisie, the self-employed, the owner-manager of an SME, as well as 
white-collar employees in public sector employment with delusions of life-long 
economic security sometimes encouraged by savings and ownership of modest 
portfolios of bonds and shares. 
Globalisation has made the regulation and accumulation crisis of the greater 
economies critical for the whole world economy and, consequentially, for all 
economies great and small. Hence the inability of Fordism as an explanatory 
paradigm within which the national state and the national economy play a central and 
irreducible role, to come to terms with the protracted crisis of its own theoretical 
object. If the Fordist paradigm cannot explain the crisis of Fordism other than in 
terms of the presence of features that were previously absent (or invisible in terms of 
that particular paradigm), the post-Fordist approach cannot explain the crisis of 
Fordism other than in terms of an ideologically constructed `opposite' of Fordism. 
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In the manner of philosophy, which, in the words of Hegel, like the owl of Minerva 
takes flight at dusk, at the end of a civilisation's highest moment, this study begins 
with an investigation of a phenomenon that emerges, globally and historically, at the 
end of Fordist epoch of capitalism, or, at least, at a time of Fordism in crisis. This 
phenomenon is the promotion of SME development as, at least in appearance, a 
reaction to the failure of large enterprise (in peripheral conditions, read `mainly 
multinational enterprises') to keep its part of the bargain in the context of Fordist 
partnership between the state and itself. This bargain takes the form of stable and full 
employment in the national jurisdiction within which the enterprise is fiscally 
domiciled, and of a positive contribution to public finances through the payment of 
corporate and other taxes (when all or part of these are not waived as part of the 
state's own part of the bargain) and its contribution as employer towards its 
employees' national insurance. From this point of view, SME promotion coincides 
with the post-Fordist preferential commitment towards SMEs and with the post- 
Fordist critique of the Fordist preferential commitment towards large enterprise. 
Chapter 5.0 (A survey of SME-support organisations in the context of different 
variants of national Fordism), illustrates the results of an empirical study carried out 
by means of a questionnaire amongst forty-one organisations from nine different 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malta, Poland, Tunisia, United Kingdom 
and the United States of America). 
The Maltese case is studied separately and mainly by means of the author's direct 
participant observation of the research, organisational and political work leading to 
the setting up of the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise (IPSE) and the 
first months of its existence. The observations are presented in Chapter 6.0 (Stakes 
and stakeholders: The case of Malta's Institute for the Promotion of Small 
Enterprise). 
The methodologies used to carry out both studies are illustrated in Chapter 4.0 
(Methodologies). 
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The international survey and the in-depth study on Malta were superimposed, as it 
were, on the eightfold typology of national Fordisms proposed - albeit in outline form 
- by Peck and Tickell: classical, flexible, blocked, state, delayed, peripheral, primitive 
and hybrid (Peck and Tickell 1994: 286,287). 8 The response to the questionnaire by 
national organisations committed to SME promotion and development was tested for 
`fit' with the attitude towards SMEs that the authors of the typology would have 
expected to prevail in the countries in each of the eight categories. In fact, the 
countries chosen for the survey were mainly those given as examples of each category 
by Peck and Tickell. Malta was placed by the author in the category of peripheral 
Fordism. An interview with Professor Adam Tickell (reported here as Appendix I), 
where he was asked to comment on the structures, the role of SMEs and SME 
promotion in the countries chosen by him and Peck as examples of the proposed eight 
national variants of Fordism, yielded more material for the analysis of fit between the 
results of the survey and Peck and Tickell's own pre-conception of attitudes to SMEs 
and SME promotion in each ideal-typical variant. 
The superimposition of the two revealed a remarkably good qualitative fit between 
Peck and Tickell's pre-conceptions and attitudes and facts on the ground in each of 
the nine countries. What variances were observed consisted, as it were, in 
quantitative differences of emphasis and intensity. 
The two interlocking theses of this study, focusing on the interpretation of the IPSE 
experiment as an inadequate attempt to address the crisis of Fordist system which had 
yielded important results in previous years, are illustrated in Chapter 3.0. The 
characteristics of the progressive social bloc put together by Mintoffs Labour 
government, its dissolution and 'New' Labour's attempt to resolve the resulting crisis 
by means of a technical project such as IPSE are duly analysed and critically 
reviewed. 
The theses aim at identifying the characteristics that can make SME promotion 
policies in a peripheral economy, sustainable and effective. To this effect the case of 
Malta, where no socio-economic regulatory system replaced the breakdown of the 
A first version of these variants can be traced back in Tickell and Peck (1992). 
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Fordist institutional fix that made the country's industrialisation possible during the 
1970s and the first half of the 1980, is of interest. 
These theses are then re-examined in Chapter 7.0 (Provisional conclusions), where 
the findings of the survey as presented and discussed in Chapter 5.0 together with the 
IPSE case study (Chapter 7.0) are confronted with the issues highlighted in this first 
chapter, in the light of the theoretical arguments developed in Chapter 2.0 and 
Chapter 3.0 with a view to distilling conclusions on mechanisms of social and 
economic regulation applicable to extended accumulation in peripheral conditions. 
This is done with an eye on the further research required to chart possible escape 
routes from the vulnerability and fragility of dependent lumpen-development - to 
borrow Andre Gunder Frank's expression - that peripheral economies appear 
condemned to. 
One thing is certain and can therefore be already clearly stated at the outset: post- 
Fordism - as both a vision of an alternative world and as a conceptual tool to 
understand this real world - is more part of the problem than of the solution. 
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Chapter 2.0 Origins, structure and crisis of peripheral Fordism in Malta 
"... regulation and crisis are linked as intimately as two sides of a coin" 
Robert Boyer 
Fordist socio-economic regulation in Malta flourished between 1971 (with the 
election of the first post-independence Labour government) and 1979 (the second oil 
shock). During this period, there was a successful shift in direct and indirect 
employment with British military establishments to employment with export led, 
foreign direct investment driven industries. Employment in manufacturing increased 
by 1.7 times between 1971 and 1979 whilst exports (of which 97.8 per cent consisted 
in manufactured products) increased by more than nine times in the same period. With 
an insignificant domestic market, most manufacturing products were exported. 
Foreign direct investment originating from Europe (initially from Britain but then 
increasingly from West Germany) and the US took place in mechanical engineering, 
electrical and electronic machinery, rubber and plastics but also - decreasingly - in 
garments, textiles and footwear. 
This chapter will analyse the experience and crisis of the country's system from a 
Post-Fordist perspective, thus introducing the main task of this project. This will be 
followed by an illustration of the conceptual toolbox that will be used to tackle it, 
together with the outline of other relevant concepts. 
2.1 The foundations of 'a sovereign, self-governing, export processing zone' 
Malta - until 1964 a British colony and a ]European Union member since 2004 - has 
been aptly described as "a sovereign, self-governing, export processing zone" and its 
industrial development as "a programme of export-led industrialisation, fuelled by 
foreign direct investment and by imported technology" (Brincat 2006). This model of 
development has proved to be politically highly resistant. It has survived a number of 
momentous political changes over its almost half a century of operation. Its 
beginnings precede independence and it has survived otherwise very different 
political seasons, including EU accession. 
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Britain's declared intention to close down the naval dockyard - thereby making 
around 42,000 unemployed - led to the Maltese Parliament's historic Break with 
Britain Resolution of December 1957, with the Nationalist opposition voting with the 
government side, and to the resignation of the Labour government in April 1958. The 
resolution threatened a break with Britain unless its government maintained its 
commitment not to close down its establishments on the Island before it found 
alternative jobs for its employees. As Labour and trade union supporters took to the 
streets and the opposition refused the Governor's request to form a government, the 
former declared a state of emergency and a Royal Instruction gave him full powers of 
direct rule. This implied the suspension of the Mac Michael Constitution of 1947 
with its provision of a Maltese self-government whose responsibilities excluded 
'reserved matters' namely, defence and foreign treaties, aviation and cartography, the 
dockyard, emigration, visas, nationality and passports, censorship of mail and 
telecommunications. ' 
Nevertheless, a few months later the Governor published Malta's first Development 
Plan, covering the period 1959-1964. The Plan adopted Balogh and Seers' foreign 
direct investment led and export-driven model. Given the authors' relationship to ,, 
him, this model could, equally well be referred to as Mintoff s model, nevertheless 
without the integration, component. This was immediately followed by the 
promulgation of a package of incentives, the Aids to' Industries Ordinance of April 
1959., This included duty exemptions on imported raw materials and capital goods, 
tax holidays, grants and soft loans and subsidised factory buildings. 
A London-based Industrial Development Board was set up - with Lord Hives, 
formerly chairman of Rolls-Royce, as its first chairman - to give strategic direction to 
Malta-based Aids to Industries Board tasked with the administration of the Ordinance. 
The Colonial power opted for industrialisation without a corresponding consensual 
regulation mechanism and goes for repressive regulation, that is without an 
intermediary institution. 
A background note to the main historical players mentioned in this chapter is given in Appendix II. 
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With the adoption of an objectively retrograde constitution in 1962 - based on the 
Singapore constitution of 1958 - elections could again be held. With the Church 
declaring a vote for Labour as a sin, the Nationalist Party won. In 1964 it obtained 
what the Labour opposition condemned as a humiliating independence from Britain 
and was again returned to power in 1966, once more with the threat of mortal sin 
weighing heavily on voters intending to cast their vote for Labour. 
In 1967 the Maltese Parliament passed legislation setting up the Malta Development 
Corporation (MDC), the government's sole development and investment promotion 
agency, with the express mission to take over from the Industrial Development and 
Aids to Industries' Boards, and give top priority to export-oriented foreign direct 
investment. The MDC survived for about 45 years until it was fused with the Malta 
External Trade Corporation (METCO) and the Institute for Small Enterprise (IPSE) - 
both of which were originally MDC offshoots - to form Malta Enterprise. MDC's 
role throughout the 33 years of existence under this name has been critical for the 
`success' of the foreign direct investment led and export driven model. The 
Association Agreement with the European Communities of 1970 (effective in 1971) 
with its provision of duty free entry for goods manufactured in Malta into the 
Common Market, gave a great impetus to incoming foreign direct investment and 
exports, a policy that was enthusiastically embraced by the Labour governments of 
1971-1976,1976-1981,1982-1987 and 1996-1998. 
2.2 Mintoff's Fordist regulation system 
Mintoff s election in 1971, once the 'politico-religious battle' was called off, and the 
Church and Labour made 'peace', left a remarkable effect. He requested, and was 
readily granted, permission by London to replace Sir Maurice Dorman with a Maltese 
Governor General, Sir Anthony Mamo. This was followed by the closure of NATO 
bases, and the revision of the Defence and Financial Treaty with Britain which was 
concluded with a hefty increase in annual rent for British bases until their closure in 
1979. Mintoff made effective use of the Libyan, Soviet and Chinese cards to wrest a 
better deal from Britain and NATO for financial assistance so as to make up for 
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Malta's loss of income from rent of military facilities establishments and installations 
as well as for redundancies this would cause. The Labour Prime Minister adopted a 
populist and third-worldist international posture, which included the declaration of 
Malta's neutrality and non-alignment. A thorough nationalisation process took place. 
This included the banking sector (Barclays and Lombard), telecommunications (Cable 
and Wireless), broadcasting (Rediffusion) and energy. 
In an evident attempt to establish the Fordist conditions for production, the extent of 
which is illustrated by his 1977 speech to the CBI (see Chapter 1.0), he continued by 
setting up state-owned enterprises in - amongst other sectors - civil aviation, shipping 
and grain storage. He then went on to establish the Republic in 1974. 
Nevertheless, none of these ever even dented a development policy based on the 
fundamental primacy of foreign direct investment and exports. A look at the growth 
of exports between 1950 and, 1985 shows that these increased by 283 per cent 
between 1970 (one year before beginning of Labour's 16 years in government) and 
1975, by 161 percent between 1975 and 1980, and by 12 per cent between 1980 and 
1985 (two years before Labour's 1987 defeat). 
Labour's policies of import substitution, bulk-buying and barter trade with centrally 
planned economies, were many times used as an indication that Mintoff wanted to 
take Malta down the communist trail.. This author subscribes with Vella's position 
(1989,1994) that these were no deviations from a pragmatic and energetic 
commitment to promoting the development of foreign direct investment (FDI)-led and 
export-driven capitalism. Labour was just trying to cajole the Maltese entrepreneurial 
class to move from its traditional involvement in import and distribution into 
manufacturing. It was hoped, as did many elsewhere in an obviously "unlocal" 
strategy (Peck and Tickell 1994: 284) that infant industries based on captive local 
markets would later become export-oriented. This was, accompanied by measures 
intended to stimulate internal demand. In any case, the small local market and state 
direct involvement in industry never played a significant role in the productive sector. 
FDI did. 
The 1971-1987 Labour governments put in place a regulatory system consisting of: 
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(a) Co-option of the trade unions in government with a view to creating consensus and 
mobilization amongst workers in foreign owned Fordist `extended work bench' 
industries (increasingly female) for the industrialisation project whilst containing the 
inevitable internal contradictions. 
(b) Workers' self-management in large pre-Fordist public sector enterprises such as 
the former Admiralty dockyard (essentially male and militant workers). 
(c) Increasing number of working days a year. 
(d) Authoritarian measures to curb absenteeism. 
(e) Imposing a wage (and price) freeze in a particularly critical conjuncture. 
Ironically, Labour governments and the media supporting them never made a 
sustained effort to counter taunts by the opposition that they were steering `Catholic 
and western Malta' towards a socialist or outright communist destination. On the 
contrary they presented these unsympathetic reports as 'evidence' that the Labour 
party (or `movement', to indicate what was then a statutory alliance with the powerful 
General Workers Union) was indeed a genuinely people's instrument of social 
progress. 
This encouragement of a `false consciousness' is understandable in view of the 
contradictory tasks facing Labour's leadership in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
It had to promote a viable and effective development of capitalism whilst 
simultaneously satisfying the demands of its working class base for jobs and a higher 
standard of living. To have refuted the image of a maverick leftist and third-worldist 
radicalism - an image that `stuck' to Mintoff to this day and contributed decisively to 
his charisma in Malta and internationally - would have run the risk of delegitimating 
Labour in the eyes of its working class base. The threat of delegitimisation with its 
own mass support base was ever present throughout Labour sixteen years in power 
between 1971 and 1987. The 'perverse' (as it was then conceded to be) result of the 
1981 general elections, whereby the Labour party won a majority of seats - and 
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therefore legally won the contest - with a minority of votes, forcefully reminded its 
leadership of the reality of this threat. 
Labour's mass base, consisting mainly of the traditional urban blue-collar working 
class, with the workers of the former HM Dockyard as its proud shock-troops, and 
former British Services civilian employees and locally enlisted uniformed personnel, 
voted the Nationalist Party out of government in 1971. They did so even though 
`their' Labour party was evidently going to play a game of objectively dangerous 
brinkmanship with London and NATO. The livelihood of the overwhelming majority 
of Labour supporters in the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s depended on direct 
and indirect employment with UK Services and NATO. They voted for Mintoff who 
was threatening to `go elsewhere to get a better deal'. He had already tested their 
resolve to vote for Labour at any cost in the past. They had in fact voted Labour in 
the 1961 and 1966 elections although this meant committing `mortal sin' and `eternal 
damnation', a terrible and tremendous choice for the then staunchly Catholic Maltese. 
Mintoff was now asking them to gamble their jobs for an uncertain future. 
Nevertheless, not voting Labour also meant that the British could in any case 
eventually dismantle their bases and their naval dockyard completely and leave. The 
almost continuous haemorrhage of jobs since the end of the war was a constant 
reminder that 'the , 
Queen' (as the Maltese almost universally liked to personify Britain 
and the Empire) could no longer afford a global military presence and therefore could 
no longer guarantee a lifelong employment or other gainful occupation. Thus, 
although losing their jobs would have meant packing their bags and joining those who 
had already emigrated in their thousands to Australia and Canada, voting for Labour 
was by no means a reassuring alternative. 
Mintoff, who had failed to obtain full integration with metropolitan Britain as a final 
solution to Malta's peripheral status and its economic consequences, was proposing to 
tell Britain that although it would have to leave in any case at the end of an agreed 
period and according to an agreed time-table, it would in the meantime have to pay 
much more for the rent of its bases. He was also telling his core voters that with the 
extra money he was proposing to wring out of Britain and NATO, he would somehow 
create alternative and more lasting sources of national wealth and employment than 
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Britain - whose empire was now evidently exiting the world stage - could ever 
guarantee. In other words, Labour's core voters knew that they were being asked to 
vote themselves out of a job that their fathers and grandfathers had always considered 
as secure in exchange of an allegedly better but ultimately as yet unspecified 
alternative. 
Another factor that is often ignored when considering the difficult choices facing 
Labour's mass base in the late 1960s and early 1970s is the fact that many working 
class families - densely concentrated in the urban accretions around the harbour - had 
British connections. 170 years of British presence meant that few workers had 
absolutely no family connections with the UK. Mintoff himself - although his own 
life-itinerary is by no means typical, the working class son of a civilian Royal Navy 
employee, he went on to become a Rhodes scholar - married an Englishwoman, 
Moira de Vere. Voting for Labour under these circumstances was no painless and 
light-hearted decision. These circumstances distinguished the post-war Maltese 
working class from other strata of Maltese society who had traditionally maintained a 
deliberate cultural distance from Britain, reflected in a nostalgic preference for Italy 
and - prior to the war - for fascism. 
The `sacrifice' that the Labour Party demanded of its followers required a tremendous 
and psychologically complex effort of mobilisation that found its expression in the 
Fordist regulation model adopted by the Labour governments of 1971,1976 and 1981. 
This model had worked well in the course of the first of these three legislatures, less 
well in the second one and was evidently in crisis throughout the third one to the 
extent that in this period the country was as close as it ever came to a civil war after 
1798-1800. 
Labour's efforts succeeded in establishing Malta as an internationally competitive 
platform for export-oriented foreign direct investment. Most major foreign-owned 
exporters, including the most important one, ST Microelectronics, first located in 
Malta under Labour administrations. At the same time, it failed miserably in 
convincing Maltese entrepreneurs to depart from their traditional propensity to stick 
to imports, distribution and retail with safety-valve investments in real estate and to 
invest in industry especially for export. When press-ganged into `producing' locally 
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what they had previously imported, they merely undertook very low added value., 
operations, typically substituting imports of retail-packaged goods with imports of the 
same goods in bulk, and packaging them in retail quantities locally. 
As soon as the import-substitution policy was lifted by Nationalist governments after 
1987, these entrepreneurs simply went back to importing, distributing and retailing. 
At the same time they started investing some of the super-profits they realised thanks 
to Labour's creation of monopoly situations within which they had operated, into 
speculative real estate operations, just in case Labour would one day come back. The 
only success was recorded in the tourism sector, where Maltese entrepreneurs did 
invest and with considerable success. Notable examples are the Tumas Group, Mose' 
Fenech and his sons, the Zahras and the Corinthia Group). 
2.3 The post-Fordist debate in Malta 
As a matter of fact, the failure to match the success achieved on the FDI front with 
success on the domestic investment front, soon crystallised into a classic dual 
economy situation with small traditional Maltese owned micro-enterprises limiting 
themselves, with a handful of exceptions, to producing for the local market (naturally 
protected manufacturers of customised and fitted furniture and kitchens as well as 
wooden or aluminium apertures are the classic examples), and technologically more 
dynamic foreign-owned medium sized and large enterprises producing almost 
exclusively for the foreign market. A quantitatively marginal middle group consisted 
of small manufacturers acting,, as outsourcers for exporters (tool-makers, plastic 
injection mould operators and garment producers are typical). This, unintended, by- 
product of the model underlying Malta's development since the end of the 1950s -a 
development mode characterised by its substantial continuity in spite of the many 
political changes the country has witnessed in its post second world war history, as 
Vella has emphasised in a seminal essay (Vella, 1994) - is one of the points being 
studied in this project. 
The interest in the development of small sized enterprises in the productive sector 
appears in Malta - as, generally speaking, elsewhere = when the category of medium 
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and large productive export-oriented enterprises, in Malta's case almost always 
foreign-owned, is in crisis or is losing dynamism and new foreign direct investment is 
slow in coming. The shift in focus towards SMEs, typical of the trends towards the 
"brave new world" (Hall 1989) examined in other chapters tends also to generate 
interest in export promotion aimed at small enterprises. Small locally-owned 
enterprise promotion and export promotion tend to emerge together with arguments to 
the effect that foreign medium and large firms are in any case already export-oriented 
and have little or no need of assistance with exports. Small locally-owned enterprises, 
however, need to be assisted to break out from the narrow limits of the domestic 
market. In Malta's case, this is normally part of a pessimist outlook for the prospects 
of investment promotion. This was certainly the case of the 1980-1983 period when 
rising oil prices (second oil shock) reduced incoming foreign direct investment to a 
trickle and crippled - although ultimately, thanks to the wage freeze, did not wipe out 
- even major existing exporters. The argument at that time was: if we cannot attract 
any new investors let us assist what we already have to export. 
Another, radically defeatist point of view that emerges in such conjunctures, is that 
which argues that one does not need worry because with the developed world already 
in a `post-industrial' stage, there is no point in attempting to promote industry, let 
alone making an effort to attract foreign direct investment in industry. To insist on 
the promotion of industrial development, we are told, is to exhibit a Marxist fixation 
with alleged iron laws of history that require a country to go through capitalist 
industrialisation before it can hope to emancipate itself from it. 
"There is a strong, Marxist-inspired prejudice against merchants as compared to 
industrialists, based on Marx's view that the merchant bourgeoisie delayed the rise of 
capitalism in Western Europe, and hence slowed down the march of history. But it 
can easily be argued that, in so doing, they toned down the inhumanity of the process 
and ensured a more equitable balance between the interests of the present and future 
generations. The f exibility of mind and other skills required to carry out a mediating 
economic function are plainly more humanly satisfying and self-reliant than the type 
of industry that has been set up in Malta in recent years. " (Serracino Inglott: 1980) 
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These words were written by a leading ideologist of the opposition Nationalist party 
in 1980, when the Labour government was desperate to contain the damage that the 
oil-price driven international economic crisis was inflicting on its efforts to attract 
industry to Malta in a bid to make up for the job losses resulting from the closure of 
British military bases only the year before. The convergence of this vaguely post- 
modem point of view with post-Fordist (or radically pre-Fordist) visions is 
remarkable. In his Alternative Future for Malta, Serracino Inglott pleads for a non- 
industrial future where the Fordist factory is replaced by a pre-capitalist utopia of 
small independent producers, cooperative farmers and merchants, and the Fordist state 
is replaced by a radically decentralised polity. 
It is also on such occasions that it dawns upon the policy maker that the productive 
economy is also made up of small enterprises but that there is a gap -a gap in 
technological and marketing capability - between the small enterprise inhabiting the 
space of the domestic-market oriented traditional economy and the medium and large , 
enterprise, foreign-owned and export-oriented. This was also certainly the case in the 
mid-1990s, when loss of competitiveness of existing export industry and scarce 
success on the investment promotion front, stimulated the now Nationalist 
government to support a proposal for a restructuring of industry as well as of the state, 
agency tasked with promoting industrial development namely, the MDC. The thrust . 
of the Rambell report to the Federation of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce - 
organisations that tend to under-represent foreign-owned export oriented industry - 
was that the Maltese government ought to prioritise small and medium sized 
enterprise in its industrial policy and to discourage further expansion of the larger 
foreign-owned companies. The Ramboll report, the written text but more pointedly 
the verbal interventions of the consultants in the course of the conversations with FOI, 
Chamber and MDC directors and staffers, had a distinctly post-Fordist flavour even if 
couched in a more pragmatic and more business oriented language than Serracino 
Inglott's above. The salient points of this report will be reviewed in Chapter 6.0. 
Before the Ramboll recommendations could be implemented, the Labour Party won 
the 1996 elections and was returned to power after nine years, out of it. During this 
period, although the Nationalist government did not give priority to industry, lack of 
any 'significant success in the services sector (success understood in terms of 
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absorption of unemployed people in sustainable jobs in the private sector) forced the 
Nationalist government to support existing foreign-owned exporters and to attempt to 
attract new ones. Meanwhile, therefore, MDC had continued with its traditional scale 
of priorities namely, priority attention was given to the foreign investor, existing and 
especially the potentially new. Under pressure from small entrepreneurs in the 
traditional sectors of production and industrial services (almost exclusively oriented to 
the local market), and conditioned by the MDC cadres who tended to explain their 
lack of any significant success in the preceding years under a Nationalist 
administration in the terms of tremendous competition from Eastern Europe and the 
Far East, the Labour government emphasised that it would give not less attention and 
priority to the small Maltese entrepreneur than it would give to the foreign investor 
(see Chapter 6.0). 
2.4 Considerations on Malta's Fordist crisis 
Concluding this brief summary highlighting the origins, structure and crisis of Malta's 
peripheral Fordism, one can make a number of observations. First of all, the Maltese 
economy and society under the Mintoff governments of 1971,1976 and 1981 
exhibited the defining characteristics of a Fordist regulation mechanism understood, 
in the manner of Aglietta (1979) and Lipietz (1985,1987), as a complex but 
functionally coherent set of economic, social, cultural and political practices 
extending from the workplace to the state and civil society. This served to ensure 
sufficient stability and mobilisation during what Gramsci referred to as the 'long 
process' of development of modem industrial capitalism. 
It can also be observed that the dependent nature of the development of capitalism in 
Malta gave Malta's Fordist regulation model a distinctly peripheral character. This 
capitalist process was characterised by the absence of a national industrial 
bourgeoisie, of an entrepreneurial class with the financial and political clout, the 
technical skills and the culture to industrialise the country and to create the social and 
political conditions of existence of such a development, by the dominance of a 
socially and politically influential class of indigenous merchant capitalists principally 
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active in the field of importation and distribution, and by the primacy of an extended- 
workshop type of foreign direct investment. 
The necessity of Fordism in the peripheries is the consequence of the crisis of Fordist 
regulation in the advanced cores of the world economy and of the resulting 
intensification of foreign direct investment from the cores to the peripheries. 
Simultaneously with experimentation with other (post-Fordist) forms of socio- 
economic, cultural and political regulatory organisation in the cores, foreign direct 
investment in the periphery brought with it the traditional Fordist superstructures that 
were now obsolete and, indeed, dysfunctional, in the cores. In the tradition of British 
and continental Social Democracy, the political agent of Keynesian-Fordist regulation 
policies in the British Isles and Europe (it is not unusual for continental authors to 
refer to "the Keynes-Fordist regulations of the Social Democratic era" (Latouche 
1969), Mintoffls Labour Party took up the role of executive guarantor of the 
regulatory needs of the development of industrial capitalism in the small territory for 
which it was politically responsible. He did so after trying, and failing, to integrate it 
with Britain -a move which could have eliminated a not insignificant obstacle to. 
industrialisation, the micro-size of the country. 
This role, however, could not if it was to be effective - be an identical re-run of the 
Fordist policies of continental Social Democracy and British Labour in the previous 
two decades. It had to be implemented according to the conditions typical of 
peripheral social formations whose capitalist development is necessarily dependent 
and subordinate to the structural requirements of capitalism in the centres of the world 
economy, as well as in accordance with the concrete and specific circumstances of 
Malta. 
2.5 Introducing the task and the conceptual tool box 
The Malta Development Corporation (MDC) was set up by an Act of Parliament three 
years after independence, in 1967. The MDC was to serve as 'a model national 
investment promotion agency for other newly independent Commonwealth states 
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such as, notably, Singapore, itself a small island state 
2. The Association Agreement 
with the European Communities of 1970 gave Malta the right to export locally 
manufactured goods to the European Common Market without incurring any duties, 
conditional upon these goods containing sufficient value added in Malta - over and 
above the value of imported raw materials, parts and components - for them to be 
deemed to be of Maltese origin. 
The following factors combined to attract foreign direct investment to Malta over the 
following decade: 
(1) free access to European markets (later on supplemented by the concession to 
Malta of duty free access for a large variety of Maltese products into the US under 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) arrangements), 
(2) the provisions of the Aids to Industry Ordinance, especially the exemptions from 
duty on imported raw materials,. 
(3) the presence on the labour market of an industrial reserve army of thousands of 
predominantly male workers with skills in metal fabrication, tool-making, mechanical 
Z Singapore - less than twice as big as Malta and, then, with a population of less than 1.9 million - 
parted ways with Malaysia on 9 August 1965. It was admitted to the United Nations on 21 September 
1965, joined the Commonwealth in 15 October 1965 and became a republic on 22 December 1965. The 
Economic Development Board EDB was restructured in 1968, followed in the same year by the setting 
up of the Jurong Town Corporation (location of the country's main industrial estate) and the 
Development Bank of Singapore. The passing of the 1968 Employment Act and the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act "to promote, " quoting Singapore's official website, "industrial peace and 
discipline among the workforce" (htti): //www. siý/explore/histoEy coming. htm), and the establishment, 
in 1970, of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, completed the basic institutional infrastructure of its 
development policy. EDB officials visited Malta in 1967-1968 for first-hand experience of the MDC's 
organization and modus operandi. 
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and electrical engineering, and capable of communicating in English, who had been 
made redundant by former Admiralty Dockyard, RAF and Army Workshops (and 
who had not yet emigrated to Australia and Canada), 
(4) the escalating cost of labour in Europe, especially in the metal trades, the most 
militantly unionised sector of the European working class, 
(5) the escalating cost of European steel, 
(6) a complex system of institutional compromises that ensured the co-option of the 
Maltese working class in a developmentalist project - the development of a peripheral 
capitalism in the absence of a national democratic industrial bourgeoisie - that 
required as an essential condition of its success not only their passive acquiescence 
but also their active political mobilisation. 
It is the latter factor that is best understood in terms of what, beginning with Aglietta's 
pioneering Regulation et crises du capitalisme in 1976 (1982,1997, English 1979), 
has become known as Regulation Theory, complemented by an array of other 
conceptual tools. The centrality of the regulationist paradigm for this study does not 
exclude recourse to other approaches that only superficially appear to be incompatible 
with it, indeed that can be integrated with it to produce a complex but coherent and 
powerful conceptual tool. MacCleod's, argument that a synthesis of a variety of _ 
perspectives including the regulation approach could enhance our understanding of 
regional development, of its uneveness, of the re-scaling of political structures and of 
the construction of its own images that it involves (2001), is especially appealing now 
that the country under consideration has become a member of the European Union, a 
state of affairs that may well facilitate its gradual industrial integration into ' an 
adjacent region, such as Sicily whose Etna valley electronics industrial cluster shares 
a principal transnational driver with Malta, ST Microelectronics. 3 Such a hypothesis, 
will not, however, be confronted in this study. Effectively what this author has done is 
to build upon previous work on the national-popular social bloc that supported 
capitalist dependent development in Malta in the Mintoff period (Vella 1979,1989, 
3 Associazione Studi e Ricerche per il Mezzogiorno, Le Regioni del Mezzogiorno: Focus sulle Economic Locali, Anno 3,2/2006 pp. 6-7 
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1994, whose approach is solidly in the Gramscian tradition but strongly influenced by 
Poulantzas and Laclau) within a regulationist framework, with a view to understand 
certain policy initiatives (particularly the setting up of short lived small enterprise 
promotion agency IPSE by a short-lived New Labour government in 1996-98) in the 
period of dissolution of the Maltese developmentalist regulation system. This is this 
author's specific contribution. 
The following conceptual tools complement the regulationist approach to inform and 
inspire this theoretically ecumenic study. 
2.5.1 Marx's notion of forms of labour's dependence on capital 
In his outline of a `general law of capitalist accumulation', Marx - referring to the 
wage-increases resulting from the changing organic composition of capital, from its 
"reproduction on a progressive scale, i. e., accumulation" (Marx 1877,1977: 575) - 
speaks of a "relaxation of the tension" of the "the golden chain the wage worker has 
already forged for himself' (Marx 1877,1977: 579-580). Marx's argument is quite 
simply that the fact that, under certain conditions of accumulation, the workers' 
"relation of dependence upon capital takes on a form endurable" - whereby a "larger 
part of their own surplus product, always increasing and continually transformed into 
additional capital, comes back to them in the shape of means of payment, so that they 
can extend the circle of their enjoyments; can make some additions to their 
consumption fund of clothes, furniture, &c., and can lay by small reserve funds of 
money" - in no way changes the fact that the relationship is one of dependence of 
labour on capital and that capital is the dominant factor in the relationship. "Instead 
of becoming more intensive with the growth of capital, this relationship of 
dependence only becomes more extensive, i. e., the sphere of capital's exploitation and 
rule merely extends with its own dimensions and the number of its subjects" (Marx 
1877,1977: 579). 
Marx does not elaborate on the `endurableness' of the condition of the working class, 
of the `form endurable' of its, dependence on capital, of the `relaxation of the tension' 
of the chain that binds it to capital. Having acknowledged and explained it in terms of 
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the inner evolution of capital, he is merely keen to put it aside. He did not 
contemplate the possibility - and he could not have, in all fairness, without 
transcending the objective conditions of his own time - that the state in capitalism 
might wish to promote an institutionalised `relaxation of the tension' between labour 
and capital. Also, he did not contemplate the possibility of `endurable' forms of class 
struggle - even and more so under less favourable conditions of accumulation than 
those considered by Marx in this text - precisely to prevent the escalation of conflict 
to the point where the very existence of capitalism would be jeopardised. He did not 
consider that the state might wish to compensate for market failure by promoting 
demand, and thus kick-start the economy back into `normal' functioning. 
These possibilities would have to wait around fifty years for Gramsci, with his . 
Americanism e Fordismo prison notebook of 1934, and for Keynes' The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money of 1936. On the one hand, Gramsci 
recognised in 
, 
the Fordist mechanism of socio-economic regulation a combination of 
force and persuasion: one in which trade unions would be co-opted and rendered 
acquiescent, where workers would enjoy higher real living standards, one whose 
ideological legitimacy would be embedded in cultural practices and social relations 
extending far beyond the workplace. Keynes, on the other hand, argued that when the 
economy is caught in a vicious circle of high unemployment and low demand, the 
state could intervene to push the economy into a virtuous cycle of high demand and 
high employment by stimulating an increase in demand. 
Building on the insights of Gramsci and Keynes, Fordism theorists have sought to 
explain a mechanism characterised by _"mass consumption, vertically organised 
production and standardized marketing, blue-collar work stability, the welfare re- 
distributive state and full employment Keynesian policies [that, JAI] has gone though 
a mutation with clear roots in the 1970s [when, JM] the post-World War II 
developmentalist project, firmly anchored in the Fordist paradigm, began showing 
cracks" (Valencia 2000: 1-2). 
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2.5.2 Gramsci's concepts of `historical bloc' (blocco storico) and 'hegemony' 
Gramsci is often invoked as a precursor by regulationists but the emphasis is 
invariably on his Americanismo e Fordismo rather than on his theoretically more 
fundamental political sociology' as this - albeit seminally - emerges from the 
`historic bloc' concept. Significantly, he originally constructed this concept to better 
explain the insertion and integration of the dominant class in the underdeveloped 
Mezzogiorno -a social formation with which Maltas shares common historical and 
cultural roots - in the emerging Italian national economy. `Hegemony', on the other 
hand, is what cements together the various elements of the historic bloc into one - 
necessarily unstable - whole. The `social formation' is a historically determined 
combination of historic blocs. Perkmann (1996: 2) has pinpointed the critical role of 
Gramsci's concept of `historical bloc' within the regulationist paradigm: 
"Hegemony precariously secures the `social structure' upon which regulation is 
based in a specific historical conjuncture: the process of regulation therefore 
acquires the character of an ensemble of hegemonic practices. To put it another way, 
such a `successful' link between hegemonic practices (as sedimented in institutional 
forms) and mode of regulation can be conceptualised in terms of the Gramscian 
`historical bloc' " 
2.5.3 The Althusserian concreteness of the regulationists 
The regulationist school - the "original Parisians"6 - are closer in their quest for 
concreteness to the PCI political economists than to the authors orbiting around 
Marxism Today, as will be illustrated later in this Chapter. The reason, we suggest, 
lies in the proximity of the Parisian regulationists to the concrete practices of the 
planning and implementation of regulation policies. in France not only in their 
s Gramsci is known to have taken an interest in developments in Malta, see his notes on the link 
between the founders of the Maltese nationalist party and the Partito Nazionale Italiano, Quaderni etc. 6 Jessop refers to them in this manner to distinguish them from the two other French regulation ist 
currents, namely that of Boccara of the PCF and the Grenoble-based GRREC. 
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academic and professional careers7, but also inasmuch as they all shared a common 
educational milieu that predisposed them to political concreteness. Lipietz8, in an 
interview of 1987 with Jane Jenson for French Politics and Society, is delightfully 
" candid about his belonging to what Pierre Bourdieu (1996) calls "the state nobility 
of France. 
" [... J we are all part of that group of French high civil servants who, from within the 
state apparatus, implemented the Fordist model in France. Afany of us, being 
polytechnicians - here I'm thinking of Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta, Bernard 
Billaudot, Hugues Bertrand, Jacques Mistral, and myself - worked in the institutions 
which were in charge of implementing the Fordist model in France after the Marshall 
Plan. These were places like the Commissariat General du Plan, INSEE, and 
Direction de la Prevision du Ministere des Finances. " (Jenson 1987) 
Founded in 1794, the Ecole Polytechnique, a state-supported institution of higher 
education and research, is the most prestigious engineering Grande Ecole in France. 
Its own website proudly declares that "The Ecole trains the scientific, industrial and 
economic elite of the nation. "9 
Although trained as an engineer, as Bourdieu has observed, the "best indicator of the 
social success of a polytechnicien undoubtedly is the more or less precocious age at 
which he escapes from the purely technical duties j required of an engineer or a 
researcher to accede to a position of authority" (Bourdieu 1996: 73). 
In other, words, the Parisian regulationists Lipietz, Aglietta, Boyer, Billaudot, Mistral 
and Bertand, were trained as engineers but in a tradition that laid more weight on the 
polytechnicien's future as 
.a generalist 
high-flying mandarin destined to act on behalf 
7 Most of them are or have been academic researchers and teachers as well as professional researchers 
and policy consultants at the service of the state. 
Alain Lipietz is a colleague of the author in the European Parliament. 9 See www. oolvtechniaue edu/paýe bhp? MID=17 
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of the state'- for which the Ecole Polytechnique provided the ethos, the esprit de 
corps and the contacts - rather than preparing the student for purely technical jobs 
which could well be carried out by lesser mortals from lesser schools. 
The Fordism / post-Fordism debate, we will argue below, leads to periodicist and 
taxonomic despair. There is a failure to develop a rigorous theoretical framework 
which enables one to recognise a concrete instance of a given phenomenon when one 
encounters it, to compare like with like when one attempts to classify it, and to assert 
a historical discontinuity when defining elements of a given period are absent and 
elements of a distinct period are present. This might continue to lead many to refute 
the entire Fordist / post-Fordist project as well as any attempt to distinguish between 
periods of capitalist development at any one point in the history of capitalism. 
Combined around a cluster of such positions in the English-speaking world are the 
interventions of Amin and Robins (1990), Clarke (1990), Bonefeld (1993), Bonefeld 
and Holloway (1991), Gertler (1988), Graham (1992), Hyman (1991), Lovering 
(1991), Megan (1988), Polled (1991), Psychopedis (1991), Rustin (1989), Sayer 
(1989), Sayer and Walker (1992), Thrift (1989) and Williams et al (1987). 
Observed from a rigorous Althusserian point of view, the un-satisfactoriness of the 
Fordism / post-Fordism family of theoretical discourses may be traced in the presence 
of competing discourses, none of which is a non-ideological theory. In Althusser and 
Balibar's Reading Capital, used in this study as a benchmark of good theoretical 
practice, 'ideology' is defined as a 
" 'lived' relation between men and their world, or a reflected form of this unconscious 
relation [... J. It is distinguished from a science not by its falsity, for it can be 
coherent and logical [... J, but by the fact that the practico-social predominates over 
the theoretical, over knowledge. Historically it precedes the science that is produced 
by making an epistemological break with it, but it survives alongside science as an 
essential element of every social formation. " (Althusser and Balibar 1979: 314). 
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Ideological theories are such not because they are concerned with the real 'practico- 
social world" (Althusser and Balibar 1979: 314) but because the authors and their, 
audience are quite satisfied with the practical consequences of their theories. The 
notion that the sun orbits around Earth is an ideological `theory' which was quite 
acceptable for a while because it correctly predicted every day that the sun would rise 
the next morning. Both ideological constructs and scientific theories may have 
'practical bearings" as used in Peirce's celebrated dictum: 
"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. " (Peirce 1931: 5.464). 
What ultimately distinguishes the ideological from scientific explanation of an object 
is that the author and the audience of the latter will not consider the knowledge of the 
practical bearings on an object as conceived by them as sufficient to accept that 
explanation as a scientific theory. The Aithusserian definition goes further: 
"Ideological theories (empiricism, idealism, historicism) see the historical totality as 
analysable in a present, a contemporaneity, in which the relations between the parts 
can be seen and recorded. To see this present implies the possibility of cutting a 
section through the historical current, a section in which the essence of that current is. 
visible. " (Althusser and Balibar 1979: 318) ., 
Finally, what is `time' in Althusser and Balibar? 
"For Althusser and Balibar, on the contrary, there is no simple unilinear time in 
which the development of the social formation unfolds: each level of the social 
formation and each element in each level has a different temporality, and the totality 
is constituted by the articulation together of the dislocations between these 
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temporalities. It is thus never possible to construct a self-contemporaneity of the 
structure, or essential section. Historical time is always complex and multilinear. " 
(Althusser and Balibar 1979: 321-322) 
This author will, for the purposes of this study, largely sideline `productionist' work 
on Fordism and post-Fordism, as well as the Schumpeterian and `flexible 
specialisation' approaches, mainly because it is the `regulationist approach' that more 
closely approximates the Althusserian canon. Moreover the regulationist approach is 
the more satisfactory because it does not single out preferentially any single 
dimension of its object, and considers all the levels of the social formation in their 
concreteness. 
Lipietz, in the already quoted interview of 1987 with Jane Jenson for French Politics 
and Society limpidly remarks that: 
" [... ] we are the rebel sons of Althusser. Of course there are some women working 
on the sociology of labour and the welfare state using the regulation approach, but as 
macroeconomists, who are primarily men in France, we are the rebel sons of 
Marxism, of Althusserian Marxism. What does that mean? During the sixties there 
was a fantastic upsurge of Marxism in France, a very particular kind of Marxism, 
structural Marxism. The main leaders in this upsurge were Althusser, Balibar, and 
Bettelheim in economics, and they all paid a lot of attention to the reproduction of the 
capitalist system. Now, the first thesis of the regulation approach is one we learned 
directly from the Althusserian school. Society is a network of social relations, and 
social relations are supposed to reproduce. " (Jenson 1987) 
"But Althusserian Marxists insisted so much on this reproduction that they forgot that 
these relations are contradictory and that they are at any, moment subject to crisis. 
The point is not to be emerveille, to be astounded, by the reproduction of social 
relations but to be very anxious about why they are not in crisis. Our approach asks 
instead how can there be regular reproduction, given the contradictory character of 
social relations? In fact, that's exactly the meaning we give to regulation. We ask 
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how, despite and through the contradictory character of relations, a unity of relations 
is reproduced. Of course, we became still more interested in this question when the 
world crisis started in the early 1970s. So, you can consider the regulation school as 
an Aufhebung, in the Hegelian sense, of structural Marxism. It goes back to the 
question of why, sometimes, contradictions are stalled and why, at times, a set of 
social relations take on a configuration such that reproduction can't occur anymore. 
(... J Most of us were Marxists of the Althusserian school but we quickly tried to get 
rid of the notions of structures without subjects, without contradictions, and without 
crisis. " (Jenson 1987) 
Jessop and Sum (2006) clarify, on the other hand, the limits of the Althusserianism Of 
what they call "early Parisian regulationists" (Jessop and Sum 2006: 45). Referring 
to Boyer, Lipietz and Coriat, they concede that 
" [... J some did adopt some of its general claims, such as the specificity of the 
Marxist dialectic (especially as a guide to theory construction) or the differential 
articulation of modes of production. Some also employed key Althusserian concepts, 
such as 'structure in dominance', social formation, overdetermination, interpellation, 
and apparatus. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 45) 
However,, V 
"they firmly rejected Althusser's reading, of the basic structure and concepts in 
Capital and Balibar's search for its invariant forms. Instead they insisted on the need. 
to begin an analysis of capital as a social relation with the commodity, money, and 
value forms explored by Marx and to identify the variables that could explain the 
alternation of stability and crisis in capitalist development. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 
45) 
Correctly, Jessop and Sum argue that 
"whereas Althusser and, Balibar, focused on general concepts of historical 
materialism valid for, all modes of production and, did not really investigate the 
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dynamic of capitalism itself, Parisian regulationists focused on specific concepts 
needed to analyze capitalism. Moreover, while Althusser and Balibar argued that 
modes of production reproduced themselves, the Parisiens knew enough about formal 
reproduction schemes (a Marxist version of input-output schemes) to conclude that 
accumulation could not occur without disproportions and conflicts. They therefore 
asked how the latter are regulated within broad limits consistent with accumulation. " 
(Jessop and Sum 2006: 45) 
Jessop and Sum observe that Benassy, Lipietz and others criticized the Althusser's 
view: 
"that structures somehow maintain themselves quasi-automatically, independently of 
effective social agency, and with no significant transformations. Rejecting the 
emphasis on structural unity typical ofAlthusser's concern with reproduction, 
regulation theorists stressed the 'unity of unity and struggle' in regulation [... J. " 
(Jessop and Sum 2006: 45) 
They also note that Aglietta and Lipietz, 
"[... J asked how capitalism could survive even though the capital relation itself 
inevitably produced antagonisms, contradictions, and crises - all of which made 
continuing accumulation improbable and generated major ruptures and structural 
shifts as capital developed[... ) and[ ... I emphasized the role of class struggle in 
reproduction, regulation, and rupture alike. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 45) 
The authors do concede that after 1968, the role of class struggle tempered the 
systemic and functionalist streak in Althusser's work. As a reaction to his account of 
social reproduction and the formalism of Marx's schemas of economic reproduction, 
Jessop and Sum point out, the early Parisian regulationists concentrated on the 
analysis of reproduction. 
"While Marx used reproduction Schemas to show that reproduction was feasible, the 
Parisians argued that such schemas did not explain how private economic agents 
come to act in line with such reproduction requirements. This was the task of the 
39 
regulation approach [... J. In explaining how economic and social reproduction was 
secured, they looked to specific institutional forms, societal norms, and patterns of 
strategic conduct. These express and regulate conflicts until the inevitable tensions 
and divergences among different aspects of regulation reached crisis point [... J. A 
period of struggle then occurs until new forms of regulation were stabilized. 
Although they mostly agreed at first on starting from the value form in analyzing these 
processes, Parisiens have since diverged on both the object and mode of regulation. " 
(Jessop and Sum 2006: 45) 
2.5.4 Dependent and peripheral development 
This model emerges from concrete analyses of specific social formations especially in 
Latin America, rather than from the macrostructural and broad historical overviews of 
Andre Gunder Frank and - particularly unhelpful for concrete analysis - 
Wallemstein's `world systems' notion. At the level of concrete analysis there is no 
incompatibility between the regulation approach and research inspired by dependency 
theory in, say, Latin America. Concrete regulationist research does not deny the 
critical importance of a social formation's mode of insertion in the world economy, 
and concrete dependent development studies do not deny that structures of 
international dependence must be complemented by local structures - including 
institutional compromises and `historical blocs' - if for no other reason than to ensure, 
as in the Maltese case, dependent development. Evans' comparative research on India, 
South Korean and Brazil (1995) - building upon his previous work on dependent 
development and the relationship between foreign investment, the state and domestic 
capital in Brazil '(1979) - indicates that, irrespective of their specific policies, 
competent bureaucracies could play a role in promoting industrial development if 
only they succeeded to establish a robust alliance with'a local industrialising elite. io 
Vella's work on the achievements and limits of a developmentalist class alliance 
10 Evans has since revised his views on the development potential of industrial development in Brazil in 
the light of "... anew appreciation of the economically coercive constraints placed on transformative 
strategies by the global neoliberal regime" (report of a lecture at UCLA, 25 May 2004 
http: //wwax. 
-isop. ucla. edu/article. asp? parentid=1.1691). 
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between local industrial elites and working class in the Mintoff period in Malta (see 
below) shares Evans' interest in the role of local drivers of dependent development, 
2.5.5 Mobilisation ideologies, such as `populism' 
The work of Germani is especially useful to understand the role of class-transversal 
interpellations whose effectiveness to cement social blocs favourable to industrial 
development in the absence of a sufficiently hegemonic national manufacturing 
bourgeoisie, is critical for an understanding of the social and political viability of 
institutional compromises supporting determinate accumulation regimes. This 
approach is rendered more rigorous by the application of the Laclau's concept of 
discursive articulation of national popular interpellations, one derived from 
Poulantzas and ultimately Althusser. 
2.5.6 Social embeddedness of economic phenomena 
This notion emerges from `New Economic Sociology' especially Granovetter (1985) 
as reflected in the embeddedness of economic development policies (such as those 
identified with the Developmental State) in determinate social and cultural practices, 
and institutions. Although the notion of `embeddedness' is precisely just that, an 
insufficiently theorised metaphor, it is a useful guide for research. In the case of the 
formation and implementation of economic policy - central issues in the construction 
of the institutional compromises required for the Fordist accumulation regime - the 
identification of concrete interests embedded in kinship networks (such as Maltese 
families with both merchant capital and manufacturing capital interests, or the Chilean 
families considered by Zeitlin and Radcliff (1975: 5-71) encompassing landlords as 
well as capitalists) is critical to understand the social viability of political 
compromises. 
Granovetter's focus on networks as modes of embeddness is, when transposed into a 
microstate context - such as Malta - especially where this spatial characteristic is 
accompanied by clientelism as hegemonic mode (when seen from `top to down') and 
41' 
mode of coping with real or apparent scarcity, say of jobs (looking at it from `below'), 
is a particularly useful conceptual tool. Mouzelis, referring to the period 1830-1880, 
notes that "... in the precapitalist Greek economy, the linkage between State and `civil 
society' was not in terms of classes or rather of secondary organisations representing 
class interests, but in terms of purely personal clientelistic networks [... J due to the 
overriding dominance of patronage politics during this period, which excluded all 
possibility of distinct 'class ' politics" (1978: 16). Although we would argue that, in the 
Mediterranean region alone, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
development of capitalism does not eliminate clientelism, and that, therefore, 
clientelist politics and class politics are not mutually exclusive - in the same manner 
as, and perhaps precisely because of, the articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
modes of production in one social formation - the fact remains that the study of the 
economy/society/state interfaces in Mediterranean societies reinforces the argument 
against economistic reductionism both of the vulgar Marxist and neo-classical 
economics type. " 
2.5.7 Embedded autonomy of state intervention in the economy 
The notion , of - 
`embedded autonomy' of state intervention in the economy, as 
formulated by Evans (1995), in his convincing attempt to show that coherent internal 
organisation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of successful state action. This 
needs to be complemented by close organic links with society (Gramsci would speak 
of a historic bloc acting as a solid foundation for successful state action) requires an 
understanding of its own limits. This in turn requires a prior understanding of the 
limits of that state's actions as well as a realistic relationship to the global economy. 
Queiroz Guimaräes argues that: 
'Although the seeds of network analysis in social anthropology -a powerful ethnographic tool for the_, 
study of clientelism - were planted in the 1950s by Barnes, Mitchell and Both at Manchester 
University, it was not until the late 1960s that this "theoretical instrument which views circles of 
relatives and friends, coalitions, groups and business houses, industrial complexes, and even nation- 
states as scattering of points connected by lines that form networks" (Boissevain: 1979, p. 392) 
flourished. It is significant that one of the three principal protagonists of the revival of network analysis 
in anthropology was Jeremy Boissevain, emeritus professor at the University of Amsterdam, certainly 
the Malta specialist amongst world-class anthropologists. 
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"There are many challenges and difficulties that tend to emerge when the state 
considerably increases its role in the economy, including difficulties in coordinating 
state intervention and the penetration of private interests inside the state apparatus. 
The capacity to countervail these obstacles requires a strong and coherent 
bureaucracy and a state able to impose and sustain certain directions, despite the 
pressures and opposition from social groups" (2004: 16) 
His study of the attempt by the Brazilian military government (1974-1978) attempt to 
implement an ambitious programme of industrial restructuring shows that unlike the 
successful precedents set by the developmentalist states in Japan and South Korea, 
Latin American states lacked the technical competence as well as the political and 
social capacity to manage their relationship to various social classes and parts thereof. 
The Maltese state, because of 
(a) the microdimensions of the territory and population under its jurisdiction, 
(b) the inheritance of a colonial bureaucracy (practically coexstensive with the 
almost totality of the wage-earning. petty bourgeoisie given that His/Her 
Majesty's Maltese government employed most of this class) with a strong 
tradition and culture of autonomy from both the working class and, until 
independence in 1964, also from the nationalist section of the bourgeoisie 
(essentially the traditional professional groups who, until 1943, has still 
dreamt of some sort of integration with Italy) as well as from the 
immensely powerful Catholic church; the bureaucracy, however, through 
their identification with and support for the pro-imperial Progressive 
Constitutional party, had the added advantage of a keen awareness of their 
corporative and social embeddedness in Maltese society, and 
(c) a centralised micromanagement of the institutional compromises necessary 
for a successful Fordist accumulation regime at the top of the executive, 
namely at ministerial and almost always at prime-ministerial level, 
was more successful as a developmentalist state than Latin American states (although 
it shared with some of them a functionally and phenomenologically similar populist 
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mobilisation mode, and although the economy it was called to manage was - like the 
less backward Latin American economies in the same period - characterised by 
dependent and peripheral capitalist development. It was not, however, anywhere as 
successful as the South East Asian developmentalist states (whereby the most 
interesting comparison is that with Singapore, as illustrated above in this chapter). 
One need not accept the tendency of neo-corporatist literature to postulate or assume 
the autonomous role of the state, to appreciate its insights of their interest in the 
structuring of the political arena in the terms of, amongst other, monopolisation and 
unequal access. Especially useful is its interest in the privileged access of determined 
sectors to government through organisations "licensed [... J by the state" to represent 
these sectors (Schmitter: 1979, p. 13). 
2.5.8 Rejection of the Post-Fordist `Brave New World' 
Post-Fordism, in this author's view, is merely a largely unstable state of affairs 
characterised by the crisis of the Fordist regulation and the frantic search for 
alternative regulatory mechanisms. This state of affairs has its own aesthetic (post- 
modernism), its own ethics (rejection of meta-narratives), which aesthetics and ethics 
are in the last instance mere consolations for the uncertainty caused by the crisis of 
Fordism. 
Categorisation is only worthwhile and possible if it enables us to distinguish between 
different objects of investigation according to the same distinguishing criteria within a 
common referential system. Unlike the periodic table of chemical elements 12 
`Fordism' and `post-Fordism' are related to each other by loose impressionistic 
counter-positions, not unlike the "suckling pigs", the "stray dogs" and the "animals 
that resemble flies" cited by Borges from the, "certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled 
'Celestial Empire of benevolent Knowledge "' in whose "remote pages it is written 
that the animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed 
12 Devised by the Russian nineteenth century chemist Dmitri Mendeleev to provide a useful framework 
to classify, systematize and compare the different forms of chemical behaviour on the basis of the 
conceptual criteria of'atomic weight' and'atomic number', whose meaning is derived from a rigorously 
constructed theory. 
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ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (I) fabulous, ones, (g) 
stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if 
they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair 
brush, (1) others, (m) those that have just broken a' flower vase, and (n) those that 
resemble flies from a distance. " (Borges 
_1964,1993) 
The theoretical inadequacy of the whole ideological edifice counter-posing two 
`historical' periods, Fordism and post-Fordism, becomes especially evident when one 
considers attempts to characterise the post-Fordist period. What emerges are visions 
of the future presented as negations of visions of a previous epoch, the Fordist one, 
whose historical roots are traced back - at least as far as the core economies of the 
world capitalist economy is concerned - to somewhere between the two world wars in 
the first half of the twentieth century. The entrance into a period of crisis, whether of 
an irreversible and terminal or a recurring and cyclical nature, is generally identified 
as sometime in the 1970s. 
This already begs the question: is Fordism an epoch, understood as a historically 
concrete period referred to as a concrete geographical reality (global, regional, 
national, local or all of them) characterised by the dominance of a determinate mode 
of socio-economic regulation and corresponding political and ideological practices 
and institutions? 
Or, rather, is it a term used to qualify, more or less approximately, a social formation 
in which the capitalist mode of production is dominant but the reproduction of which - 
and the reproduction of the dominance of which - in the formation are not sufficiently 
guaranteed by economic (market) means alone and, therefore, have to be safeguarded 
by particular institutionalised practices at the social and political levels, which are the 
social and political conditions of existence of a determinate mode of socio-economic 
regulation? 
In fact, with the exception of a number of epistemologically rigorous texts, the 
discussion on Fordism and post-Fordism oscillates without warning 
, or without 
adequate notice between these two (and other) options. The `epochal' option is often 
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couched in historicist terms13 and is, therefore, idealist and might be considered as 
scientifically useless. 
The second option is rarely as carefully and self-consciously expressed as has been 
done above. Certainly it has not, to the author's knowledge, been set in the precise 
terms adopted here, terms taken from the Althusserian Lire le Capital paradigm. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the French regulationist approach to Fordism and post- 
Fordism is exceptionally rigorous and `cartesian' in the definition of its object of 
investigation. Moreover, Michel Foucault, whose intellectual heritage cannot have 
failed to influence the French regulationists, attributes the writing of his classic Les 
Mots et les Choses14 to his reading of the hilarious taxonomy in Borges' text. 
"This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, 
as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our thought, the 
thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography - breaking up all the 
ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild 
profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten 
with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. " (Foucault 
1994: xv) 
As regards the second option, it must also be observed that the concept of 'economy' 
is often reduced to that of an operations management notion of what to produce and 
how, where and when to produce it. When the terms Fordism and post-Fordism are 
used to name a particular 'economy at a particular time, slippage into tautology - 
whereby, ultimately, a reality is (said to be) Fordist or post-Fordist because it is (said 
to be) Fordist or post-Fordist - is a frequent occurrence. 
.. A-, 1, 
" This author adheres to the Althusserian epistemological canon. Although it is not without its own 
problems, it is still the most rigorous. Accordingly, `historicism' is used in the Althusserian sense 
namely, as an "interpretation of Marxism which [.. J is characterised by a linear view of time susceptible to an essential section into a present at any moment. " From Brewster's Glossary in the English edition of Althusser and Balibar (1979: 314). 14 Translated as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
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In the case of both options, but more so in the `epochal' one, the tendency is to adopt 
a view of one's object of investigation that is simultaneously holistic and reductionist. 
We will refer to this as the `totalising' approach. One of the more totalising, of the 
more `visionary' and consequently less theoretically rigorous accounts of post- 
Fordism as the passing away of all that is generally associated with Fordism - is that 
of authors associated with Marxism Today. 
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It may be argued that their `totalising vision' of capitalism in the late 1970s and 1980s 
was a reflection of their own political despair of the possibility of a socialist political 
project that was both worthwhile and feasible. Ash Amin in his appropriately titled 
introduction to the post-Fordist debate, 'Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of 
Transition', reports the range of criticism levelled at the vision of post-Fordism 
outlined in Marxism Today by Stuart Hall and others (Amin 1997: 4-5). Nevertheless, 
he fails to situate this journal's unenviable political position and the effect of this on 
the views of its `school'. Pollert (1988,1991) as well as Hirst and Zeitlin (1989, 
1991) noted the exaggeration of the role of flexibility in Marxism Today's 
characterisation of post-Fordism. Meiskins Wood, writing in Marxism Today itself 
(1989), Rustin in New Left Review (1989) and Sivanandan taking a shot at Marxism 
Today from the pages of Race and Class (1990), underlined the ultimately reactionary 
political effects of the image of a brave new post-Fordist world conjured by Marxism 
Today. The critics of Marxism Today's vision of post-Fordism, however, failed to 
relate the shortcomings of this vision to the conditions of its production. 
Hall's often-quoted description of the "brave new world" of post-Fordism in the 
October 1988 issue of Marxism Today is worth examining: 
"A shift to the new `information technologies'; more flexible, decentralised forms of 
labour process and work organisation; decline of the old manufacturing base and the 
growth of `sunrise', computer-based industries; the hiving off or contracting out of 
functions and services: a greater emphasis on choice and product differentiation, on 
marketing, packaging and design, on the `targeting' of consumers by lifestyle, taste 
and culture rather than by categories of social class; a decline in the proportion of 
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the skilled, male, manual working class, the rise of the service and white-collar 
classes and the feminisation' of the work force an economy dominated by 
multinationals, with their new international division of labour and their greater 
autonomy from nation state control; and the `globalisation' of the new financial 
markets, linked by the communications revolution. " (Hall 1988 October: 24) 
Hall's post-Fordism is an epistemologically idealist or essentialist totality as defined 
and as distinguished from the `Marxist totality' by Brewster in his Glossary for the 
English edition of Althusser and Balibar's Reading Capital: 
"An originally Hegelian concept that has become confused by its use by all theorists 
who wish to stress the whole rather than the various parts in any system. However 
the Hegelian and the Marxist totalities are quite different. The Hegelian totality is the 
essence behind the multitude of its phenomena, but the Marxist totality is a decentred 
structure in dominance. " (Brewster 1979: 322) 
"The Hegelian totality presupposes an original, primary essence that lies behind the 
complex appearance that it has produced by externalisation in history; hence it is a 
structure with a centre. The Marxist totality, however, is never separable in this way 
from the elements that constitute it, as each is the condition of existence of all the 
others (overdetermination); hence it has no centre, only a dominant element and a, 
determination in the last instance (structure in dominance); it is a decentred 
structure. " (Brewster 1979: 319) 
"The Marxist totality is neither a whole each of whose elements is equivalent as the 
phenomenon of an essence (Hegelianism), nor are some of its elements epiphenomena 
of any one of them (economism or mechanism); ' the elements are asymmetrically 
related but autonomous (contradictory); one of them is dominant. [... J Hence it is a 
structure in dominance. But the dominant element is e not fixed for all time, it varies 
according to the overdetermination of the contradictions and 'their uneven 
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development. In the social formation this overdetermination 
is, in the last instance, 
determined by the economy [... J" (Brewster 1979: 319) 
2.5.9 Analysis and regional regulation policy 
inside the Italian Communist 
Party in the 1970s 
The epistemological limitations of Marxism Today's notion of post-Fordism require 
no further discussion. Attention needs to be shifted to why it was so 'metaphysical' 
and so little un-concrete in contrast with the French regulation school. This author 
argues that to understand the post-Fordist debate, we must also undertake studies of 
the conditions of existence of this debate and of its dramatis personae. In other words 
we must engage in a sociology of knowledge, or of what is presented as knowledge, 
as scholarship or, indeed, as science. This author would argue that not only would 
these studies inevitably contribute to our understanding of the debate and of the 
production of the variants of Fordist/post-Fordist discourse, but it would also 
contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of socio-economic regulation 
of accumulation that the post-Fordist debate purports to discuss, insofar as these 
mechanisms condition the production (and repression) of discourse about themselves. 
Such studies would doubtlessly be complicated by the fact that in an increasingly 
global environment, conditions in one location may well effect the production of 
discourse in another location. This task is certainly beyond the scope of this study but 
we will briefly engage the case of Marxism Today's contribution to the post-Fordist 
debate. To do so one will need, briefly, to leave Britain - where the journal was 
printed - and to look at Italy. The Italian intellectual ferment in the 1970s, we will 
argue, reflected the crisis of Italy's own Fordist regulation crisis. This same ferment 
provided important elements that would later condition the production of post-Fordist 
discourse in Britain, especially the Marxism Today brand of post-Fordism. 
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Marxism Today was the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
It flourished in the 1980s under the editorship of Martin Jacques and served as a 
platform for Hall's seminal `cultural studies'. Its success with intellectuals of the Left 
in Britain reflected the boom in academic respectability of Marxist studies emanating 
from Italy and France. In itself, this was a reflection of the intellectual influence of 
the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) and the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) in their 
own countries and in the more cosmopolitan parts of Europe, which peaked early in 
the second half of the 1970s. 
It also reflected their vigorous assertion of a `Eurocommunist' `third way' politically 
and intellectually independent from the theoretically sterile and politically debilitating 
influence of the Soviet Union. '5 
Marxism Today benefited, in terms of intellectual credibility and academic 
respectability in Britain, not from an increase in the political stature of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, but in spite of this party's political insignificance and its 
somewhat lukewarm and belated coming to terms with the radical break that 
(especially) the PCI was making not so much with the Soviet Union but with its own 
past. The author argues that the evident hopelessness of a significant future for the' 
British Communists and the absence of a credible national popular party to act as 
beneficiary of the theoretical practice of what called itself the theoretical journal of a 
political party, ultimately doomed Marxism Today to an increasing distance from 
effective reality and political relevance. Nevertheless it did benefit for a while from 
the success of the continental communist parties. It did, during that period, contribute 
to creating an intellectually stimulating environment for the British left, as is reflected 
in Anderson's Arguments within English Marxism of 1980 (see also Anderson 19761, 
and 1983,1984). 
u The Spanish Communist Party proclaimed its Eurocommunist line even more shrilly than the Italian ; 
and French parties, but failed to generate the same level of creative cultural ferment than the PCI and, 
to a much lesser extent, the PCF. The Spanish Communists used their Eurocommunism to distance 
themselves from the Communist parties of the Warsaw Pact, whilst the Italian communists used their 
Eurocommunism to shorten the distance between themselves and the Catholic world in Italy. As a 
result, the PCI increased and maintained its national prestige and political strength, preparing the 
ground for its metamorphosis into today's Democratici di Sinistra. 
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The cultural openness and the eclecticism, encouraged by the communist parties of 
France and Italy was politically determinant to attract thousands of progressive 
intellectuals back into militancy with these parties, especially in the case of the latter. 
These were not just the grandi intellettuali with their high media profiles but the rank- 
and-file `organisers of consensus' in the Gramscian sense. Much bigger numbers 
were attracted into their sphere of influence or `hegemony' (again in the Gramscian 
sense) as sympathisers, even when genuinely independent ones. This was a reversal 
of the mass exodus of intellectuals from the western Communist parties, especially 
after the crushing of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and of the Prague Spring of 
1969. 
In Italy and France, where the Communist parties were national mass parties with 
deep live roots in the territory, the intellectuals who came back to the party or who, at 
least, entered into an unprejudiced and mutually respectful dialogue with it, regained 
confidence in the feasibility of an alternative progressive future for their country. 
Thus, they found a `meaning' for their personal militancy within or close to the 
Communist party. This process was not one of smooth linear progression but a 
dialectical one that changed the individuals and the organisations involved in it, 
certainly as far as the most important party involved, the PCI. It was a process - not 
yet complete - that changed the party and Italy itself, radically. It was a process that 
engaged traditional Communist intellectuals in a lively debate with Marxist and post- 
Marxist currents that had previously been dismissed as bourgeois or petty bourgeois, 
such as those drawing inspiration from the Frankfurt School. More importantly for 
Italy, it was a process that brought them into a constructive give-and-take with 
progressive Catholics. Without this give-and-take the compromesso storico or 
'historical compromise' championed by the PCI's general secretary Enrico Berlinguer 
and president of the Christian-Democrat Party, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC), Aldo 
Moro, would have been inconceivable. 
It is pertinent to point out, at this stage, that the publication of the definitive critical 
edition of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, did not take place before 1975, a few months 
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after Michel Aglietta defended his troisieme cicle thesis and one year before this 
thesis was transformed in the first French edition of A Theory of Capitalist 
Regulation, after almost a decade of painstaking research for the preparation of the 
text's critical apparatus (Gerratana 1967,1975). This publication, which includes the 
1934 text Americanismo e Fordismo, appearing as it did half way through the PCI's 
most successful decade, contributed significantly to enhance the party's prestige 
amongst intellectuals of most political persuasions in Italy, Europe and beyond. 16 
Looked at from a different perspective, the `historic compromise' may be interpreted _ 
as precisely the macro-political arrangement necessary for the "institutional fix" (to 
borrow Peck and Tickell's term 1994: 282) necessary to support the Fordist 
mechanism of economic regulation appropriate for the regime of extended 
accumulation'7 that had been developing in Italy since the 1950s, accelerated in the 
1960s and entered into a phase of protracted crisis in the 1970s. It is in this context 
that one can read the communication of the terrorist group calling itself Brigate Rosse 
that kidnapped Moro on 16 March 1978 and finally executed him, claiming to have 
done so to 
"disarticulate the structures and the projects of the imperialist bourgeoisie by hitting 
the political-economic-military personnel that is their expression. " (Bulletin No. l . 
In Boccä 1978: 36). 
They took pains to situate their action historically at 'a very specific moment of the 
development' of capitalism in the world, in Europe and in Italy. The crisis of 
imperialism, they 'claim, had triggered a "profound restructuring" aimed at bringing 
Italy "back under the control of the centres of multinational capital". The traditional 
16 It is ironic that the Notebooks, or Quaderni, including the one containing the Americanism and Fordism notes, may well owe their survival to the celebrated political economist Piero Sraffa, a close friend of both Gramsci and Keynes. 
"A mechanism and a regime that Italian Communist economists at the time continued to explain 
within the framework of the Leninist concept of "state monopoly capitalism" (Pesenti 1972 Vol. 2: 97- 129), but without the rigidities of their colleagues in the East (Bader et al Vol. 2 1978: 189-192, Mottek 1982: 46-74, Assmann et al 1983: 624-9). Lenin's 1917 text "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", from which Pesenti quotes approvingly deserves to be examined in the context of the pre- "= history of regulation theory. 
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liberal European nation-state, they explain, has become obsolete for capital and was in 
the process of restructuring itself into the "Imperialist State of the Multinationals" 
(Bulletin No. 1. In Bocca 1978: 36). 
Their aim was to sabotage the socio-economic institutional fix intended to secure the 
manageability of labour through the external co-option of the most important party of 
left. The PCI, with its 34.7 per cent of votes, had agreed not to vote against the 
government in parliament in exchange for a greater say in the running of the country 
including public sector enterprises, a vital element in what Peck and Tickell call 
Italy's "delayed Fordism" (Peck and Tickell 1994: 286-287). Although not an 
automatic consequence of a political deal between the PCI and DC, such a 
development would have gone a long way to pre-empt the hostility of the 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), the largest trade union 
federation. The CGIL was, in any case, willing to be involved in a concerted effort to 
overcome the crisis. This willingness is reflected in the language adopted by its 
general secretary, Luciano Lama, in a comment given to the press at the conclusion of 
an agreement reached in January 1977 between the three trade union federations18 and 
Confindustria, the Italian federation of industries: 
"The agreement certainly constitutes not only an important contribution by the 
workers towards decreasing the cost of labour, but is also a serious commitment to 
increasing productivity through higher utilisation of existing plant capacity and 
labour. " (In Angher et a11978: 7) 
Lama's 1977 statement confirmed an economic policy that had been forming itself 
since Enrico Berlinguer's 1973 seminal articles in La Rinascita. The PCI's proposed 
economic reforms of Italy's sprawling public sector industries were articulated into 
three essential positions: democratic economic planning, decisional autonomy for 
individual enterprises and employee participation in management (Bruscagin 2006). 
Planning was not regarded by the PCI as the suppression of the market, but as the 
1 The CGIL, the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) and the Unione Italian del Lavoro (UIL). 
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formulation and coordination of measures to enhance innovation capacities and 
competitiveness. 19 It was not central planning but regional planning to be formulated, 
implemented and monitored separately in each and all of Italy's twenty regions. Any 
public sector investment would be budgeted for and financed by the regions and, to 
this end, the PCI put forward its own proposals for the reform of local government 
finances (Holland 1979). 
It was democratic planning in the sense that it was to be formulated and monitored by 
Italy's elected legislative bodies in Rome and in the regions, and not by anonymous 
central and regional bureaucratic structures. The PCI's concept of planning was a 
political function rather than a techno-economic one. Barca, a leading economic 
policy Communist spokesperson, saw this as a critical distinguishing characteristic of 
the regulatory regime proposed by the PCI in comparison with traditional Social 
Democrat-Keynesian programming in other European countries and in Italy itself 
under essentially centre-left governments in the 1960s (Barra 1978: 33-4). Employee 
participation in management of public sector firms (including companies with some 
public sector) participation was, intended to ensure the democratic character of 
planning - and alignment of corporate strategy with local planning strategies - at the. 
level of the firm. The insistence on decisional autonomy for individual public sector 
enterprises on the ground was intended to enable these enterprises to adhere to local 
development plans in accordance to the concrete needs of the locality. 
The PCI, on the one hand, 
, 
lost no occasion to draw closer to European Social 
Democrat parties but, on the other, it emphasised the differences in economic policy 
between itself and these parties. At the same time, it underlined the superiority of its 
regulatory programming policy in terms of its long term effectiveness and its political 
content within the Italian context. 20 In an article for World Marxist Review, Barca 
19 As Berlinguer emphasised in December 1974 in his report to the Central Committee in preparation 
for the fourteenth congress to be held the year after in 1975 (Tato 1984). 
20 The PCI's insistence on its national autonomy in relation to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and to any other communist party, such as the Cuban, Chinese or Vietnamese, precluded it from 
making any statement that might in any way be construed as the PCI's imposition of its line on other 
European parties. 
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outlined the key issues regarding his Party's economic policy. 
21 Given the relative 
scarce accessibility of this text, it is worth quoting at some length: 
"The system's inability simultaneously to attain two goals - economic development 
and monetary stability - is the clearest expression of the continuing grave structural 
crisis in Italy. IVhenever the task is to ensure economic development and increase 
employment, the system is plunged into a spiral of unbridled inflation; whenever the 
task is to contain inflation, the country moves into a depression or, at least, 
stagnation. At the same time, depression no longer automatically creates the 
conditions for a cyclical tupswwwing, as it did in the earlier phases of capitalist 
development. Thanks to the gains of the trade-unions and the strength of the working- 
class movement, capitalist efficiency schemes, through the sacking of workers 
from. 
enterprises, are workable only to a limited extent (the first to be hit by unemployment 
are the young who have yet to get their first jobs). Most frequently, 'depression 
reduces the average labour productivity and increases outlays by industry and the 
state for various types of aid. These specific features of the crisis in Italy [... ] show 
the futility of Keynesian neo-capitalist policy. Keynes' writings do-contain 
a set of 
instruments that Marxist economists can also use for their research, but the recipes 
proposed by Keynes and his followers do not provide a way out of the crisis. " (Barca 
1978: 31) 
"[... J these recipes amount to the manipulation of aggregate demand. " Nowadays, 
however, even the subtlest manipulations, whether of total demand or of its various 
components [... J tend merely to increase the amplitude of the swings between 
depression and inflation. In Italy it is increased mainly by the vast balance of 
payments deficit, the measures used to cover it and the austerity in spending on social 
needs. ' What is also essential is that government intervention designed to increase 
investment has a negative effect 'on' imports and the balance of payments [... J long 
before it has any positive effect on development and employment. How to escape 
from this blind alley? The PCI has suggested intervention which -has an effect not 
21 Significantly, this was the international communist monthly discussion forum published in Prague between 1958 and 1989, in whose 53-strong Soviet-dominated editorial board, the PCI (together with the French, Spanish and British parties) doggedly defended their right to be different. 
. ý.. _, ýý_: ýý.., ý. ý,. ti. _ .. 
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only and not so much on quantitative macroeconomic magnitudes characterising 
demand as on the quality of its various components. [... J this is intervention which 
tends to change the qualitative characteristics of both consumption and investment. " 
(Barca 1978: 31-32) 
"The practical motives for putting forward this political proposal are self-evident. 
Selective intervention in consumption and investment makes it possible, first to avoid 
the traditional antithesis between the need to reduce consumption 1... J and the need 
to increase investment. Second, it helps to assess the effect of various types of 
consumption and investment on the balance of payments. The PCI proposals also 
take into account the fact that there is much waste of resources in Italy due to the 
need (or habit) of satisfying requirements through costly individual decisions, which. 
are satisfied in the socialist countries and also in some capitalist countries on a 
collective basis whether free or against a charge. This relates to transport, public 
health, infrastructuring of industrial and residential areas, education and sometimes-, 
of everyday services. The expansion of social and collective consumption could 
undoubtedly, help to economise on resources without reducing the satisfaction of . 
people's needs, while creating a new, reference point and new guidelines for 
investment. " (Barra 1978: 32) 
"The programming suggested by the Social Democrats (like the ones centre-left 
governments tried to practice in Italy in the 60s) promises a capitalist mechanism of- 
accumulation and its ability, to guarantee a sufficient degree of development. It is 
designed mainly to correct a posteriori the discrepancies cause by this type of 
development. Such programming is, not necessarily doomed to immediate and 
complete failure, as it was, in Italy. Wherever the state apparatus and the fiscal 
system are more efficient and the structural discrepancies less grave, it has yielded 
some results, such as putting within the reach of families some real service and 
guaranteeing a definite level of well being. But even then, the financing of the 
mechanism of accumulation tends inevitably to run into ä crisis, despite the growing 
share of the profits going to the states. Because of the very large share of surplus 
value going into rent and bank interest, Italy slid; into a crisis which produced a 
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situation of ungovernability as soon as the system was deprived - as it was from 1971 
to 1973 - of props like the low cost of raw materials and on the whole relatively low 
wages. " (Barca 1978: 32-3) 
"four JMJ Programming would assume responsibility for the problem of 
accumulation itself, and so move on from reforms to redistribute incomes to reforms 
capable of creating structurally new conditions for accumulation itself The 
`austerity' policy proposed by the PCI [... ] stems from the need of such a switch 
1... J. 
Indeed the Italian Communists do not regard `austerity' as abandonment of some 
quantitative demands in order to allow the capitalists once again to set in motion 
their mechanism of accumulation and their market, but as the assumption of 
responsibility by the working class for the problems of investment, accumulation and 
demand. " (Barca 1978: 33) 
"The differences from the traditional Social Democrat project become even more 
obvious in the course of this transition. Indeed, it is one thing to tackle the problem of 
the relationship between programming and the market in a situation in which 
programming has the task of only re-establishing the equilibrium and mediating 
between classes within the framework of the capitalist mode of production. It is quite 
another to tackle this problem in an effort to practice a type of programming which - 
while the market mechanisms are preserved - calls in question the characteristic and 
basic distinctive feature of the dominant mode of production, ignoring use-value and 
regarding the growth of accumulation as the ultimate goal. There is no doubt that the 
programming proposed (by the PCI) implies deep going changes in the system. Any 
intervention designed for a qualitative regulation of investment affects not some 
abstract wealth but the concrete social wealth and its various use-values. [.. J 
demand for state intervention (which has now become fundamental for development) 
that the process of accumulation should serve to satisfy priorities instead of minor 
requirements, it exposes the antagonisms within the dominant mode of production and 
clashes with it. There is good reason why the PCI's struggle for reforms is not only 
an economic or even only a political struggle, but also a struggle in the sphere of 
culture. It is designed to rally forces around conceptions of way of life and 
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consumption and establishment of values which differ profoundly from the 
individualistic and consumer attitudes engendered by the capitalist market. " (Barca 
1978: 34) 
The PCI's capillary organisational presence throughout the territory enabled it to 
undertake initiatives aimed at this "rallying of forces around " particular "conceptions 
of way of life", "values" and "consumer attitude" (Diamanti 2003) 22 Through, on 
the one hand, its equally impressive presence in actual enterprises directly, or through 
entrepreneurs in or close to it, and, on the other hand, its dominance and/or 
determining presence in many regional, provincial and town governments as well as 
in hundreds of thousands of consigli di condominio (statutory management committee 
in a block of flats), school and university councils etc., - all of which will from time 
to time draft tender specifications for public tenders - the PCI was able to play a 
significant role in nudging the `quality' of demand in the direction outlined by Barca. 
We have been working to introduce into the market - which continues to be a 
capitalist market - new protagonists and to range alongside the traditional individual 
consumers `collective consumers' capable of imposing on the market a demand which 
differs qualitatively from traditional demand. These new consumers are the regions, 
provinces, communes and voluntary collective associations (such as cooperatives) 
capable of expressing the requirements of the masses in transport, culture, housing 
and energy, and exerting an influence on the market that is collective and social 
rather than individualistic. One of the most characteristic current aspects of social 
and political life in Italy is that millions of people have been discussing plans for 
developing railways and energy, and electing schools and neighbourhood councils. " 
(Barra 1978: 35) 
22 Diamanti observes how constant the topographic footprints of the 'red' areas have been throughout 
the post war period. Not only did it effectively retain its original centre of gravity in the centre of the, 
peninsula, but expanded especially in the 1970s and 1980s - when the PCI increased its electoral 
strength - towards the north and the south (Diamanti 2003: 41). New `red' areas were, however, 
always contiguous with the original footprints in the case of provincial areas or limited to important 




The PCI's project in relation to the crisis of the Fordist regime in Italy correlates well 
with the ideal-typical features characterising Fordism and post-Fordism in the 
literature. The project advocates decentralisation and localisation of political and 
corporate decision-making within the framework of democratisation of the decision- 
making process. It actually begins to implement this throughout the territory where it 
is strong enough to do so. This fits in well with Jessop's observation of the 
"resurgence of regional and local government" (Jessop 1994: 271-273) and Mayer's 
argument that there is objective scope for determinant local involvement of regulatory 
fixes at the local level (Mayer 1994: 329-32). Nevertheless, Peck and Tickell register 
their doubt about how paradigmatic this feature actually is for the post-Fordist 
transition: 
"Local regulatory experiments, to be sure, have a role to play, but they have to be 
understood for what they are. First, their global prominence and ideological 
significance stem to a certain extent from their straightforward rarity: there seem to 
be just a handful of genuinely innovative local experiments and a raft of pale 
imitations. Second, their 'visibility' is also a reflection of the fact that they have been 
sucked into a political vacuum left by the breakdown of national regulation after 
Fordism-Keynesianism: [... J they are unlikely to fill the regulatory `space' left by the 
collapse of Fordism-Keynesianism. [... ] Third, in the context of neo-liberal hegemony 
and a generalised shortage of global investment, it is difficult to see how local 
strategies can do anything other than bend to the will of global competition [... J. The 
basic difficulty then is trying to establish local order in the face of global disorder. " 
(Peck and Tickell 1994: 298). 
The Italian experience does not support Peck and Tickell's pessimism but, then, they 
will certainly have no difficulty inciting a great number of failures, of non-innovative 
cases and 'pale imitations" (Peck and Tickell 1994: 298), of successful instances. 
Certainly Malta is one country that they could conceivably cite as evidence in their 
case. Of course, one might argue that Malta is a microstate, a 'minority category' 
globally. But then, one might'consider it as a 'majority category' if one views it not as 
a sovereign state, an increasingly unimportant quality for a large number of states in 
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the epoch of globalisation, but as 'just' a local socio-economic and political structure 
in the company of town governments elsewhere. In such a context, local 
administrative structures are imposed from above but local (pre-Fordist) structures of 
informal political power (clientelist networks) have and to some extent continue to 
carry out a socio-economic regulatory function. 
In Italy's case, however, the local dimension of the PCI's project for a new regulatory 
regime to replace the old Social Democrat-Keynesian one established by Christian 
Democrat and the Socialist Party coalition governments of the 1962-1974 period, is 
central to the whole strategy. It appears, with the above-mentioned reservations, to 
locate the former squarely within the post-Fordist stream. 
The theoretical thrust of the PCI's project is that the crisis of the Fordist or Social 
Democrat-Keynesian regulation regime may be solved by shifting the location of the 
mechanisms of regulation: from the top of the political system and corporate system 
to a level as close as possible to citizens in their roles as producers of added value and 
as private and collective consumers of private and public goods and services; from 
the geographical centres of a viable territory's legislative, executive and economic 
centres to regional, provincial and municipal jurisdictions. 
The political, `lesson' to be drawn from the project is that its success or failure will 
depend on the political strength of its promoters and the political ability of a critical 
mass of stakeholders to coalesce around such a programme. 
This brief excursion into the political dimension of the crisis of Italy's Fordist regime 
in the 1970s 
, 
is intended, first of all, to highlight the importance of an approach to 
socio-economic regulation that "in contradistinction to the focus in the majority of the 
post-Fordist literature" and "in contrast to the comprehensive cataloguing of 
production innovations" does not reify "changing conditions in the productive 
sphere" and concentrates, on "emergent political structures and state forms'. ' and 
new social compromise[s] ". Peck and Tickell observed that 
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" 1... ] a great deal of post-Fordist literature falls considerably short of the 
requirements of a regulation approach in failing to specify either how the post- 
Fordist economy might be socially or politically regulated or how it might be pieced 
together in macroeconomic terms. " (Peck and Tickell 1994: 282-283) 
They also noted that the regulation approach meant focusing on: ` 
" [... J the structural coupling between the system of accumulation (a 
macroeconomically coherent production-distribution-consumption relationship) and 
the ensemble of state forms, social norms, political practices and institutional 
networks which regulationists term the mode of social regulation. " (Peck and Tickell: 
282-283). 
In the twelve years since they called for more attention to the politics of the crisis of 
Fordist regulation and of attempts to regulate accumulation under the conditions of 
this crisis, the paradigm-shift required to comprehend the totality of the problem has 
not taken place. We are left where we started from, which is not much further than 
where Hall and the Marxism Today band of brothers dropped us almost twenty years 
ago: with totalising visions of a post-Fordism as total negation of totalising visions of 
Fordism. 
This leads us to the second justification of the Italian excursion. This experience 
teaches a lesson which is both political (the production of hegemony) and 
epistemological (the production of knowledge" or theoretical discourse). Generally, 
problems of political theory, this author holds, cannot be satisfactorily resolved by 
producers of knowledge that are insufficiently involved in the practical resolution of 
the problems studied. The further away they are from the terrain of practical 
resolution, the less satisfactory` will be the (apparent) theoretical resolution of the 
problems. Furthermore, the less satisfactory will be the formulation of the problem 
and the fuzzier its contours. 
1 
In these cases, Borges-type taxonomies are not surprising. Contrast the PCI's 
approach to the problems that led to the formulation of its project of a solution to the 
crisis of regulation in the 1970s to Hall's impressionistic outline of a post-Fordist 
"brave new world" in Marxism Today (Hall 1988). The latter is fuzzy whilst the 
former is concrete. The latter reflects the weakness of a desperate British Communist 
Party condemned to political irrelevance. Hall's depiction of the present-on-the-way- 
to-the-future appears to justify the absence of a meaningful political platform. 
2.5.10 A note on the concept of the State 
The concept of state underlying this study is certainly not the instrumental-essentialist 
one of vulgar Marxism. Poulantzas, in his earliest text on the subject "Preliminaires a 
1'etude de hegemonie dans l'etat" published in 1965 - three years before the French 
edition of the better known Political Power & Social Classes - dismisses Vyshinsky's 
definition of the state'as simply and directly as "the will of the ruling class ". Such an 
"idealist and voluntarist" conception of state, Poulantzas, points out, presumes that 
(1) there is a subject that expresses rules of conduct and laws (the state is reduced in 
this perspective to its normative dimension only) and that this subject is personified in 
a "class will", and (2) that the state is only an instrument of coercion, used by the 
ruling class to enforce its will. In, Political Power & Social Classes, he states that 
"... inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven development, the state 
has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of 
a social formation. This, is, " he continues, "precisely the meaning of the Marxist 
conception of the state as a factor of `order' or `organisational principle' of a 
formation: not in the current sense of political order, but in the sense of the cohesion 
of the ensemble of the levels of a complex unity, and as the regulating factor of its 
global equilibrium as a system" (1968,1978: 44-45). 'In Poulantzas' "State, Power & 
Socialism", the state invites us to see the state as "the material condensation of a 
relationship of forces, (which, JM) we must grasp as a strategic field and process of 
intersecting networks" (1978 b: 136 ff. 
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Although claims that Jessop's work on the state "represents perhaps the most 
theoretically sophisticated discussion of the state currently available" (Kelly 
1999: 109) are somewhat exaggerated, his "strategic-relational" approach is certainly 
on the right track. We follow him in his qualified acceptance of Poulantzas' later 
assertion - albeit an elliptical one - that the state is ultimately a 
`social relation', and 
consider Jessop's identification of 
"the core of the state apparatus f ... j as a 
distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively 
binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their general will" 
(Jessop 1990: 341) 
as a valid basis for a working concept of state. Jessop criticises Poulantzas for failing 
to resolve the dichotomy between macro and micro-accounts of state power, namely 
between explanations of state power as benefiting the dominant class `in the last 
instance', and accounts of the multiplicity of class interests and other struggles 
featuring actors other than classes that impact on (and are impacted upon by) state 
policy and state behaviour, Jessop's own solution is itself ultimately unsatisfactory. 
Jessop is evidently unwilling to abandon the premise that the state is somehow biased 
towards determinate strategies (cited in Hay 1994: 350-1) but is ready to drop the 
epistemological primacy of either class or capital in explanations of state power 
(1990: 83 - 94 ff). Within Jessop's theoretical framework the issue of state autonomy 
is redundant, given that he does not recognise any prime mover from which the state 
is to some extent (even to no extent at all)' autonomous (1990: 354). ', '... State power 
is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains 'or restores the conditions 
necessary for capital accumulation in a given situation" (ibid). 
Ultimately in this author's understanding, Jessop's concept of state is that of a cluster 
of relationships between accumulation strategies, state forms and hegemonic projects 
(1990: 196 - 220), one that can only be 'described but is 
not ultimately theorisable. 
Policy, in these terms, "... is best understood as being moulded around particular 
he emonic pro ects, as, expressed maim b dominant gJ 1' Y political parties, whose 
relationship to the dominant regime of accumulation is crucial " (Kelly 1999: 112 - 
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2). The typical example Jessop refers to is the Keynesian welfare state. Jessop's state 
is particularly useful to focus attention on the central issue of interest to regulation 
theory, namely on the importance of various non-economic elements that maintain 
conditions favourable to the continued reproduction of an inherently crisis prone 
capitalist economy (Kelly: 113, Jessop 1997 b). 
Although this leads us to the conclusion that we have no satisfactory theory of the 
state, it does - paradoxically - focus our attention on what are best understood as 
proxies of class and other interests in society (political parties, constituted bodies) and 
the interfaces between them and specific state apparatuses at particular points in time. 
This is especially useful when we are faced with concrete situations characterised by 
historical blocks within which a fraction of the bourgeoisie does play a role but does 
not seem to be actually driving developments. This is certainly the case during the 
Fordist period in Malta. 
We have noted that although the dominant historical progressive bloc during this . 
period brought together local industrial entrepreneurs and the industrial working class 
(opposed by merchants and petty bourgeoisie welded together in a conservative 
historical bloc), the industrial bourgeoisie was incapable of hegemonising the bloc of 
which it , 
formed part (and to which it owed its momentary political clout and 
promotion of a regime of accumulation favourable to it. The industrial bourgeoisie. 
consisted essentially of a handful of nouveaux riche with little social weight and 
status in comparison with the older and influential merchant bourgeoisie, related 
through kin and, a multitude of Granovetterian `strong' and `weak ties' with the 
judicature, the more prominent members of the professional classes, the higher clergy 
and top civil servants, and capable, of mobilising through these ties the Gramscian 
`organic intellectuals' of the conservative bloc - teachers, lower clergy, middle and 
lower civil servants, rank-and-file professionals: lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, 
especially in the rural areas. 
The driver of the progressive bloc was not a class but the Labour government acting 
through the state and through civil society including, in the latter, the Labour Party 
itself and its front organisations. The reference to the Labour government as the - 
somewhat bonapartist - 'driver, as opposed 
to the Labour party in the 1970s and early 
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1980s, is a purposeful one: the corporativist compromise between working class and 
industrial bourgeoisie was acted out at mainly at the level of the state with the Labour 
party (statutorily united with the General Workers Union) protecting this class 
compromise by capillary hegemonic work amongst the working class (especially, 
hence the chink in the armour, were it felt strongest, amongst the Dockyard workers 
and other public sector blue-collar employees). 
If we refuse to shift attention from the abstract level of either class or capital to the 
`lower' but more concrete level of politically concrete actors (such as parties, as 
emphasised in Jessop's text above), we will be unable to make concrete sense of 
concrete situations such as we are faced with in this case study. Understandably this 
formulation begs the question: may we deduce in a priori fashion that state power in 
capitalism is necessarily capitalist state-power? Yes, if by capitalist state power we 
mean the final effect of the (not always and not necessarily centrally coordinated) 
action of the ensemble of ideological and repressive. state apparatuses, namely the 
maintenance or restoration of the conditions necessary for capital accumulation. This 
is, however, little more than a mere tautology: if the concept of a mode of 
production's dominance in a social formation includes the existence of a state as a 
function of that dominance, then that state can never be - by definition - anything but 
that mode of production's dedicated state. On the other hand, the (tautological) 
conclusion that state power in capitalism is necessarily capitalist state-power, should 
not lead us to think in terms of the bourgeoisie or ä fraction of it being in command of 
the state in the manner of owner-managers of a commercial enterprise. Its dominance 
must be understood as the dominance of its interests, as its condition as the ultimate 
beneficiary of state power, but not necessarily as its direct and immediate driver. This 
is even more important when we are dealing with non-national capitalist interests. The 
case under consideration is a case in point. 
It cannot be emphasised enough, moreover, that, to quote the same dictum of Boyer's 
that we started with, "regulation and crisis are linked as intimately as two sides of a 
coin ". The dominance of the interests of the bourgeoisie or a fraction of it are 
guaranteed by state only to the extent that the subaltern 'classes within the dominant 
bloc whose support or acquiescence are required to prop up the system continue to 
support or acquiesce to it. In the case tinder consideration, the local industrial 
bourgeoisie's lack of autonomous and established hegemonic clout, and its having to 
rely not only on the support of the working class but of political managers from a 
class subaltern to their own. 
2.6 
.A note on other concepts 
Having established the main theoretical context of this project, the author sees scope 
for a short overview of some of the other concepts which are relevant to this work. 
This note is not meant to be of an exhaustive type but rather as a generic annotation 
related to the debate regarding definitions of the phenomena under examination and / 
or factors which are closely linked to them. 
2.6.1 Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Although not as interesting and captivating as the debate on Fordism and post- 
Fordism, there is an on-going debate on the definition of a small and medium-sized 
enterprise. Traditionally, the main criterion used - which is also the simplest, most 
comparable and easiest to access -is, that of the number of employees engaged by the 
enterprise. This is indeed a criterion in practically every definition of an SME. 
Nevertheless, Pezzani (1985) refuted a one-dimension approach to the debate and 
claims it Js defective since the number of persons needed for an enterprise's 
operations depends on various factors, such as the automation of the production 
process and the final product itself. Thus, as technology improves, the number of 
employees might shrink. This, he argued, would not necessarily mean that the 
enterprise is becoming smaller in absolute terms. 
Over the years, but mostly in the 1970s during the 'epoch' of the Fordist crisis and the 
rise of post-Fordist idealism exemplified by SMEs, other variables started being put 
forward as better reflecting the size of anenterprise. These included productive 
capacity, capital, sales turnover, value-added, and market share. Cattaneo (1975) 
suggested that the size of an enterprise is directly related to the degree of control _ 
it 
. 
exerts on its market. The less it influences the market, the smaller it is. 
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Numerous authors, most notably Pczzani (1985) and Corbetta (2000), focus on the 
internal structure of the enterprise: the smaller the enterprise, the more familiar it is in 
nature, the more it produces a limited and specialised number of products, and the 
more there is the possibility of finding the owner as the hands-on manager. Bannock 
and Albach (1991) converge on most of these considerations but draw the attention to 
the fact that even some of the larger companies are personally controlled 
by the 
owners and their families. 
When contributing to the debate on the determinants of the size of an enterprise, 
Varacca Capello and Zattoni (1997) go as far as suggesting that even the factory floor 
space it occupies can be used as one of these criteria. Nevertheless, they at the end 
settle for a definition which is based mainly on the size of the workforce, even given 
the fact that their idea could be conceptually challenged by extrapolating Pezzani's 
argument (1985), namely that better technology could lead not only to a shrinking 
workforce, but also to a decrease in the space needed for production. 
To date, different countries and organisations embrace different definitions of SMEs, 
many of which are regularly updated to take into consideration changing economic 
conditions. The thresholds vary considerably, and many times these definitions allow 
for the identification of sub-groups of enterprises, namely micro, small and medium. 
This fact will be further considered in . 
Chapter 5.0. Danish consultants Ramboll, 
Hannemann and Hojlund (1996) and later the Maltese'authorities themselves tried to 
come out with there own definitions within the context of a 1997 amendment to the 
Industrial Development Act. This was also an issue of discussion within IPSE and 
made it also to the newspapers. Chapter 6.0 will discuss this point thoroughly. 
On a supranational level, the European Union's definition of SMEs is 
multidimensional since it takes into- consideration the number of employees, the 
independence of the enterprise of a larger group of companies, turnover and balance 
sheet total. The definition, which is updated regularly - with the last revision 
approved in 2003 and effective as from 2005 -'distinguishes between micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises.,.: The maximum thresholds are 250 employees and a 
maximum turnover of EUR 50 million or a balance sheet total of less than EUR 43 
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million (the thresholds are down to 50 employees and EUR 10 million turnover and / 
or balance sheet total for enterprises to be classified as small, and 10 employees and 
EUR 2 million for micro enterprises. (European Commission 2003) 
The importance given to SMEs within the post-Fordist debate led to a proliferation of 
SME-support organisations and to a growing interest in SME policy. 23 Various 
authors, including Tolentino (1990) and Brunetti et al (1988) stress the importance of 
having a conducive and enabling policy in the SME sector and give empirical 
evidence to link this up with the success and sustainability of assistance programmes 
aimed at such enterprises. Similarly, Corbetta (2000) states that SME policies must 
have both a micro and a macro economic nature. Micro economic measures help 
influence a number of profit determinants as identified in the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem (1961) stating that the market value of a firm is determined by its earning 
power and the risk of its underlying assets. Nevertheless, this alone does not imply an 
alteration of what Schumpeter (1939) called "the general business situation", namely 
those set of conditions on which the enterprise has no direct control. Thus, the need 
of a complementary macro economic policy. 
2.6.2 Multinational enterprises 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) definition of, 
a multinational enterprise (MNE) examines the relationship between the parent 
company and its foreign affiliates, setting out rigid thresholds. Contrary to the case of 
SMEs, these are not based on company size, turnover and / or balance sheet totals. 
Instead, the basis is that of equity stake holdings. Thus, the definitions of SMEs and 
MNEs are not mutually exclusive. 
UNCTAD, arguably one of the most proactive organisations in researching and 
collecting data in this area of research as shown in its annual World Investment 
Report, draws a distinction between subsidiaries and associates. In the case of, 
associate affiliates, the foreign investor owns between 10% and 50% of the equity 
23 See results of international survey in Chapter 5.0. 
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capital. Similarly, an enterprise is considered as a subsidiary of a multinational if the 
parent enterprise controls over half of the shareholders' voting rights, thus effectively 
controlling the company's structures. In the case of non-incorporated branches, the 
parent enterprise must hold a minimum 10% stake (UNCTAD 1992 - 2005). 
Stolarski (2003) ponders on the non-exclusivity of the definitions of 
SMEs and 
MNEs. He criticises the validity of the UNCTAD definition on the grounds 
that even 
a "network of two groceries" in two different countries would 
fall within this 
definition. This critique highlights the fact that high economic relevance and 
influence, political clout and significant social impact - all of which imply a 
Fordist 
mode of production - are directly associated with the term. 
Various authors, including Dunning (1992) and Jones (1996), have tried to address 
this criticism by suggesting the inclusion of further variables within the 
definition. 
These included not only the size of the enterprise, but also the number of countries 
in 
which operations are present. 
Nevertheless, Asheghian (1998), Buckley and Muchielli (1997), Dunning (1992) and 
even Jones (1996) suggest that although MNEs cannot be considered as a 
homogeneous group, the international nature of their activities can be taken as the 
main factor that distinguishes them from other enterprises. 
On the other hand, within the context of its Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines 'for Multinational 'Enterprises), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states that a 
precise definition of MNEs is 'not required for the purposes of such guidelines. It 
broadly defines them as a category of "companies or other entities established in 
more than one, country and sö linked that they may co-ordinate their, operations In 
various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a 
significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the 
enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership 
may be private, state or mixed. " (UNCTAD 21 June 1976, amended on 13 June 
1979,17 May 1984,4 June 1991 and 27 June 2000). 
69 
Worth of note is the fact that in 1974, Latin American countries pressed the United 
Nations to acknowledge the nature of 'transnational' enterprises as complementary but 
distinct to that of 'multinationals'. This distinction was accepted and transnationals 
have come to be defined as those enterprises whose headquarters are outside the 
geographical region where the investment is made. Within the scope of this thesis, 
the author takes the terms 'multinational' and 'transnational' to be synonymous. 
2.6.3 Microstates 
Defining a microstate is arbitrary in many senses and relies heavily on quantitative 
criteria, as the work by Diggines (1985) shows. The United Nations broadly puts a 
state into such a category if it has less than 1.5 million inhabitants. While sticking to 
this definition within the context of this project, one must point out that this 
categorisation does group together the likes of Cyprus (780,000 inhabitants) and St 
Kitts & Nevis (45,000). It also fails to point out that while certain microstates are at 
the forefront of international relations - the Vatican State has more nuncios and 
diplomats than its population of 800 citizens - others like San Marino and Andorra 
have only recently joined the United Nations despite being independent for many 
years. Others still do not have their own security forces (Andorra relies heavily on 
Spanish and French services in this sector) and do not have a currency of their own 
(Liechtenstein's currency is the Swiss Franc). While some microstates are 
economically vibrant and prosperous (Luxembourg), others find it difficult to even 
afford maintaining the minimum number of foreign representations. 
Thus, one might argue that apart from the subjective qualitative criteria based mainly 
or exclusively on population, a microstate to be defined as such must not only be 
relatively very small in size but must also enjoy international recognition. 
Armstrong et al (1995) associate small size to economic disadvantages, even though 
the outcome depends on the way in which the country manages its system. The 
microstate dimension of the Maltese case is further 'aggravated' by the fact that the 
country is insular and on the periphery between an economically and socially affluent 
Europe on one side and a totalitarian and relatively unstable Africa on the other. 
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Briguglio (1995) argues that all these characteristics brought together do make an 
economic system, such as the one of Malta, intrinsically weak. He claims that such a 
weakness can be measured by means of a Vulnerability Index. Similarly, Buttigieg 
(2004) is clearly concerned that the administrative burden of the European Union 
acquis communautaire might be too much for a microstate to handle if it is not given 
the necessary room for manoeuvre. 
Baldacchino (2000) positions himself against this idea of the apparently inherent 
structural weakness of small states and presents statistical evidence showing that there 
is not much difference in the economic performance between larger and smaller 
developing countries. Moreover, he argues - in a way reminiscent of the "brave new 
world" (Hall 1998) of post-Fordism and the notion of 'flexible specialisation" (Piore 
and Sabel 1984) - that instead of being vulnerable, smaller countries enjoy a 
comparative advantage because of inbuilt flexibility. 
The debate on a definition of a microstate is marginal to the scope of this dissertation, 
with the author choosing adopt the one spelt out by Diggines (1985) for the sake of 
clarity and conciseness. 
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Chapter 3.0 The Fordist regulation context, the object of investigation and the 
main theses 
Before reconsidering some of the theoretical assumptions that underpin this study, let 
us revisit what we have referred to as Fordist regulation system that crystallised 
during Labour's Mintoff period. In the case of Malta in the 1970s, the `complex 
system of institutional compromises' or system of `regulation' worked and (literally) 
delivered the goods. The working class was successfully co-opted into the effort to 
promote the development of a dependent peripheral capitalism, one that was export 
led and foreign direct investment driven. 
From this point of view, if we were to insert the Maltese case into one of the two 
categories considered by Moran in his discussion of the questions: "What is the 
impact of foreign direct investment in manufacture and processing on the growth and 
welfare of developing countries? Are there dangers as well as opportunities 
associated with FDI? How can developing countries design policies toward FDI to 
capture the benefits and avoid harm? ", we would tend to place Malta in the same 
category as territories whose "approach [... ] to using foreign direct investment to 
enhance host country economic development", an approach that Moran traces back 
to the "export-led growth strategies in Singapore, Hong Kong, and special zones of 
Malaysia - is to allow manufacturing multinationals to establish wholly owned 
subsidiaries to assemble duty-free inputs to send into world markets" (2006: 6). 
This author would certainly not place Malta in the category of countries adopting the 
"second approach - incorporated into import substitution policies in Latin America, 
Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia - [... ] a mandate by host authorities that 
manufacturing multinationals take national partners and meet specific domestic 
content targets [in the, JMJ hope that such performance requirements will ensure 
technology transfer to local companies, generate backward linkages, and build an 
indigenous industrial base in the host country" (Moran 2006: 6-7). 
Moran, referring to "evidence that has emerged over the past two decades about [the, 
JM] two rival approaches ", argues that the Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysian 
model has resulted in a better deal for the host country (2006: 7-12-15). 
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3.1 Fordist regulation and peripheral dependent development under Mintoff 
Although the Maltese Labour governments in the period 1971-1987 did, in certain 
phases, advocate import substitution, this was invariably strategically complimentary 
and subordinate to the promotion of export-led and foreign direct investment driven 
industrialisation - nor could it be otherwise in a country with no significant local 
market. It is true, however, that the Maltese Labour Party failed to contradict those 
that accused it of an inward looking orientation on the basis of the facts; on the 
contrary, it went out of its way to defend its marginal recourse to import substitution 
thus reinforcing the impression that it was indeed its principal development strategy. 
Why this happened will be discussed later in this study. At this point it will suffice to 
note that import substitution was quantitatively marginal and concerned mainly small 
and microenterprises; its role, this author submits hypothetically, must be understood 
within the above mentioned regulation project rather as an engine of economic growth 
and - inasmuch as the regulation project was intended to make Malta more attractive 
as a foreign direct investment location - import substitution was (1) not a policy 
alternative to secondary to export-led and foreign direct investment driven 
industrialisation strategy but was (2) secondary and subordinate to it, moreover it was 
(3) paradoxically, a function of its success. 
Before proceeding, we must sketch out the configuration of social blocs within which 
was embedded Mintoff s developmentalist project and the accumulation regime that 
made it possible, as proposed by Vella (1979,1989,1994): 
Diagram 3a: Opposing social blocs 1971-1987 
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3.1.1 The fundamental components of the `developmentalist' bloc 
The `developmentalist period' (which period is in this author's view characterised by 
a Fordist accumulation regime) as proposed by Vella's begins with the victory of the 
Labour Party at the 1971 elections and drags on, but with increasing difficulties, until 
Labour's defeat at the 1987 elections. The crisis had already translated into a minority 
of valid votes cast at the 1981 elections when the Labour Party was returned to 
government only thanks to a legitimate but anomalous majority of seats. In the table 
above, compiled by the author on the basis of Vella's work, are counter-posed the two 
historic blocs confronting each other during the period under consideration. The 
fundamental components of the `progressive' or `developmentalist' bloc are the 
economically and socially weaker section of the Maltese bourgeoisie, the 
industrialists, and the overwhelming majority of the working class in both private and 
public sector, in export as well as local-market industries. Some of the industrialists of 
this bloc were already industrialists before Labour came to power. 
The archetypal example is Joseph Cassar of the Marsovin winemakers' family, a 
former president of the Federation of Industry, former Chairman of the MDC and a 
close advisor to Dom Mintoff in this period. Cassar and others in his situation 
supported Labour's project in the 1970s because its `developmentalism' augured well 
for their own plans to upgrade their existing manufacturing establishments and 
venture into exports. This small but sturdy nucleus was not limited to industry but 
included hotel and catering entrepreneurs who saw the potential of the project for the 
then fledgling tourism sector. 
Others were press-ganged (black arrow from V to I) into the bloc when the Labour 
government introduced import substitution on consumer goods; merchant families 
who had been importing - consumer goods were faced with a choice between 
abandoning trading altogether or to import the same goods but in bulk packaging, and 
then package these goods in Malta for the local market. Given the captivity of their 
market, many of them did very well indeed considering the insignificant capital 
investment. If, however, the intention had been to cultivate a class of home grown 
export industrialists through the classic infant-industries process, then the import 
substitution element of Labour's developmentalism failed miserably. Only a handful 
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took advantage of other elements of Labour policy (notably the setting up of a series 
of barter agreements with the USSR and other centrally planned economies, with 
North African and Middle Eastern states, backed by central bank agreements to 
facilitate settlements and - in the case of Libya - extending barter arrangements to 
include crude - and by a net of treaties against double taxation) to venture into export 
markets. Most of the original few that did take advantage of these opportunities, 
however, were successful. A few have become modestly sized multinationals (Bortex, 
with production facilities in Tunisia, and Corinthia, with investments in Portugal, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Turkey, Tunisia, Gambia and Libya). 
3.1.2 The discrete charm of the foreign direct investor 
It must be noted here that the existence of this dense network of export opportunities 
had a much more impressive effect as a tool of FDI promotion than on locally owned 
industry. Although Malta had no local market worth talking about, it sold itself as a 
processing zone from which US and European companies could penetrate and 
increase share in markets to which Maltese registered manufacturers enjoyed 
privileged and preferential access. FDI exporters are included in the table on the side 
of the developmentalist bloc but external to it. Although they objectively benefited 
from Labour's developmentalist policies - indeed they were its main beneficiaries - 
foreign investors tended to avoid overt social and political involvement. The role of 
foreign direct investors in this period (initially British, followed by US, Japanese, a 
wave of West Germans, and finally Italians in mechanical engineering, electrical and 
electronic equipment, textiles and garments, shoes, gold jewellery, plastics, boat- 
building, pharmaceuticals, medical products, prefabricated housing for the European, 
US, Asian and - surprisingly - to a much lesser extent North African markets) in 
relation to the developmentalist bloc and to the conflict between the two blocs has not 
been satisfactorily investigated. 
Their discreteness notwithstanding, they did play a role in determining policy. This 
happened in various phases of an FDI's project's life and at various levels depending 
on its importance in terms of exports and employment. In the case of average sized 
projects (the 1971-76 and 1976-1981 Labour administrations had instructed MDC to 
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give priority to larger investment projects by multinationals and not to actively target 
projects by small foreign investors), the bargaining interface between the state and the 
investor was the MDC board of directors, made up mainly of influential private sector 
industrialists and chaired by one of them, which would consider the investor's 
proposal (business plan, feasibility study, financial forecasts) and then trade off 
between the project's estimated employment over the first three years of operations 
(employment was, at least for the first half of the 1970s, the criterion that carried most 
weight) and its request for benefits under the Aids To Industries Ordinance of 1959. 
In fact, informal negotiations with the investor took place prior to the board's 
deliberation. Prior to submission of a formal application for state aid - as we would 
call it today in EU terminology - MDC executives responsible for investment 
promotion would invariably attempt to entice a targeted investor with a over-generous 
mix of available incentives whilst emphasising the advantages of a productive 
presence in Malta arising from productivity, quality of human resources, 
infrastructure, strategic location in the central Mediterranean and so on. Following 
submission of an application, further and formal bargaining would take place with 
MDC executives responsible for preparing proposals to guide the board in its 
decision; at this point, investors would be invited to upgrade their projects' 
contribution to the national economy or to downsize their request for benefits. 
At this stage, third parties would often intervene with MDC executives and not rarely 
with board directors and the chairman himself, in an attempt to influence the MDC's 
final offer and ultimately the board's decision. Professional service providers 
(lawyers, accountancy and audit firms, tax consultants) but also foreign owned 
companies already settled in Malta (generally the applicant's suppliers or clients), 
local business persons with an interest in the project and, in the more important cases, 
foreign embassies. In the most important cases, negotiations would take place with the 
minister of industry and sometimes directly with the prime minister: as was the case 
with Motorola (1979/80, project did not materialise) and SGS Ates (1980/81, today 
ST Microelectronics). In the latter case, the prime minister's involvement may have 
been prompted not only by the project's inherent importance but also by the fact that 
at that time the investor concerned was totally owned by the Italian public sector 
holding company Finmeccanica (represented for a while on the Maltese subsidiary's 
board of director's by today's Italian prime minister and former president of the EU 
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Commission, the economist Romano Prodi) and the Italian government was eager to 
keep Malta out of Libyan and Soviet spheres of influence. Today ST is the country's 
most important industrial exporter and its views on a broad range of policy areas 
(from human resource development to corporate taxation) are not taken lightly. 
The above-mentioned discreteness of foreign direct investors and their low socio- 
political visibility could well have to do with the fact that the fast track treatment they 
were afforded by MDC and their access to the highest political authorities made 
collectively organised public lobbying (such as through the Federation of Industry) 
both unnecessary and undesirable. Furthermore, it was customary in the 1970s for 
government to appoint a representative of the Island's largest industrial trade union 
(the General Workers' Union, at that time related to the governing Labour Party 
through a `statutory union' and co-opted in the cabinet of ministers), generally its 
general secretary, to the board of directors of MDC. This -a fact of critical 
importance for a regulation approach to Maltese developmentalism of this period, and 
a core element of the institutional compromises that sustained its accumulation regime 
- also meant that foreign direct investors as well as Maltese industrialists within the 
developmentalist bloc were provided with a statutorily sanctioned institutional 
channel of communications with the largest industrial trade union parallel to and 
outside of the conflictual logic of collective bargaining at the level of the individual 
firm or in the broader context of talks between unions and the Employers' 
Association'. 
3.1.3 The industrial working class 
The other most fundamental element of the progressive bloc was the industrial 
working class (IV in the table). Within this element, the politically more militant 
component were the Dockyard workers. Formerly a state of the art Royal Navy 
admiralty dockyard, this impressive and sprawling establishment has never managed 
The Malta Employers Association was formed in 1965 following the amalgamation of the Union of 
Employers (founded in 1958, then renamed Association of Employers 1958) and the Malta Employers 
Confederation. The latter had been constituted in 1960 and effectively consisted of the Association of 
Employers, with whom it shared a director general, and a number of British owned companies - 
operating in Malta, namely Shell Company (Malta) Ltd, BP Malta Ltd, ESSO Standard (Malta) Ltd, 
Malta Tobacco Company Ltd, as well as NAAFI and Turquant Youngs & Co as observers. 
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to overcome the transition to a commercial ship repair yard. From a work practices 
point of view, it faced the 1970s with a rigid pre-Taylorist organisation -a fact only 
partially explained by the nature of ship repair work itself - combined with an array 
of in-house trades that only a naval shipyard could afford and that would have been 
more economically outsourced assuming they were likely ever to be required in a 
civilian setting. For almost two hundred years, Dockyard workers practically 
constituted the totality of Malta's industrial proletariat and the birth of both the 
Labour Party and the General Workers Union would have been unthinkable without 
them. To this day, ironically on the eve of his possible extinction, the Dockyard 
worker is the popular icon of an industrial worker in Malta. Turning them into a self- 
managed yard did not prevent the Dockyard from accumulating debts; only the state 
subsidies have kept it - to this day - from bankruptcy. High wages (including 
overtime and bonuses) made the Dockyard worker amongst the best paid industrial 
employees in Malta, as well as the most likely to obtain a wage increase when this 
was demanded by the General Workers Union. 
In a similarly strong position were the employees of public corporations (mainly 
utilities and telecommunications) and state owned companies (principally the national 
air and sea carriers, and the banks), especially in those grades represented by the 
General Workers Union. In most of these cases, wages were only nominally linked to 
productivity. 
The politically weakest components of the progressive bloc were those producing 
most of industry's added value and almost all of its domestic exports, namely machine 
operators in private industry. Characterised by internationally competitive 
productivity levels (there is evidence to show that on a like-with-like comparison, 
average productivity was marginally higher than in Germany and marginally lower 
than in Singapore), and by the application of Taylorist work-practices (partially 
replaced by flexible specialisation practices towards the end of the period under 
consideration, a development that - contrary to urban legend - generally resulted in a 
higher level of exploitation and discontent). From 'a socio-cultural point of view, the 
unprecedented growth of employment in industry - especially in export oriented 
foreign owned industry - had a number of as yet insufficiently appreciated effects: it 
stimulated a significant increase in female participation in the work-force, it led to a 
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capillary percolation of positive attitudes towards industrial employment by women 
and men (in a culture where the ultimate goal had always been a public sector job) 
and it encouraged the interiorisation of an industrial work ethic that predisposed the 
subject to accept the linking of wage with productivity. 
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Generally speaking, the GWU was softer on management in private industry than in 
the public sector, a trend that continued after the fall of Labour in 1987. Private, 
especially export-oriented, industry as well as important tourism establishments 
tended to use the channels available to them to justify their position on any actual or 
potential industrial dispute with government. The issue, if considered to have 
industry-wide repercussions would then be tackled by the minister concerned with the 
corresponding GWU section secretary. If the issue was considered to be particularly 
sensitive it would be brought up with the GWU representative in cabinet. Inasmuch as 
the MDC board was also statutorily entrusted with the task of advising government on 
issues of industrial policy, not infrequently issues involving the GWU would also be 
discussed between the industrialists and the GWU representative on the board, or 
directly between the MDC chairman and the general secretary of the GWU. Finally, 
any issue likely to transform itself into a full blown dispute with national 
repercussions, would almost certainly come up in joint meetings of the Malta Labour 
Party administrative committee (its `politburo') and its GWU counterpart. This 
militated against any strong unilateral action by the GWU in the private sector and, 
even more so, by any of its section secretaries and encouraged compromise at all 
levels. Shop stewards often found themselves in difficult situations, pressed between 
the demands of members on the shop floor and instructions from above to pour oil on 
troubled waters. "Whenever `sacrifices' were necessary, the unions were expected to 
shoulder responsibility and help persuade workers to comply" (Borg Bonello 2001: 
76). 
2 It is interesting to note that anthropologists have concentrated on the impact of tourism on Maltese 
society and culture but have largely ignored industrialisation. Boissevain, is a case in point. Neither his 
first study on the Island, Saints and Fireworks: Religion and Politics in Rural Malta, (Progress: 
Valletta, 2005 2"d edition, essentially his 1962 Ph. D thesis, based on field work during 1960-61, and 
written under the supervision of Lucy Mair at the LSE) nor his latest paper ("Hotels, Tuna Pens, and 
Civil Society: Contesting the Foreshore in Malta", in Boissevain, J., Selwyn, T., Contesting the 
Foreshore. Tourism, Society, and Politics on the Coast, Amsterdam University Press 2004, pp. 233-260) 
engage with the impact of industry. See also Vella, M., Review of Boissevain, Selwyn: 2004 in Journal 
of Mediterranean Studies Vol. 15 No. 2 2005 pp. 503-506. 
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Another totally neglected aspect of the contrast between the low-productivity public 
sector workers, especially the militant Dockyard workers, and workers in high- 
productivity private industry, especially those in the export-oriented sector - one that 
may have contributed to the internal contradictions of the progressive 
developmentalist historic bloc and to its eventual disintegration, is the fact that the 
former were largely male and a very high proportion of the latter were women: the 
political effect of the gender aspect of the social construction of the bloc's icons and 
self-perceptions cannot be underestimated. A shift of emphasis in Labour's portrayal 
of the working class hero from the macho Dockyard shipwright to the female machine 
operator whose work and social contributions financed the Dockyard's losses (and the 
shipwright's own wages), a welfare state and other items of public expenditure, would 
have been unbearable to the Dockyard militants, whose manhood had already been 
challenged by Mintoff3 (and possibly unthinkable within the male dominated world 
view of Labour in the 1970 and 1980s). 
On the other hand, this failure to update perceptions exacerbated the bloc's internal 
tensions: workers in the export private sector (a high percentage of whom were, 
repeat, women) became increasingly disillusioned with the developmentalist project 
and resented the undue credit given to Dockyard workers. 
3.1.4 The disintegration of the progressive bloc 
Later, in the second half of the 1980s, when the progressive bloc gradually 
disintegrated and the GWU had no reason not to rock the boat, it would still move 
with great caution for the simple reason that employers - now emboldened by the fall 
of Labour and with no institutional compromise in place - tended to threaten mass 
dismissals and downright plant closures in response to union demands. The breaking 
point came in the autumn of 1989 when the Nationalist government announced that in 
view of the lifting of the wage and price free imposed as an emergency measure by 
the previous government, the next year's cost of living increase (a Labour legacy and 
an important element of its Fordist accumulation regime) would cease to be an across 
3 On xx/xxlxx in a rally for Dockyard workers, Mintoff, literally asked them to prove they had "meat 
balls". 
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the board flat increase for all employees, but in the case of employees covered by 
company collective agreements, these would receive the difference - if any - between 
any annual increase stipulated in the agreement and the annual statutory cost of living 
increase announced by government. All unions (including the conservative-leaning 
ones) protested against what was essentially a dismantling of the central mechanism 
of `the social contract' (Borg Bonello 2001: 75) but only the GWU decided to test the 
employers' resolve by demanding the full annual cost of living increase over and 
above the annual increase. 
Emboldened by initial successes, it decided to call a strike at a major hotel, the 
Phoenicia, whose owners, Trust House Forte, had refused outright to comply with the 
GWU's request. Police were called in to throw the strikers out, all employees were 
made redundant and the hotel was closed (Borg Bonello 2001: 77-79) indefinitely for 
refurbishment. If the GWU had been losing a steady trickle of private sector members 
during the developmentalist period because these felt that their union was too passive 
(dotted arrows from III to VIII, and from IV to IX) - clearly Labour's 
developmentalist project, especially towards the end of the period, was insufficiently 
hegemonic and the compactness of the progressive historic bloc was loosening up - 
after the disintegration of the progressive historic bloc, the GWU lost members from 
both the private and public sectors because these felt that their union risked their jobs 
by fighting wars it could not hope to win. The Phoenicia dispute left the GWU "in a 
state of shock" (Borg Bonello 2001: 82), throwing it reeling back to its traditional 
pragmatic approach of applying only so much pressure to bear on an employer as it 
felt that employer could and would bear without endangering jobs in that 
establishment (Koziara: 1975), an approach the GWU leadership had regularly 
employed before its involvement in the Fordist regulation system of the Mintoff 
period when it had become accustomed to deal with capital as a whole rather than 
with individual firms with specific corporate strategies. The Phoenicia fiasco also 
brought home to the GWU the fact that the locus of power in a transnational 
interlocutor was not situated at the local level but at its apex outside of the host 
country's jurisdiction and outside of the logic of any institutional compromise that 
may exist at the national level (Grixti: 1993). 
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3.1.5 The conservative historic bloc 
The conservative historic bloc was dominated by merchant capital, a section of the 
local bourgeoisie with over two-hundred years of modem commercial experience with 
even older roots in Mediterranean coastal trade, not untypical in their economic, 
political and cultural frame of reference of merchant capital in other parts of the 
Mediterranean, such as, for example, Greece (Mouzelis 1978: 20,27,36,64). Some of 
its elements can be traced back to the cotton business that flourished in Malta in the 
18th and 19t' centuries when merchants would buy locally produced cotton, manage a 
putting-out system for its spinning and weaving and then export the coarse cotton 
sailcloth principally to Barcelona. With the wiping out of this industry by cheaper 
Egyptian and US products, Maltese merchants focused on imports to meet the 
increasing demand of the British garrison in Malta as well as for the shiphandling 
trade, a booming business especially after the opening of the Suez Canal and the 
application of steam power to sea-transportation, two developments that transformed 
Malta into a major coal bunkering depot and a strategic British naval base along the 
route to India. Organised within the Chamber of Commerce (founded in 1848, one of 
the earliest in the British Empire, Vassallo 1998), Maltese importers and other social 
elements linked to them by related business interests and often kinship (ship owners 
and agents, entrepöt traders, banking, insurance, real estate, wholesale distribution, 
contractors to the Army and Navy, established professional groups) have since 
consistently fought any attempt to encourage local manufactures of anything they 
could themselves import, distribute and sometimes re-export. 
When, after World War II, a few Maltese entrepreneurs attempted to lobby the 
colonial government for a customs duties regime that would make it less difficult for 
them to develop local industries, they found they could not do so through the 
Chamber of Commerce and were compelled to set up the Federation of Industries 
(1946). Importers were wary of the 1959 Aids to Industries Ordinance and were 
always on the look out for any attempt by beneficiaries of the Ordinance's provision 
for exemption from customs duties on raw materials, parts and components for export 
processing industries, to sell any of their products in Malta. The scrupulousness with 
which they monitored export-oriented manufacturing industries became much more 
intense with the sharp increase in the number of foreign direct investment after the 
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1971 Labour victory and turned into open hostility against the latter with the 
imposition of a series of provisions amounting to an import substitution policy 
running in parallel with an FDI and export promotion policies. It was at this point that 
any reservations any importer (and any member of related social groups) may have 
had regarding the Nationalist Party (some of them had in the past sympathised with 
smaller parties, principally with the pro-British Progressive Constitutional Party led 
by the Anglo-Maltese Strickland family, owners of The Times of Malta), they now 
rallied around it in a united front against Labour and pressed for its renewal from a 
party of conservative village notables into a modem mass party of the Christian 
Democrat type. 
Nevertheless a number of importers did seize the opportunity of a captive market 
provided by the import substitution measures, to invest in low added value mixing and 
packing industrial operations (procedures so simple that they would normally not 
qualify for change of customs' tariff heading) to import no less than they had always 
imported whilst realising an even higher profit in the process. Often, the same family 
of entrepreneurs and, indeed, the same individual would be involved in both imports 
(requiring import licences obtainable through evidence of an equivalent value in 
exports by the same firm or through the same firm) and import substitution 
manufacturing; the situation regarding specific political behaviour in these cases of 
apparent conflict of interest raises similar methodological problems for research as 
those tackled by Zeitlin and Radcliff (1975) in the case of kinship networks including 
both landlords and capitalists in Chile. The black arrows (V to I, VI to II) in the table 
above, indicating a movement from the conservative to the developmentalist historic 
bloc must be understood within the limits of these opportunistic conditions embedded 
in kinship networks; this is especially the case with the larger firms and more 
important families (element V). This element of opportunism, a reminder of the 
flexibility and ambiguity of fractional determination within the same class, had 
important precedents: the transformation of the Farrugia family from grain importers 
and millers into the country's premier (and for most of the time, sole) brewers is a 
case in point. Their establishments having been burnt down in 1919, in riots with a 
distinct anti-British character during which the Marines shot and bayoneted protesters 
leaving four dead, the firm of Farrugia & Sons was so well compensated that he latter 
opted to set up a brewery rather than go back into the grain business. A virtual 
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monopoly on the production of beer and light ales for the Mediterranean fleet ensured 
the venture's feasibility for what will soon be a century of successful operations. 
The mass support base of the conservative bloc was made up of the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie (this author follows Poulantzas' definition, 1978 b: 191-332) coded V in 
the table above: the self-employed and small enterprise, providers of services for the 
local market, small importers, professionals in law, medicine and accounting 
(although the more established and larger professional firms would be more properly 
located in the dominant element of the bloc, namely V in the table). Similar to them in 
terms of political behaviour were small holding tenants (VIII) in rural areas (there are 
no agricultural wage earners in Malta and Gozo), a social group still solidly behind 
the Nationalist Party but representing today only 2.1 % of total full-time gainfully 
employed (National Statistics Office: June 2007). 
By far the most important element of the mass base of the conservative bloc (VII in 
table), and of the Nationalist party's core electorate as well as of the membership of 
the pro-Nationalist Party trade unions is the new petty bourgeoisie (as defined by 
Poulantzas 1978 b: 191-332) consisting of the civil service and other public sector 
employees including teachers in state schools and tertiary education, together with 
managerial, clerical, supervisory and technical staff employed with V and VI, private 
school teachers as well as ecclesiastics and members of religious orders. The dashed 
arrow entering this element from outside of the frame indicates that sections of this set 
(mainly the older civil servants) came to this bloc from the pro-British Progressive 
Constitutionalist Party, originally a progressive current that had gone as far as 
entering a `Compact' with the Labour Party during the pre-World War II period. 
The 1981 electoral results and the outright defeat of 1987 is evidence of an increasing 
deterioration of the mass base of the developmentalist bloc, including of its working 
class mass base. This translated itself into a small but significant migration of working 
class votes to the Nationalist Party, especially after the latter successfully exploited 
the contradictions ' of the developmentalist bloc by reinventing itself as a popular 
Christian Democrat party with its own `left-wing' and a Workers Secretariat to tackle 
those issues that the Labour Party and the GWU had to underplay or altogether ignore 
for the sake of the institutional compromises required for the functioning of a Fordist 
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accumulation regime. An element of embourgeoisement of the Labour Party's 
working class base may have also contributed to this migration; the Labour 
government's policy of assisting as many as possible to become owners of their own 
homes and, if possible, to build one on cheaply priced state-owned land with the aid 
of a small loan scheme, may have played a role in this regard. The most effective 
factor in the downfall of the progressive developmentalist historic bloc, however, was 
the combined effect of the contradictions that inevitably emerge when, in the absence 
of a national democratic bourgeoisie with a significant productive component within 
it, the historic tasks normally undertaken by this class (from the development of 
capitalism, built upon at least a critical mass of industrial production, to the separation 
of Church and State, from effective national sovereignty to at least the basics of a 
welfare state) are undertaken by a political party carried to power by a militant 
working class. "... regulation and crisis are linked as intimately as two sides of a 
coin ", notes Boyer. That the developmentalist historic bloc flourished for a decade 
and survived for a further seven, thereby ensuring the social and political conditions 
of existence of a successful accumulation regime whose characteristics enable us to 
identify it with systems of Fordist regulation, is itself evidence of the effectiveness of 
the measures taken to contain the succession of crises - endogenous ones arising from 
the configuration of the class struggle within it, and exogenous one resulting from its 
insertion in the world economy - it endured. Its fall sets the stage for the central object 
of our investigation. 
3.2 The specific object of investigation and the main theses 
In early 1996 a newly elected Maltese Labour government set up an Institute for the 
Promotion of Small Enterprise (IPSE). At first, IPSE operated as a unit within the 
MDC but in July 1998, it was recast as a limited liability company with the state 
holding 99.9 per cent of shares through the MDC and the representative bodies of the 
private sector (the Federation of Industries FOI and the Chamber of Commerce CoC) 
holding the balance of shares but with a majority on IPSE's board of directors and a 
chairperson chosen from a shortlist submitted by them. Government undertook to 
coverall IPSE's budgetary requirement and to finance its programmes from part of 
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the income expected from the privatisation of up to 40 per cent of selected public 
sector corporations as well as from EU grants, should these become available. 
The almost 160 year old Chamber of Commerce represented the dominant and 
hegemonic fraction of the Maltese entrepreneurial class, the traditionally laissez faire 
advocating merchant capital. As we have seen in the previous section, the much more 
recently constituted FOI (1946) represented the politically and socially weaker local 
industrialists, traditionally oriented towards low added value manufacturing for the 
local micro-market and therefore protectionist (but only to the extent of the weight of 
their manufacturing operations within their mix of interests, which invariably 
included import, wholesale distribution and real estate). Government left "the door 
open" (The Malta Business Weekly, 23 July 1998: 36) for the participation of the 
representative organization of micro-enterprises, the General Retailers' & Traders' 
Union GRTU with a commensurate shareholding and a director. The GRTU had, in 
fact, chosen not to join at the outset because it disagreed with the exclusion of the 
small retail sector from IPSE's terms of reference and with the inclusion therein of 
manufacturing enterprises in need of assistance to restructure themselves to be able to 
cope with the planned liberalisation of the local market. 
Although the government had from the outset maintained that IPSE would focus on 
manufacturing enterprises and industrial services, the broadening of the Institute's 
target to include larger manufacturing enterprises (admittedly, a Maltese large 
enterprise would be at best a medium sized one elsewhere) was a departure from the 
original emphasis on small enterprises and had only taken place later and gradually as 
the new government took cognisance of the pressing need to modernise most or, 
indeed, of all locally owned productive activity. Certainly, the fact that reference on 
"iz-zghir" / iz air / (literally, "the small one", an elastic populist term for the less 
powerful in society but one that does not distinguish between the unemployed, 
employees, self-employed, small entrepreneurs) was more emphatic in the electoral 
campaign that led Labour to victory after nine years in opposition and more nuanced 
after its election, suggests a measure of tacticism on its part. Labour's internal crisis 
and early elections in 1998 would cause the emphasis on "the small one" to be 
recuperated. Meanwhile, however, the shift in emphasis took place in the course of 
over a year of formal structured dialogue between all stakeholders (directly between 
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government and private sector through its representative bodies, indirectly with the 
trade unions who were regularly briefed by the prime minister personally on the 
unfolding of the consultation process but not- formally involved in it) regarding the 
Labour government's strategic objective to liberalise the local market gradually but in 
not more than seven years in synchronisation with a programme of assistance to 
industry to upgrade its international competitiveness. 
The programme was an integral part of Labour's bid - in principle accepted by 
Brussels - to set up an industrial free trade zone with the European Union within 
five 
to seven years. This alternative to the opposition (and only other party in parliament) 
centre-right Nationalist Party's advocacy of full EU membership as soon as possible 
and at any cost, was not seen by the new government to preclude full membership 
after the establishment of the free trade zone and the completion of the industrial 
restructuring programme. The industrial free trade zone option was, in any case, seen 
by the Labour government as sufficient for Malta to comply with the belated 
commitment, formally undertaken by virtue of the 1970 Association Agreement with 
the European Communities, to reciprocate the right given to Maltese industrial 
exports to enter European ports duty free with liberalisation of the local market for 
European industrial goods (read non-agricultural products and to the exclusion of 
services). 
This was the policy context within which IPSE was finally chosen to play a central 
coordinating and administrative function in the implementation of an industrial 
restructuring programme declared to be a necessary condition if liberalisation was to 
impact positively on the country's development. Moreover, through the government's 
commitment to channel part of the proceeds from partial privatisations, IPSE was 
situated within an integrated strategic policy project combining restructuring, 
liberalisation and privatisation, involving not only domestic economic considerations 
but also linking it `organically' to a medium-term process that would - to the extent 
of its success - not only further extend the integration of the economy of this micro- 
state into the world-economy (or at least in a regional economic bloc, the European 
Union) but it would also transform the mode of the Maltese economy's international 
insertion from an `external' one into a more `organic' one, linking more directly and 
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intimately even the smaller hitherto insular and insulated enterprises with the outside 
world with all the rigours and opportunities that this implied. 
It must be emphasised that although manufacturing exports were structurally 
determinant, they were almost exclusively generated by foreign owned companies 
that had set up in Malta beginning in the second half of the 1960s, especially since the 
constitution of the MDC, their statutory benefactor. In classic dual-economy mode, 
the modern, foreign-owned, manufacturing export sector had very limited operational 
contact with the traditional `inward-looking' manufacturing sector. Wholly foreign 
owned green-field establishments, actively sought and promoted by MDC, 
predominated and - literally - only a handful of foreign/local joint ventures were 
significant exporters. Linkages at the production level were few and far between and 
limited mainly to plastic injection and toolmaking for the foreign owned plastic 
products industry (small manufacturers were actively promoted by the foreign owned 
exporters who could thus meet the increasingly insistent market requirement for 
flexible specialisation without making any radical changes to their own internal 
organisation, except downsizing). 
On the whole, however, the overwhelming majority of local manufacturers had no 
other relation to the wider world other than through their roles as importers/buyers of 
raw materials, semi-finished goods, parts, components, plant and equipment, as oil- 
price dependent consumers of energy, and as competitors on the local market - 
together with foreign owned export industry - for certain scarce resources: space 
(MDC was often accused by Maltese entrepreneurs to favour foreign owned projects 
when allocating heavily subsidised factory space in its industrial estates, the only ones 
on the Island), skilled human resources (whereby the larger foreign owned players set 
the wage and salary levels in specific sectors) and training grants (a very limited fund 
taken up almost exclusively by the larger foreign owned exporters). Ironically, the 
push and pull of the world market had been felt in a much more pervasive and 
capillary manner in the heyday of the garment industry in the late 60s and mid-70s, 
when a relatively large number of small local firms produced garments on a CMT 
(cut, make and trim) basis. The programme of industrial restructuring (within which, 
it must be emphasised, IPSE was intended to play a vital role), import liberalisation 
and privatisation was intended to eliminate the traditional / modem, domestic market / 
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export market dichotomies, thereby also eliminating the assumption that export- 
capability and international competitiveness were the exclusive characteristics of the 
large firm and beyond the reach of small and medium sized enterprises. Effectively 
such a programme, if optimally successful, would `socialise' to an unprecedented 
degree the integration of the productive activities on this small island into the world 
economy by bringing most of even the smallest units into contact with global or 
regional markets. Clearly, this programme was an ambitious programme, perhaps 
unrealistic. The more recent comparative literature on Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) indicates that domestic market size ultimately determines whether EPZs 
succeed in drawing local manufacturers into world markets (Schrank: 2001). Small 
countries, let alone microstates, it is implied, simply have to face up to reality and 
lower their aim. Although Malta has been justifiably defined as a one "sovereign free 
trade zone", this does not mitigate the limitations of size. 
The premature fall in October 1998 - after only two out of a five year legislature - of 
the government that set up IPSE, brought about the immediate termination of the 
project we have outlined above and, in 2000, the formal end of IPSE itself when the 
newly constituted Malta Enterprise took over the functions and most of the staff of the 
MDC, IPSE and the export promotion agency METCO (Malta External Trade 
Corporation). 
This paper aims at a broader understanding of the IPSE experience by identifying the 
conditions of its brief existence. The brief narrative above is embedded in specific and 
historically determined institutional, socio-economic, political and cultural structures, 
that constitute the conditions of its coming to be, as well as of its final exit from the 
stage of the history of what we have chosen to term the Maltese microstate, whereby 
its micro-characteristic is itself one of a number of elements of the conditions of 
existence of IPSE and of the political project of which it was such a critical part. It 
was a brief strutting on that stage but it was a centre-stage performance, for not only 
did IPSE share the fate of the government that gave birth to it but its own conditions 
4 Compare to Madami, D., (1999) A Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zones, 
Washington: Trade and Development Research Group, World Bank; Lee, Y. S., (1999) "Labour Shock 
and the Diversity of Transnational Corporate Strategy in Export processing Zones", Growth and 
Change 30 (Summer): 337-365; Johansson, H., Nilsson, L., (1997) "Export Processing Zones", World 
Development 12: 2115-2128. 
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of existence were that very government's own conditions of existence. IPSE's own 
internal contradictions - which contradictions proved ultimately intractable - were 
that government's own internal contradictions, and the latter were so intractable as to 
ultimately cause that government's fall. In other words the issues involved in this 
study go far beyond a technical discussion of SME promotion policies and best 
practices, of organizational and managerial problems. The issues discussed in this 
paper concern the dialectic between economic development (and its contradictions) 
and political development (and its contradictions) in a peripheral capitalist economy 
in conditions of what, in this author's view, is best explained as a prolonged Fordist 
crisis, one that is still in progress. 
3.2.1 The principal thesis 
The principal thesis defended in this study, in fact, is that IPSE and the political 
project of which it was an integral part, indeed the thrust of the 1996-1998 Labour 
government's strategy and the social energies that propelled it into power after nine 
years in opposition, can best be understood as elements of an ultimately inadequate 
attempt at a solution to the crisis of a Fordist system. 
As we have seen, the latter was gradually constructed in the first half of the 1970s 
although the historical roots of its own conditions of existence may be traced to the 
second half of the 1920s, in Britain's attempt to ensure social stability and political 
acquiescence at the lowest possible cost in one of its premier overseas naval bases 
after the 1919 emergency5 and, later, in the light of German rearmament and Italian 
ambitions6. Notwithstanding a series of traumas - some resulting from this Fordist 
system's own internal contradictions and others, such as the oil prices shocks of 1973- 
4 and 1979-80 - it made possible an impressive development dash that coincides with 
the first (1971-1976) and most of the second (1976-1981) Labour governments led by 
Dom Mintoff. 
s2 lines on 7 Giugno 1919 & mutinies in RN ports. 
62 lines on PN's fascist/irredentist leanings. With the middle classes and the bourgeoisie tending 
towards Italy, Britain had to work out an arrangement with its employees in Malta (working class in Dockyards and professionals/white collars in civil service/heath service etc). 
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During this decade the basic material and organizational infrastructure required for 
any sort of modem socio-economic development in a sovereign state were put into 
place, export-led foreign investment driven industrialisation not only replaced the 
thousands of jobs lost with the gradual closing down of British military bases in the 
run-up to their definitive closure at the end of the first quarter of 1979 but also caused 
a net increase in the labour participation rate - especially female - and tourism 
developed into a major foreign exchange earner. 
The legitimate but anomalous result of the 1981 elections (with Labour obtaining a 
majority of seats in parliament but a minority of votes) signals that the Fordist system 
was beginning to crumble under the weight of its own contradictions, indeed it may 
be argued that its very success accelerated the fall from power of the political party 
that alone could mobilise the mass support for a Fordist system in Malta, the Labour 
Party. The latter survived a final momentous legislature (1981-1987) during which the 
Fordist "institutional fix" survived but under almost unbearable political strain that at 
times bordered on to civil strife. The `spontaneous' Fordist social compromises that 
ensured economic growth in the 1970s, had to be formally `imposed from above' in 
the first half of the 1980s: the wage and price freeze of 1982-4 is a case in point. 
Although it effectively `saved' the economy by preventing what would certainly have 
resulted in massive de-investment in export industry and tourism, this draconian 
measure played a major role in bringing down the Labour government at the 1987 
elections. 
Although Fordism is no longer a dominant economic model (albeit the economy of 
the world's most populous nation, China, does exhibit distinct Fordist-regulatory 
features, Chunli Lee 19957), the concept is still useful precisely because without 
reference to (past) Fordist systems, their crisis and disintegration, we could not begin 
to understand the crisis constituted by their passing away (and/or by the absence of a 
See also conference materials from the "Political Regulation and High Technology Development in 
China: the Case of Telecommunications and the Internet Network" and "Making Local Development 
Transnational: Foreign Investment and Institutional Transformation in China" sessions, of the 2006 
Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) 2006. An interesting perspective on 
Chinese Fordism, neo-Fordism and post-Fordism as reflected on distance-learning organisation and 
methodologies is to be found in Dinq Xinqfu, From Fordism to Neo-Fordism: Industrialisation Theory 
and Distance Education. A Chinese Perspective as well as a shorter version of his doctoral dissertation 
A Comparative Study of Distance Higher Education Systems in Australia and China in the series ZIFF 
Papiere, Zentrales Institut fuer Fernstudienfoschung, Hagen, pp. 84-112. 
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functional substitute). Nor can we content ourselves with generic references to the rise 
to dominance on a world-scale of a neo-liberal rationality and globalisation to explain 
the crisis of Fordist regulation, all too often presented as a national[istic], inward- 
looking if not outright autarkic attempt to promote capitalism inside the conceptual 
confines of an outmoded `westphalian' paradigm of statehood. 
Regulation, it cannot be sufficiently emphasised, is not `economic regulation' as 
understood in mainstream economic policy studies, namely as: 
"... a form of government intervention designed to influence the behaviour of firms 
and individuals in the private sector. Other forms include public expenditures, taxes, 
government ownership, loans and loan guarantees, tax expenditures, equity interests 
in private companies and moral suasion. Defined as the `imposition of rules by a 
government, backed by the use of penalties, that are intended specifically to modify 
the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector, ' regulation in 
general is aimed at narrowing choices in certain areas, including prices (airline 
fares, minimum wages, certain agricultural products, telephone rates), supply 
(broadcasting licences, occupational licensing, agricultural production quotas, 
pipeline certificates "of public convenience and necessity'), rate of return (public 
utilities, pipelines), disclosure of information (securities prospectuses, content 
labelling), methods of production (effluent standards, worker health and safety 
standards), standards for products or services (safety of children's toys, quality of 
food products, [local, JMJ-content requirements in broadcasting) and conditions of 
service (requirements to act as a common carrier or not to discriminate in hiring or 
selling goods and services). " 
This definition, from The Canadian Encyclopaedia, is quoted a fairly typical example 
(httl2: //www. encyclopediecanadienne. ca/index. cfm? PPNm=TCE&Params=AI ARTAO 
002514 ). Tellingly it links this entry to another one on "Economic nationalism" 
(http: //www. encyclopediecanadienne. ca/index. cfm? PyNm=TCE&Params=AI ARTAO 
002513). The problem is partly semantic: Aglietta's pioneering text spoke of 
"regulation" and described the theory of regulation as "the analysis of the way in 
which transformations of social relations create new economic and non-economic 
forms, organised in structures that reproduce a determining structure, the mode of 
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production". The restrictive practices listed in the text above, taken from a bilingual 
Canadian publication, are instances of "reglementation" and not of regulation. The 
French version of the said text, in fact, reads as follows: "La reglementation (my 
emphasis, JM) de 1'economie, une des formes d'intervention de I'Etat, vise a influencer 
le comportement des entreprises et des particuliers du secteur prive. " 
(http: //www encyclopediecanadienne ca/index. cfm? PPNm=TCE&Params=FIARTFO 
002514). 
More importantly, however, is that the dichotomous opposition of, on the one hand, a 
supposedly internationalist neo-liberal rationality that tends to dissolve all national 
socio-economic regulation structures and mechanisms to, on the other, an essentially 
nationalistic regulationist paradigm does not bear empirical scrutiny. Some of the 
strongest instances of Fordist regulation regime have been and are, at least selectively, 
open to the world. Not only does Chinese Fordism not imply an inward looking 
regulation regime but, on the contrary, it may be argued that China's attractiveness as 
an internationally competitive foreign direct investment location is due to its Fordist 
regulation regime; indeed, it may be further argued that a precocious dismantling of 
that regime will probably result in a socially critical situation and a hike of the 
political risk of investing in China. Japan itself, in spite of its idiosyncratic variation 
from rigid models of Fordist regulation, could not have developed into a major 
economic power without a robust regulation regimes; Peck and Miyamachi, whilst 
reminding us that regulation theory is not and should not be presented as an inflexible 
transition model but, rather, an evolving approach to political economic research, one 
that can shed light on this country's unique regulation mechanism (1994). In any case, 
these mechanisms certainly did not militate against Japan's aggressive state-supported 
outward foreign direct investment, on the contrary it may be argued that Japanese 
8 With reference to the period of high growth 1955-1973, Itoh agrees that there was indeed a Fordist 
regime of accumulation in place, with domestic demand driving growth, but this took place without 
wage and salary indexation (1988,1992). Uni postulates that the Japanese economy 1962-1973 
constituted a "Fordism without a Fordist wage compromise" (1991,1992). Hirano thinks that in the 
1960s, wages grew stably in Japan (formation of demand) in the medium to long-term but not in the 
short-term; he demonstrates the existence of a Fordist cycle of consumption-production-productivity 
(the Boyer model). Tohyama, on the other hand, there was no Fordist fix; high growth rates were 
obtained by a distribution of productivity gains favourable to capital and investment was profit driven. 
Uni, H. Post-war Japanese Capitalism and Fordism, Keizai-Hyoron, Vol. 40, No. 11,1991 and 
Accumulation Regimes in Japan after the War, Keizaigaku-Zasshi, Vol. 92, No. 5/6,1992 quoted in 
Itoh, M. The Basic Theory of Capitalism, London: Macmillan 1988; Itoh, M. "The Japanese Model of 
Post-Fordism" in Storper, M. and Scott, A. eds., London: Routledge, 1992; 
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direct investment abroad has been a function of the evolving Japanese regulation 
system. We will have occasion to refer again to Japan below when we consider briefly 
the usefulness of the `developmentalist state' model for a study of Malta's post-war 
development. 
Back to Malta, the success of its foreign direct investment policy (in terms of a surge 
of incoming investment that created enough employment to more than replace jobs 
lost through the closing of British bases and to generate enough fiscal income to 
finance an impressive welfare state and the foundations of a modem infrastructure) 
could not have been achieved without the elaborate system of institutional 
compromises that constituted the Maltese regulation system which flourished in the 
1970s; paradoxically even its protectionist policies and its nationalisations of the 
banks were intended (and succeeded) to enhance its international attractiveness as a 
location for foreign direct investment. 
This thesis situates itself in the theoretical framework of regulation theory as 
summarily outlined by Boyer and Saillard (2002: 36-44). The whole study may be 
seen as belonging to a stream of current research, exemplified by but not limited to 
ongoing work9 conducted within the Association Recherche et Regulation network 
attached to LEPII-CNRS at the Universite Pierre Mendes France at Grenoble and 
presided by Robert Boyer. Seminal examples of research on diverse national 
trajectories, in the wake of which this dissertation is located, are Coriat on France, 
Japan and the role of intellectual property rights (1993,1998,2004), Mjoset on the 
Nordic European countries (1993,2004,2007), Inoue and Yamada on Japan (1994), 
Sapir on Russia (1990), Hillcoat (1986) and Miotti on Argentina (1994), Ominami 
(1989), on Chile, Aboites (1989) and Hernandez Laos on Mexico, Gutierrez Garza 
(2003) on. Especially relevant to this paper is the theme of "subordinate international 
insertion" of national-specific regulation systems in Latin America. Boyer's "National 
trajectories: From canonical Fordism to different modes of development" (2002: 229- 
237) provides an outline of the scope of contemporary research into the complex 
For a list of dissertations defended by members of the network at the Universite Pierre 
Mendes France between 2000 and 2007 as and for doctoral work in progress, see 
http: //web. upmf-grenoble. fr/lenii/reaulation/Theses actualites/theses html 
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systems that keep a society together in spite of the internal contradictions of the 
development of capitalism within, as well as at the international and global levels. 
A definitional sketch of Fordism is sufficient for the purposes of this study. Following 
Boyer, we define Fordism as one of a number of possible accumulation regimes, that 
is as a system of regularities that make possible the overall process of capital 
accumulation, thereby permitting "the resolution or postponement of the distortions 
and disequilibria to which the process continually gives rise" (Boyer 2002). 
Specifically, Fordism is an accumulation regime characterised by three distinguishing 
features, whereby the first two define the so-called "regulationist wage nexus ": 
(1) An organisation of work whose inner logic tends towards a fragmentation of 
the division of labour into separate tasks, mechanisation of production 
processes and the clear cut separation of design and production; 
(2) By means of an institutional compromise employees share the gains of 
productivity other than through market mechanisms (that is, not through the 
increase in the "price" of labour that is a consequence of diminishing labour 
supply consequent upon extreme accumulation); 
(3) The above are complemented by "compatible institutional forms ", whether it 
occurs within oligopolistic competition or a monetary regime based on credit. 
In addition, an essential characteristic is that the process of adjustment of 
production and demand occurs mainly within a single nation.. . in other words, 
intensive accumulation is governed by internal consumption. (Boyer and 
Saillard 2005: 338) 
Fordism, it must be emphasised, is not the only issue of Regulation Theory. This 
supposition, Boyer notes, "... confuses an important theoretical result with founding 
concepts, methods or ability to explain and interpret a range of phenomena far wider 
than economic growth during the 1960s" (Boyer 2005: 2). Regulation theory has 
inspired and informed thirty years of empirically grounded research of concrete and 
geographically diverse social formations since the appearance of Aglietta's pioneering 
work. The focus of regulation theory is no longer on Fordism but on their internal 
96 
contradictions. It is the failure to understand this that encourages the accusation that 
Regulation Theory is "... a conciliatory analysis of perpetual capitalism ", a 
capitalism "without contradiction" capable of forever defusing its own disequilibria 
through self-regulatory mechanisms. "Not at all, " replies Boyer, 
"given that the concept of Fordism emerges frý om observation of the limits of the post- 
war growth regime at the time when it entered a structural crisis. In more general 
terms, all accumulation regimes and modes of regulation are affected by a series of 
disequilibria and conflicts that eventually destabilise them. The theory's relevance 
does not derive from an analysis of stabilised regimes, but rather from its capacity to 
detect and anticipate probable sources of crisis: regulation and crisis are linked as 
intimately as two sides of a coin" (ibid). 
Crisis is, after all, precisely the fundamental condition within which the objects of 
investigation of the present study are situated. They may be said to be amongst the 
results of the crisis of a specific national instance of Fordist regulation, a crisis 
brought about by the contradictions that the Fordist system itself attempted to contain 
through a complex edifice of institutional compromises, which contradictions were to 
some extent exacerbated by the `collateral damage' caused by Fordist regulation 
itself. IPSE - itself the scene of attempted institutional and social compromises (in the 
literal sense of a locus of representation, where the said compromises were publicly 
enacted) - was one such outcome. The long crisis of the Fordist regulation system that 
had flourished in the 1970s was one of IPSE's principal conditions of existence and 
IPSE was itself an attempt to restore some sort of regulation system to resolve that 
crisis. It was, however, an inadequate solution even though its final design was 
technically impressive in its bid to go beyond the post-Fordist rhetoric of much SME 
development doctrine. Its inadequacy was social and political, and inasmuch it 
reflected the social and political inadequacy of the New Labour government of 1996- 
1998. Later in this section, this will be put forward as the second central thesis of this 
study. 
In practice, a successful Fordist institutional compromise is one that binds together 
the industrial working class and the dominant fraction/s of the industrial bourgeoisie 
by institutionalising a social and political compromise between them whereby the 
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relationship between wages and capital accumulation is regulated by means other than 
the market-determined supply and demand of labour but by extra-economic means to 
ensure the best possible fit between production and consumption. This institutional 
compromise defuses situations that could lead to structural ruptures, thereby ensuring 
the further development of capitalism even in exceptionally critical situations. Under 
normal conditions the consent of the subaltern classes at the level of production (on 
the shop floor) is secured not through imposition `from above' or `mechanically', 
through the action of repressive state apparatuses (in Althusser's sense) such as 
legislation and the judiciary and enforced by police action or military intervention, but 
through the effective organisation of consent `from below', the result of the 
construction of hegemony (in the sense developed by Gramsci, the first to attempt to 
theorise Fordism) by the dominant fraction of the ruling class over other fractions of 
the same class and over the subaltern classes through the action of the ideological 
state apparatuses (amongst which Althusser includes, together with the educational 
system and other, also the trade unions). 
In practice, there is never a purely `moral' or `spontaneous' compromise 
enthusiastically consented to `from below'. In practice, it is always a mixture of carrot 
and stick, of persuasion and coercion with the threat of coercion more or less visible 
but ever-present, almost always legitimate in terms of legislation often agreed to - in 
the national interest - at the legislative level by parties with working class mass bases; 
sometimes the coercive element borders on the illegal or even crosses the border 
between the legal and the illegal and seeks justification on the bases of a real or 
allegedly real exceptional situation (the coup d'etat is a case in point). It is important 
to note the following: 
(1) A Fordist institutional compromise is an inherently unstable construction that, 
whilst it attempts to secure socio-political stability and continuity with a view 
to safeguard the `economic system' or - more precisely - the capitalist 
accumulation process, it itself is not free of internal contradictions; 
(2) There is not one such invariable and universal model of the Fordist 
institutional compromise, but - at the level of a `concrete analysis of a 
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concrete situation' - there are as many variants as there are national contexts 
within which the situation is situated; 
(3) At a mid-range level of abstraction (broadly in the Mertonian sense) there are 
a number of recognisable categorical variants: say, the authoritarian type such 
as the fascist state in Italy 1922-1943 and Germany 1933-1945, the Keynesian 
social-democratic type which includes the New Deal period in the US in spite 
of an antipathy towards both Keynes and social democratic politics. 
This cursory review of the regulationist approach - which needs to be read in close 
relation with section 2.5.3 The Althusserian concreteness of the regulationists 
(above) - would be incomplete without a look at Jessop's approach to regulation, 
especially the Fordism/post-Fordism dichotomy. 
Having had the advantage of an arms distance overview of various regulationist 
schools, Jessop has synthesised a useful framework for the concrete research. We 
conclude this section with a tabular overview of what he refers to as the five 
"alternative referents for Fordism /post-Fordism " (Table 3b). This overview, 
however, must be seen against the background of Jessop's assumption that 
tendentially Fordism gives way to post-Fordism, and that the Keynesian welfare state 
is replaced by the "Schumpeterian workfare state" (Jessop and Sum 2006). 
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Table 3b: Five alternative referents for Fordism / post-Fordism 
" Labour (production) process (= a particular configuration of technical and social relations of 
production) 
and/or/4 
" An accumulation regime (= a macroeconomic regime sustaining growth in capitalist 
production and consumption) 
and/or/4 
"A social mode of economic regulation (= an ensemble of norms, institutions, organisational 
forms, social networks and patterns of conduct which guide and govern a given accumulation 
regime). 
and/or/4 
"A mode of societalisation (= a pattern of institutional integration and social cohesion which 
complements the dominant accumulation regime and its social mode of economic regulation, 
thereby securing the conditions for its dominance within the wider society). 
and/or/U 
"A social formation characterised by the contingent correspondence of all four preceding 
features. 
Source: Jessop and Sum (2006) 
Jessop and Sum concede that there is no consensus amongst regulationists regarding 
the definition of Fordism / post-Fordism. Elaborating on the framework above, they 
illustrate "ideal-typical" (note the Weberian terminology) characterisations of what 
happens at each level in Fordism (see Table 3c). 
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Table 3c: Ideal-typical characterisations of Fordism 
" Distinct type of labour process independently of any other linkages. Mass production of 
complex consumer durables based on moving assembly line techniques with semi-skilled 
labour of mass worker. 
" Stable mode of macroeconomic growth. Virtuous circle of growth in relatively closed 
economies. Mass production, rising productivity based on economies of scale, rising incomes 
linked to productivity, increased mass demand owing to rising wages, increased profits based 
on full utilisation of capacity and increased investment in improved mass production 
equipment and techniques. Exports of goods and services rising wages increasing mass 
consumption imports of mass produced consumer durables. 
"A social mode of economic regulation. Exclusively (ideal-typical) or dominant (i. e. linked 
with other - subordinate - types). Involving: (a) separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations with multidivisional, decentralised organisation subject to central controls; 
(b)monopoly pricing; (c) union recognition and collective bargaining; (d) wages indexed to 
productivity growth and retail price inflation; (e) monetary emission and credit policies 
oriented to securing effective aggregate demand; (f) state-sponsored social reproduction 
oriented to the generalisation of norms of mass consumption and the provision of 
infrastructure and means of collective consumption suitable to a Fordist mode of growth; (g) 
state involvement in managing conflicts between capital and labour over individual and social 
wages to maintain virtuous circle of growth (key wage bargains in mass production 
industries), wage benchmarks set in mass production industries through comparability claims 
and indexation of welfare benefits financed through progressive taxation for non-gainfully 
employed). 
"A general pattern of social organization. Consumption of standardised mass commodities in 
nuclear family households and provision of standardised collective goods by bureaucratic 
state. Implied: Fordist society is typically urban-industrial, middle class, wage earning. 
" Fordism sometimes a "co presence, structural coupling, co-evolution and strategic co- 
ordination of all four possible Fordist phenomena. " 
Source: Jessop and Sum (2006) 
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As far as post-Fordism is concerned, Jessop and Sum identify the ideal-types 
illustrated in Table 3d at each of the four levels: 
Table 3d: Ideal-typical characterisations of post-Fordism 
" "As a labour process, post-Fordism can be defined as af exible production process based on 
flexible machines or systems and an appropriately flexible workforce. Its crucial hardware is 
microelectronics-based information and communications technologies. These are relevant to 
'manual and non-manual work, to small, medium and large businesses, at corporate, 
divisional and workplace level, to managements and unions, and so on' (Clark 1989: 6). This 
enables post-Fordism to spread far beyond flexible mass production of complex consumer 
durables in large factories. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 75) 
" "As a stable mode of macroeconomic growth, any virtuous post-Fordist circle would reflect 
the newly dominant labour process and changes in international economic relations. An ideal- 
typical post-Fordist accumulation regime would be based on flexible production, growing 
productivity based on economies of scope, rising incomes for polyvalent skilled workers and 
the service class, an increased demand for differentiated goods and services favoured by the 
growing discretionary element in these incomes, increased profits based on technological 
rents and the full utilization of flexible capacity, reinvestment in more flexible production 
equipment and techniques and/or new sets of products, and a further boost to economies of 
scope. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 76-77) 
" "As a mode of regulation, post-Fordism would involve commitment to supply-side innovation 
and f exibility in each of the main areas of regulation. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 77-79) 
" "The post-Fordist 'mode of societalisation' is especially uncertain because, in contrast to the 
post-war dominance of the American model, the crisis of Fordism has seen rivalry between 
Japanese, West German, and American models. In addition the spatial division of labour is 
being reorganized in and across national systems. " (Jessop and Sum 2006: 79-82) 
Source: Jessop and Sum (2006) 
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3.2.2 The dismantling of the Fordist edifice 
Let us now return to the Maltese case. The dismantling of the Fordist edifice 
continued throughout the nine years of Nationalist administration (1987-1996), as 
evidenced by a fall of Malta's international competitiveness and therefore of its 
attractiveness as foreign direct investment location. This situation was not lived as a 
crisis by the Nationalist government and the social bloc that it represented. The 
diminishing importance of industry in the national economy was presented - and still 
is, but to a lesser and more subdued extent - as a historical inevitability given what 
was pictured as a global trend towards a post-industrial future. Government 
ideologues even suggested that industry had to be considered as a historical anomaly 
for a small island-state such a Malta, one whose maritime traditions and historical 
vocation was necessarily oriented towards trading and services. Industry was 




"There is a strong, Marxist-inspired prejudice against merchants as compared to 
industrialists, based on Marx's view that the merchant bourgeoisie delayed the rise of 
capitalism in Western Europe, and hence slowed down the march of history. But it 
can easily be argued that, in so doing, they toned down the inhumanity of the process 
and ensured a more equitable balance between the interests of the present and future 
generations. The flexibility of mind and other skills required to carry out a mediating 
economic function are plainly more humanly satisfying and self-reliant than the type 
of industry that has been set up in Malta in recent years. " (Serracino Inglott: 1980) 
These words were written by a leading ideologist of the opposition Nationalist party 
in 1980, when the Labour government was desperate to contain the damage that the 
oil-price driven international economic crisis was inflicting on its efforts to attract 
industry to Malta in a bid to make up for the job losses resulting from the closure of 
British military bases only the year before. The convergence of this vaguely post- 
modem point of view with post-Fordist (or radically pre-Fordist) visions is 
remarkable. In his Alternative Future for Malta, Serracino Inglott pleads for a non- 
industrial future where the Fordist factory is replaced by a pre-capitalist utopia of 
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small independent producers, cooperative farmers and merchants, and the Fordist state 
is replaced by a radically decentralised polity. 
This radically defeatist point of view, one that often emerges in such conjunctures, 
argues that one does not need worry because with the developed world already in a 
`post-industrial' stage, there is no point in attempting to promote industry, let alone 
making an effort to attract foreign direct investment in industry. To insist on the 
promotion of industrial development, we are told, is to exhibit a Marxist fixation with 
alleged iron laws of history that require a country to go through capitalist 
industrialisation before it can hope to emancipate itself from it. 
The second half of the 1980 and the first half of the 1990s witnessed an 
extraordinarily creative attempt at identity reconstruction and re-branding to 
compensate for the economic effects of the Fordist crisis. Prominent Maltese 
intellectuals sincerely believed that Malta was going in the right direction, namely 
towards a 'post-business, post-capitalist, knowledge society" such as was predicated 
by Drucker (1993). Friggieri, Serracino Inglott's successor to the chair of philosophy 
at the University of Malta, for example, seized upon Fukuyama and Lyotard to 
condemn Labour's "monopolistic and totalising vision" of history. "Mintoff', he 
wrote in an article on the Nationalist party's political journal, "challenged the 
religious-ecclesiastic metanarrative and attempted to substitute it with a narrative 
inspired by the most statist form of socialism ". The Nationalist party on the other 
hand, Friggieri argued, refused metanarratives in favour a plurality of narratives, 
individual initiative and "marketing liberalisation" (1994: 28-9). The political 
sustainability of this line depended, however, on the extent of Nationalist 
government's success in generating alternative sources of employment to compensate 
for the relative and absolute decrease in the importance of industry as a generator of 
wealth. However, although financial services and tourism played an increasingly 
important role in the economy, these could not - on their own - compensate for the 
reduction in the importance of industry. The Nationalist government resorted to public 
expenditure to sustain growth and, once the considerable reserves accumulated in the 
1970s and early 1980s had been depleted, it resorted to deficit-financed public 
spending. Whilst this fulfilled the requirements of entrepreneurs in the import and 
wholesale distribution sectors, real estate and insurance, and went some way to 
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satisfying the new petty bourgeoisie element of its mass support base, especially 
actual and aspiring public sector employees, it did nothing for the governing 
Nationalist party's other traditional element of the social bloc it represented, the self- 
employed and particularly those encadred in the above mentioned GRTU, the General 
Retailers' & Traders' Union. 
This breach in the government's defences was successfully stormed by the Labour 
party but not before electing a new leader (with Alfred Sant, a Harvard DBA and 
former chief executive of the MDC, replacing the populist Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici), 
re-branding itself as New Labour, demonstratively moving its headquarters from its 
industrial waterfront location in the militant working class of Cottonera district to a 
newly built vaguely post-modem block in Hamrun, an area with a considerable 
concentration of small furniture makers, tailors and mid-market high street retail 
outlets. New Labour's electoral commitment to scrap the newly introduced Value- 
Added Tax (VAT) if it won the 1996 elections, galvanised the self-employed and won 
it the GRTU's support. With an eye towards the acute shortage of workshop space 
authorised by the planning authorities and MDC's preference for export oriented 
industry (as already noted above, almost exclusively foreign), the Labour party also 
promised equal treatment with foreign investors by MDC for locally owned small 
enterprises (albeit, without distinguishing between manufacturing, services and retail). 
3.2.3 The Ramboll Report and `Flexible Specialisation' 
t 
6 
Gradually, the governing Nationalist party - under pressure from the FOI, many of 
whose members were apprehensive about the impact of EU accession on industries 
oriented mainly or exclusively towards the local market and until then still protected 
by duty tariffs and an additional protective levy - had begun to complement its post- 
industrial rhetoric with a renewed interest in industrial strategy. A number of 
significant foreign exporters were also privately beginning to express concern that the 
government's enthusiasm about EU membership might lead Maltese negotiators to 
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agree to scrap the generous package of investment incentives without fighting 
for 
significant derogations. '° 
The FOI and the CoC, with EU assistance and government endorsement, finally 
commissioned a study of the state of industry in Malta within the scenario of 
hypothetical EU accession in the next round of its expansion and on the restructuring 
required to enable the less competitive sections of industry to survive and possible 
thrive in a regime of customs' union with the EU. The study, carried out by a British 
consultant for Ramboll Gruppen A/S - the Scandinavian engineering consulting group 
that was formally awarded the EU contract - had been largely completed by the 1996 
elections but was only published after immediately after the roundly defeated 
Nationalist government was replaced with a Labour administration". Anecdotal 
evidence strongly supports the conjecture that the FOI and the CoC withheld 
publication during the electoral campaign as this would have damaged the Nationalist 
party's chances of being returned. 
The thrust of the report was that unless immediate steps were taken to construct "a 
stable macroeconomic future for Malta" -a process that would certainly mean 
"short-term pain" - namely, restructure industry (with special attention to the largely 
small locally owned industrial enterprises, a sector whose importance in terms of 
gainful employment contrasted sharply its irrelevance in terms of exports), and focus 
on promoting small high value-added foreign direct investment (indicating that the net 
contribution of large industrial establishments to the national economy was negative - 
the report recommended "capping" the value of benefits and incentives granted to the 
larger transnationals operating in the Island - and implying that volatility was inherent 
in the corporate interests of large industrial establishments producing the sort of goods 
exported by transnationals in Malta). The report also advocated the abolition of trade- 
E 
F 
10 Both expatriate and locally recruited managers of foreign owned firms, especially those of 
transnational subsidiaries, have generally been - in the Maltese experience - discreet in expressing 
their views on politically sensitive issues, even within the sectorial committees of the FOI where the 
most outspoken tend to be local entrepreneurs whose political allegiances are in any case almost 
invariably well known and whose enterprises are - again in the Maltese case - generally smaller than 
the foreign owned and with few exceptions oriented towards the local market. 
"The Study and Action Plan for the Restructuring of Malta's Manufacturing Sector was formally 
published in June 1996 but was not available to the public until after the October 1996 elections, 
followed by an Action Plan: Addendum to the Rambell Report in October 1997. 
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union backed restrictive practices (especially in the loading and unloading business in 
harbours) and public sector cuts (resisted by the trade unions) 12. 
Although the authors do not acknowledge their intellectual sources (and may have 
well not been conscious of their affinities - elective or otherwise - with them), the 
underlying philosophy of the Rambell diagnosis and recommendations regarding 
manufacturing is embedded in the flexible specialisation paradigm as theorised by 
Piore and Sabel in 1984, a paradigm within which is also embedded Charles Sabel's 
study for the OECD LEED (Local Economic & Employment Development) 
Programme on Ireland published in 1996, the same year as Simon Armstrong's 
Ramboll report on Malta. 
Flexible specialisation discourse was, to borrow the often-quoted expression used by 
Marshall regarding the transmission of trade skills from one generation to the next in 
an industrial district, "as, it were, in the air" and the authors of the Ramboll report 
copiously partook of that "air". 
A year before the Ramboll report, Sabel together with the Italian sociologist Arnaldo 
Bagnasco edited Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. Also in 1995, Michael Piore 
published Beyond Inidvidualism, wherein he argued that we "might find in yeoman 
democracy an indigenous model for our business institutions" (Piore 1995: 143), thus 
taking up again the suggestion first put forward by himself and Sabel in 1984 that 
"the idea of yeoman democracy [could] become the rallying cry of economic 
reconstruction" (Piore, Sabel 2001 [1984]: 305), an "ideal" that was "the most likely 
to catalyse American efforts to rebuild the economy on the model of flexible 
specialization" (304). 
As noted by Marquand, the vision of a yeoman democracy derived from Piore and 
Sabel, who "define it as the political analogue to flexible specialization, [... J as a late 
twentieth century equivalent to the Jeffersonian democracy of the late-eighteenth 
century, in which the role of the state is to create `the conditions conducive to a 
republic of small holders ", appealed to those social groups that were disappointed 
12 http: //www. doi. gov. mt/EN/commentaries/1997/10/tim2I . asp 
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with the neo-liberal vision of an influential current13 within the Nationalist party 
notably, on the one hand, white-collar public sector employees including the 
influential the teaching profession and, on the other hand, the self-employed and SME 
owners in production (including agriculture and fisheries) and services (including 
transport and retail). 
Both the Nationalist and `New' Labour parties expressed muted and cautious support 
for the Ramboll report and the ensuing recommendations for an Action Plan, albeit to 
the extent that the recommendations could have appealed (in the perception of the two 
parties, which perceptions were determined by partially distinct `world-views' as well 
as different electoral strategies) to the petty bourgeoisie or some of its sections as 
listed above. Both parties (in different manners also depending on whether in different 
moments of the Ramboll saga they were in or out of office) were careful not to appear 
to support any particular recommendation that could alienate any of these social 
groups. 
On the other hand, with the dissolution of the effective but inherently unstable Fordist 
regulation system that had been painstakingly constructed in the Mintoff period on the 
basis of a complex of social alliances and institutional compromises -a regulation 
system that had provided the social and political conditions of existence of the 
productivity gains achieved in the 1970s - Malta in the mid-1990s seemed destined 
for ever lower levels of international competitiveness. With such a catastrophic 
prospect, ably underlined by Armstrong and his team, neither of the two political 
13 This current is typified by former finance minister John Dalli - who has been relegated to the back 
benches following his defeat in the internal contest for party leadership; Dalli masterminded, amongst 
other operations, the controversial sale of the Maltese government's controlling shareholding in Mid 
Med Bank - formerly Barclays, nationalised by the Mintoff administration in xxx and a critical element 
of the Fordist regulation system constructed during the Mintoff period - to HSBC. Opposing this 
liberal current (tendentially - but relatively - also the most secular and `modern' within the Nationalist 
party) is that best typified by the present leader and prime minister Lawrence Gonzi, a Catholic 
conservative, close to the Catholic Action movement and nephew of former archbishop Sir Michael 
Gonzi 1885-1984 -a highly `political' prelate, a `statesman' whose institutional stature and influence 
made him part of the state apparatus even though he was formally external to it, he began his political 
career in the Labour Party but in 1961 interdicted the latter and all who supported it; it was only after 
`peace' with Mintoff that the Labour party could win the 1971 elections and set out to develop the 
complex and delicate system of institutional compromises that made Fordist regulation possible. 
Lawrence Gonzi's current is more concerned not to alienate the Nationalist party's mass support base 
and therefore less eager to deregulate, liberalise, privatise and downsize public expenditure and public 
sector employment at all costs. Significantly Lawrence Gonzi's constituency is in the working class Cottonera district, a traditional Labour stronghold. 
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parties - least of all Labour - could afford to ignore the Ramboll report and the 
baggage of flexible specialisation notions and assumptions that came with it. 
Armstrong's remedies for Malta's increasing uncompetitiveness were not essentially 
different from the prescription proposed by Piore and Sabel with their epoch-making 
The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (1984) in the context of the 
`industrial policy debate' in the US. Piore and Sabel proposed radical changes in their 
country's economic structure. Discarding `solutions' such as protectionism, 
investment and development planning at a national level as well as managerial 
reform, they postulate that `flexible specialisation' based on craft-type skills and 
multifunctional tools (as opposed to industrial tools whose use and function are 
limited to only a unique `step' in the production flow) must replace mass production 
with semi-skilled labour and single-product machinery. Sabel, in his Work and 
Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry (1982), distinguishes between stable and 





exists at the bottom of the business cycle: a demand satisfied by large Fordist mass 
production establishments seeking to compete on unit cost by turning to the highest 
possible number of identical units in the least possible time and, therefore, unable to 
competitively accommodate demand for smaller orders of diverse products, that part 
of demand defined by Piore as `unstable'. 
Whereas Piore and Sabel also argued that a regime of flexible specialisation in 
industry could also provide the foundations for a Rousseauian democratic capitalism - 
a nostalgic retrograde utopia - they did not envision the flexible specialisation 
industrial model itself as a return to pre-industrial production method but as a leap 
forward to a greater flexibility, a dynamic technology and an immensely greater 
variety of products. 
The appeal of the Ramboll report for both political parties in Malta was fuelled by the 
fact that flexible specialisation was for them not just an intellectual construct born in 
the US around fourteen years before 14, it was also a trend that the country had been 
experiencing for some years. Whereas early foreign direct investment in Malta tended 
14 Too early for Alfred Sant, leader of the Labour party from 1993 to date and prime minister 1996- 
1998, whose studies in the US began in 1975 (MBA at Boston) and ended in 1979 (with a Harvard 
doctorate in Business Administration). 
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to be of the Fordist type (inflexible fragmentation of operational roles and mass 
production of goods for what Piore calls the `stable' part of demand), the gradual 
increase of production costs due mainly to increase in wages determined by the 
regulation project itself (introduction of the national minimum wage, equal wages for 
women, statutory annual bonuses and cost of living increases over the minimum 
wage) and by exogenous factors (oil price increases), led several existing exporting 
companies to (1) restructure themselves and to acquire a flexible specialisation 
capability (and, in some cases, downsizing themselves in the process), and (2) 
encouraging highly skilled technicians in certain sections (notably tool-making, such 
as the moulds' workshops in plastic products establishments) to set up separate 
companies and become external outsourcing suppliers. 
The MDC itself, increasingly conscious that Malta was no longer sufficiently 
competitive to attract large stable-demand oriented operations. It modified its 
investment promotion strategy and began to target smaller unstable-demand oriented 
operations based on flexible specialisation. As a matter of fact, in the mid-1980s, 
MDC set out to build smaller factory buildings. The average standard building in the 
1970s had a total covered-area footprint of 3,000 square metres separated by an 
internal dividing wall into two 1,500 square metre factories each with its own 
entrance, loading bay and office area. Notwithstanding this, investors frequently 
would be allocated the whole building. Responding to urgent demand for factory 
space, both for new wholly foreign owned exporting operations and for locally owned 
domestic-market operators, in the mid-80s MDC's launched 700 square metre x2 
model. 
Recapitulating: the interest in SME promotion epitomised by the setting up of IPSE in 
1996-98 within the framework of the (New) Labour government's restructuring and 
liberalisation programme (itself framed within the project of an industrial free trade 
zone with the EU and partial privatisation) is first of all a political response to the 
dissolution of the complex institutional compromises that constituted socio-economic 
regulation system of the 1970s, a dissolution that had been progressing throughout the 
1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The causes of this dissolution are to be found 
principally in the very success of the old `Mintoffian' regulation system although, it 
must not be lost sign of, socio-economic regulation systems are inherently unstable. 
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The cost of co-opting the working class in the effort to develop a peripheral capitalism 
in the absence if a national democratic industrial bourgeoisie - whereby the latter's 
historic role had to be taken up by the (old) Labour party - was that the cost of labour 
finally exceeded the economy's capacity to cope with it whilst retaining its 
international competitiveness. 
Whereas the system worked smoothly in its expansive phase (in this first phase, not 
only was the working class satisfied with growing nominal and real wages, and with 
the provision of cheap housing and 'own home' building plots, new education 
possibilities for their children etc) but their ownership of the development effort 
(capitalist but dubbed socialist) enabled them to tolerate the cost to them of this 
development: reduction in religious holidays, draconian measures to reduce sick 
leave, for those who (before 1979) still worked with the British armed forces the 
knowledge that they would inevitably soon lose their job, the import restrictions 
imposed to make import substitution work (the Maltese still joke about the bad 
chocolate and toothpaste they had to make do with in that period). Nevertheless the 
system worked and it not only co-opted the working class but also - in the expansive 
phase -a critical mass of the self-employed an the small entrepreneur: the almost 
annual increase in the national minimum wage boosted demand for locally produced 
goods and services, the distribution of thousands of cheap building plots to people 
who would normally not be able to afford to build and own a house also created work 
for small builders, joiners, plumbers, tillers... in short for a social group that did not 
normally associate itself with Labour. 
Pain exceeded gain in the system's later years. The sorest case in point is the 
government's decision to impose a wage and price freeze (the former worked, the 
latter worked less) in 1982-1985 in response to international crisis and the country's 
loss of competitiveness. Not surprisingly Labour lost the majority of valid votes at the 
1981 elections and only retained government because it won a majority of seats. 
Nevertheless, it was an unequivocal defeat at the 1987 elections. 
Recourse to flexible specialisation theory is useful for a better understanding of this 
post-Fordist phase (by `post-Fordist phase' this author only understands a transitional 
period following the dissolution of a regulation system - hence a period of crisis 
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characterised by the absence of the institutional compromises that constitute a 
regulation system, a crisis reflected in the rapid loss of productivity and international 
competitiveness of this period, as well as slow growth and accumulation). The theory 
of flexible specialisation, in Malta's case, explains the restructuring and downsizing 
(and, occasionally, the closure) of several foreign owned large exporters in the 1980s 
and 1990s, as well as the changing physiognomy of foreign direct investment in Malta 
and, consequently, strategic and operational policy changes at the national investment 
promotion agency, MDC. It also explains the interest generated by the Ramboll 
report, whose underlying doctrine was an echo of Piore and Sabel's ideas. 
3.2.4 Understanding the failure of Regulation through Regulation Theory 
Flexible specialisation theory does not, however, on its own explain the dissolution of 
the regulation system of the 1970s. It does not take us very far to understand the 
institutional and political dimensions of the crisis of the system of social compromises 
that made peripheral dependent capitalist development possible in the Mintoff period, 
nor - again, on its own - is it capable of explaining the effort to reconstruct a new 
system of institutional compromises by the self-styled New Labour party in its brief 
permanence in government during 1996-1998. Furthermore, whereas flexible 
specialisation theory does help us to understand the intellectual `atmosphere' within 
which the original proposal for an SME-promotion organisation was conceived (an 
`atmosphere' produced not only by the global propagation of an intellectual current 
born a decade earlier in the US but also by the local effects of far-reaching 
transformations in the structure of the world economy), it is insufficient to explain 
either the concrete and specific effects or the concrete and specific attempts at 
solutions (successful or otherwise) on the ground in Malta (nor any other specifically 
concrete situation - in the classic Leninist sense - anywhere else in the world). 
The intellectual tool most suited to help us understand the failure of regulation in the 
1980s -a failure that lead to a prolonged period without solid and all encompassing 
institutional compromises - is regulation theory itself. Not only does it explain the 
development and necessity of institutional compromises for sustained growth in an 
export-led, foreign investment and technology economy such as Malta's, but - if 
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complemented by other approaches as was indicated above and as will be further 
elaborated below - it also provides a framework within which to formulate 
explanations for the causes of the failure of these compromises and the consequences. 
The regulation approach - necessarily one that hovers at a sufficiently high altitude 
above the ground to afford a broad historical and macro-structural panorama - needs 
to complemented by a low-flying approach, one - such as that advocated by 
Granovetter in a seminal text of the `new economic sociology', that is more concerned 
with "proximate causes [... J, for these broader questions cannot be satisfactorily 
addressed without more detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which sweeping 
change has its effects" (1985: 507). 
It is interesting that in the above quoted text, Granovetter refers in passing to the 
limitations of macro-structural analyses of `dual economy' and dependent 
development and of "broad and sweeping macropolitical or macroeconomic terms, 
with little appreciation ofproximate social structural causes" (ibid). 
"Analysts of dual economy have often suggested, for example, that the persistence of 
large numbers of small firms in the periphery' is explained by large corporations' 
need to shift the risks of cyclical fluctuations in demand or of uncertain R&D 
activities; failures of these small units will not adversely affect the larger firms' 
earnings. I suggest here that small firms in a market may persist instead because a 
dense network of social relations is overlaid on the business relations connecting such 
firms and reduces pressures for integration. This does not rule out risk shifting as an 
explanation with a certain face validity. But the embeddedness account may be more 
useful in explaining the large number of small establishments not characterised by 
satellite or peripheral status. " (ibid). 
In a situation, such as Malta's, where the extreme fragmentation of the `traditional' 
sector producing for the domestic market and the persistence within it of a large 
number of small and micro-enterprises coexisted with the medium and large foreign- 
owned export oriented establishments in the `modern' sector during the Fordist 
regulation period, and therefore predated the crisis of Fordist regulation and the 
pressures towards flexible specialisation contemporaneous with the crisis (which 
113 
pressures did contribute to the crisis), Granovetter's suggestion that we should seek 
other complementary explanations for the survival (and, in some cases, proliferation) 
of the small firm, makes a lot of sense. 
It might be suggested that the notion of `developmentalist state' might be better suited 
than regulation for an understanding of Malta's post-war development. The standard 
critical exposition of the concept of developmental state as used by its `father' 
Chalmers Johnson in his pioneering studies (1982,1995) on what he refers to as the 
"Japanese difference" (1995: 51-68) - not to be confused with intractable 
uniqueness ("the Japanese case is neither unique, exceptional, purely culturally 
based, irrational, nor inherently unstable" 1995: 25) -, as well as for its archaeology 
and epistemology, is that constituted by the contributions of Woo-Cumings, Cumings 
and Johnson himself in the volume of essays edited by. Woo-Cumings (1999: 1-31,61- 
93,32-60 respectively). Pempel's critical insights (1999: 137-181) into Johnson's 
essentially ideal-typical Weberian notion of "plan-rational capitalist developmental 
state, conjoining private ownership with state guidance" (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 2), 
together with the comparative perspectives provided by Kohli on South Korea 
(1999: 93-136), Ross Schneider on Brazil and Mexico (1999: 276-305), Herring on 
India (1999: 306-334), Loriaux on France (1999: 235-275), and the political economic 
analyses of the developmentalism contributed by Ha-Joon Chang (1999: 182-199) and 
Vartiainen (1999: 200-234), when taken together suggest - in this author's views - 
that the developmentalist ideal-type, for all its epistemological limitations, enhances 
our understanding of the institutional compromises within which Fordist 
accumulation regimes are embedded but it cannot, on its own, replace it. 
Developmentalism's focus on the apparent predominance of the political moment in 
the complex dialectic between the economy and the state in advanced capitalism, a 
predominance reflected in a nationalism-driven hegemonic ideology, tends to lose 
sight of the mechanisms of the accumulation regime and the institutional 
compromises within which these mechanisms are embedded. Not all observers of the 
developmentalist state in South East Asia can be criticised in the same manner; Wade 
(1990), who does not lose sight of the economy/state dialectic, is a case in point, and 
hence his appeal to heterodox development policy-makers in Africa (Mhone 2003). 
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The nationalist element that is so important in the Japanese case is interesting from a 
Gramscian point of view within the framework of the functionally related concepts of 
`historical bloc' and `hegemony' - themselves, as we have seen, important elements 
of an `ecumenic' theory of regulation. Japanese scholars have long realised the 
usefulness of Gramscian concepts for the study of Japanese neo-nationalism and its 
cementing, hegemonic role within Japanese capitalism15. From this point of view the 
considerable interest in both Gramsci and the regulation approach in Japan (a fact 
witnessed by Jessop in the course of his 1997 visit to Hitotsubashi University 16), a trip 
that coincided with the visits of Professor Robert Boyer from Paris (certainly the 
doyen of regulation research today) and Professor Joseph Buttigieg from Notre Dame 
University (a Maltese citizen, he is editor and translator of the multi-volume complete 
critical edition of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks -a project that has been supported by a 
major grant from the US National Endowment for the Humanities -, member of the 
editorial commission for the Italian national edition of Gramsci's complete works and 
secretary of the International Gramsci Society). The presence of Boyer and Buttigieg 
in Japan, both of whom Jessop was able to meet, confirms the recognition of the 
intensity and quality of both regulation and Gramscian studies in Japan. 
This is an -important observation if for no other reason than the fact that this author 
does not see in the literature known to him to date any satisfactory concept of state (or 
any theory of the state), that is one that comprehends, on the one hand, the complex 
but nevertheless sympathetic ('in the last instance') relationship between it and a 
social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production, and, on the other, 
the opaqueness of this relationship especially in concrete historical situations within 
which the state is accused by at least some sections of capital owning classes and by 
subaltern classes subaltern to but hegemonised by them, of threatening the survival of 
the `market economy' itself. The fierce opposition to Roosevelt's New Deal is a 
historic case in point. It is not accidental that the significance of the New Deal is of 
critical importance to regulation theory. 
15 Ohara K., Matsuda H., "Gramsci Study in Japan: Achievements and Problems, " International 
Gramsci Society Newsletter No. 12 February 2002: 7-17 
http: //www. itainet. nd. edu/p-ramsci/iQsn/articies/al2 5. shtml 
16 Jessop, B. Report on my stay in Japan October 20 - December 18 1'997 (Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science Fellowship) http: //members. icom. home. ne jp/katori/Jessop on Japan html 
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It is also not accidental that Mintoff, Labour prime minister during the period (1971- 
1981) that this author presents as one characterised by a robust Fordist regulation 
system -a system without which Malta's peripheral 
dependent capitalist development 
would not and could not have taken place - was himself perceived as a threat to a free 
enterprise and free market economy, a perception reinforced by his own presentation 
of himself and his party as `socialist' and the introduction of measures that appeared 
to confirm such perceptions and representations (such as, amongst others: the 
imposition of a national minimum wage and annual statutory wage increases, the co- 
option of General Workers Union representatives in Cabinet; the adoption of `workers 
self-management' at the former Admiralty Dockyard and other, milder, forms of 
`workers participation' in other establishments; the institution of a student-worker 
scheme at University of Malta; the signing of barter agreements with the Soviet 
Union, China and other centrally planned economies; a number of foreign policy 
initiatives and positions that - in a Cold War setting - could only be interpreted as 
signs along the way to central planning, notably the closure of NATO's Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe [NAVSOUTH] 17 and the proclamation of Malta's neutral 
status). 
3.2.5 Acknowledging the importance of the social and political context 
The fundamental weakness of the Ramboll report is the inability of its authors to 
appreciate that inasmuch as Malta's precipitously falling international 
competitiveness was not merely a technical issue, then no remedy could succeed if it 
ignored the social and political context, especially the necessity of overcoming the 
anomie and the heightened conflictuality caused by dissolution of the institutional 
17 Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH) is one of the two Component Commands in 
Allied Command Europe's Southern Region. The NAVSOUTH Commander, also known as 
COMNAVSOUTH, statutorily an Italian four-star admiral with an international staff, is responsible for 
sea control, protection of the sea lines of communication, and naval control of shipping in the 
Mediterranean and the Black Seas. COMNAVSOUTH coordinates, on a 24-hour daily basis, 
surveillance of his area of responsibility. NAVSOUTH was established as a separate headquarters in 
Malta on June 5,1967, upon dissolution of Headquarters Allied Forces Mediterranean, a major NATO 
Subordinate Command previously responsible for maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black 
Seas. In 1971 NAVSOUTH was transferred to the Island of Nisida, Naples, Italy. 
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compromises that had worked so well in 1970s. The proposal, in the main 1996 
report, to cap state aid to the largest foreign owned exporters with a view of 
increasing assistance to SMEs alienated those enterprises that, for better or for worse, 
are an irreducible element of the Maltese economy. The abrasive neo-liberalism of the 
second 1997 report (dubbed `The Action Plan' and not published under the Ramboll 
imprint), its insistence on immediate reduction of public employment, its scathing 
attack against restrictive practices (and the singling out of a series of self-employed 
sectors), and last but not least the singling out of the trade unions for criticism on the 
issue of `restrictive practices', indicates either ill-will or an utter ignorance of the 
social context of development and/or great political incompetence. The Action Plan 
was presented in such a way as to suggest that the Labour government needed outside 
prodding to carry on the reforms it was committed to undertake, hence the need of 
external professional assistance `to facilitate consultation with the private sector'. Not 
surprisingly, the Labour government publicly ignored the second publication but 
effectively decided that the Ramboll team was a drifting unexploded mine more likely 
to provoke various stakeholders rather than facilitate dialogue between them. The FOI 
and the CoC, who had been canvassing for a government grant to retain the Ramboll 
team for another year to facilitate convergence and consensus on restructuring and 
liberalisation, was informed that government did not consider such assistance 
necessary, especially since the joint task force between government and the private 
sector's constituted bodes was functioning effectively. The setting up of IPSE was a 
tangible result of this ongoing dialogue. 
In retrospect, it is not easy to understand the poverty of the Ramboll team's 
appreciation of the social and political dimensions of development and economic 
policy. To what extent is this shortcoming inherited from flexible specialisation 
doctrine? 
The latter is clearly innocent. A reading of Sabel's above mentioned work of 1996 on 
Ireland very eloquently shows the clarity with which the co-founder of the flexible 
specialisation doctrine understood the issue of institutional compromises, when he 
refers to "... sustained effort, beginning in the late 1980s, to establish a form of 
concertation between the social partners at the national level that assures the 
macroeconomic stability propitious to growth in an open economy while securing the 
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well being of the most vulnerable. The Irish attempt at concertation thus began just 
when undertakings with similar goals were being abandoned in other countries as 
unwieldy and capriciously selective in the distribution of the benefits they afforded" 
(1996: 17). 
Of course, Sabel in 1996 is not the Piore and Sabel of the mid -1980s. If we look at 
their earliest joint pronouncements, we do get the impression that in their view that 
with the dominance of flexible specialisation in the economy, centralised institutional 
fixes designed to provide stability for national growth will be rendered redundant by 
its political analogue in civil society namely, their somewhat nebulous notion of a 
`yeoman republic'. This author agrees with Marangoni and Solari (2006) who, whilst 
revisiting Piore and Sabel's seminal text of 1984 for a reflection on "on the 
interaction between industrial organisation and institutional configurations as it has 
evolved in Italy in the form of `industrial districts' and regional clusters" remark that 
"given that Piore and Sabel proposed a necessary change in institutions, our concern 
is whether the flexible specialisation model, characterising industrial districts and 
regional clusters, really requires institutions to have less of a stabilising effect. 
Contrary to Piore and Sabel, we suggest that such systems do not benefit from a 
general deregulation and from a substantial rise in uncertainty due to the demise of 
stabilising institutions. " To borrow a term (somewhat out of its original context) from 
MacLeod, Piore and Sabel's early version the flexible specialisation model, suffered 
from the utilisation of a "thin political economy" characterised by an underestimation 
of the role of the state and of asymmetric distribution of power on local development 
(2001 a). 
We have seen, above, the conditions of the Ramboll report's initial appeal to both 
political parties represented in the Maltese parliament. We have also seen, however, 
how one of its major weaknesses was its authors' inability or unwillingness to 
understand that what they were proposing required a sufficiently stable - socially and 
politically - framework of institutional compromises, one not less robust than the one 
that had sustained the vigorous industrial, growth of the Mintoff period. The 
turbulence that their programme . would 
inevitably cause required a socio-economic 
regulatory system built upon a new historic bloc. This bloc would first of all weld 
together the various sections of the working class (in industry and services, in local 
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`traditional' market oriented SMEs and foreign owned large exporting establishments 
- low, middle and high-tech ones, in private and parastatal industries - especially the 
Drydocks, utilities, telecommunications and transport, in industry with a 
predominantly male and industries with a predominantly female labour force). The 
bloc would then weld together the whole of the working class with the old and the 
new petty bourgeoisie (it was these, after all, that would have to face the brunt of the 
restructuring programme proposed by the Ramboll report). Furthermore the various 
fractions of local `productive' capital would need to be won over to this project. 
Finally, foreign direct investors would need to be assured - and shown in practice - 
that this ambitious and complex socio-economic and political project would not mean 
a reversal of Malta's (then) forty year old foreign direct investment friendly 
development path. The Ramboll proposal (especially the Action Plan) was socially 
and politically (and, therefore, ultimately also economically) unfeasible. It advocated 
an antagonistic position towards all those socio-economic interests whose support it 
would have required if it was to have any chance of success. The Labour party (and 
the then New Labour government) understood this but only from a tactical point of 
view; they failed to understand the long-term strategic issue and paid for this mistake 
dearly. 
The Ramboll proposal suffered from another defect. It was unnecessarily couched in 
what Alun Jones calls the `rhetoric of Europeization' in the Mediterranean region, 
itself an ideological discourse whose principal weakness (the cause of its ultimate 
ineffectiveness) lies in its blindness towards national socio-political complexities and 
the unwarranted assumption that liberal `reforms' can be carried out simultaneously 
with the dismantling of stabilising institutions. 
"The EU bases its approach for the Mediterranean region upon a `triple logic' of 
markets, democracy, and regional multilateralism: seen as the dominant courses of 
Europeanization. This logic is considered by the EU's political actors to offer the 
most appropriate means to further the liberal capitalism of the EU, prepare (chosen) 
Third Countries for eventual EU membership, and address both classical security 
concerns (such as the proliferation of non-conventional weapons, and natural 
resource dependency) as well as `new security' issues such as migration, drugs 
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trafficking and human rights violations in regions where the EU and its Member 
States retain a strong geopolitical and security interest. " (2006a: 10, see also 2006b). 
The Ramboll Report was not published in a political vacuum, on the contrary it was 
released in the run up to a fiercely fought electoral contest between two established 
parties commanding around 50 % of the electorate each: one dead-set - on essentially 
political and cultural grounds - on joining the EU at any cost as soon as possible and 
the other one opposing (on fundamentally economic grounds) immediate accession in 
favour of a special relationship. Within this context, the Ramboll approach was akin 
that of a salesperson attempting to sell a product to, say, a Chinese potential buyer 
using expressions known to be distasteful to the Chinese. 
The authors of the Ramboll report also underestimated the perfectly foreseeable knee- 
jerk reaction of a bureaucracy whose upper echelons were steeped in the UK civil 
service tradition. After merely thirty years of independence from Britain, during 
which time the personnel of this microstate had had to construct practically from 
scratch a complex apparatus with most of the functions of a larger sized state, it had - 
firstly and only two and a half years before - been compelled to relinquish micro- 
governance at the `bottom', at local level (the subdivision of the national territory into 
68 localities and the setting up of elected local councils with their own administrative 
secretariats, an EU inspired initiative originally opposed but then accepted by the 
Labour Party), and - secondly - it was facing the prospect of relinquishing 
governance at the `top', with several of its prerogatives transferred to Brussels if and 
when Malta joined the EU. In the context of this radical "rescaling of statehood" 
(Brenner 2004), how could they be expected to enthusiastically support proposals 
such as those featured in the Ramboll Action Plan, calling for cuts in the number of 
public sector employees? 
3.2.6 The secondary thesis 
Harvey observes a gap between neoliberalism in theory and neoliberalism in practice. 
Theoretically, neoliberalism is about minimal state intervention in markets and, where 
these may not yet exist (such as in education, environmental protection, health care 
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and social security), neoliberalism urges that they be created, if necessary by the state 
itself. "The actual practices of neoliberalism, " however, notes Harvey, `frequently 
diverge from the template... " (2006: 145). We have already noted above that even 
where market developments promote flexible specialisation in industry, stabilising 
institutions (in the sense of structures where compromises between diverging social 
and economic interests are publicly institutionalised) are nevertheless necessary and 
that the only possible legitimating locus where such structures can be situated is the 
state. Not having understood this, possibly as a consequence of its authors' doctrinaire 
neoliberalism, was one of the major weaknesses of the Ramboll report. '8 
Similarly, Maltese New Labour's unwillingness to go against the `Washington 
consensus' and not to invite the trade unions to join the `industrial restructuring task 
force' - certainly also motivated by a fear that this might be interpreted as a throw 
back to the Mintoff period when union representatives sat in cabinet and the GWU 
was bound to the Labour Party by a `statutory union' - was a strategic, and tragic, 
mistake for a party with only a one seat majority in the House of Representatives. It 
fuelled working class suspicion that New Labour was planning to betray its roots, a 
sentiment that was exploited by those elements within the party that chose to scuttle it 
in parliament in 1998 and the early elections that followed immediately after. 
Similarly for Maltese New Labour not to have succeeded in winning the consensus of 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie for its project to reconstruct a neo-developmentalist 
institutional compromise (a failure reflected in its failure to convince the GRTU to 
join FOI and the Chamber of Commerce), was yet another major setback. All that 
needed to be done was to accept the GRTU's demand that retailers be included as 
beneficiaries of IPSE's assistance programmes. True, this would have been opposed 
by the Federation of Industry - but not the Chamber of Commerce - but it would have 
kept some of the traditional petty bourgeoisie from migrating back to the Nationalist 
Party. In fact, the GRTU's exclusion - its leaders chose to ignore the open invitation 
to join whenever they felt the conditions were ripe - reinforced the suspicion that 
18 A different, but hardly implausible, interpretation is that the authors of the Ramboll report were 
simply out to create difficulties for the New Labour government. Evans', in his above quoted 2004 
UCLA lecture, citing the example of Brazil's Lula early days in office, warns that "if the political 
leader is perceived as leftist or unfriendly to capital", his/her government "will bear the brunt of 
pressure from global neoliberal institutions" (http-//www. isop. ucla. edu/article. ast)? Varentid=l 1691). 
The IMF and the WTO had no interest in embarrassing Malta's New Labour prime minister at that time but, the European Union (it funded the Ramboll report) had good reasons to do so. 
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New Labour's vow to scrap VAT if thy won the 1996 elections (a vow they had kept) 
was a mere electoral tactic and not a strategic resolve to provide a permanent political 
home for all the self-employed and not just those in manufacturing and industrial 
services. New Labour's 1998 defeat suggests that the GRTU's drew its pound of flesh 
in revenge. 
It is from these considerations that this study's secondary thesis emerges: that the 
New Labour government and perhaps, assuming they were in good faith, also the 
authors of the Ramboll report, underestimated the social and political significance of 
the IPSE issue. Certainly the New Labour government tended to see it as a technical 
issue: merely a coordinating organisation charged with the implementation of SME 
promotion programmes set up to free MDC from the distracting task of catering for 
local enterprise so it could concentrate on the more important task of promoting 
foreign direct investment. 
The political moral of the tale is that if SME promotion policies in a peripheral 
economy are to be sustainable and effective, they must correspond to a political 
strategy aimed at incorporating the small entrepreneur in the social bloc represented 
by the political party or alliance of parties proposing and implementing the said 
promotion policies. Following the breakdown of the Fordist institutional fix that made 
possible Malta's industrialisation in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s -a 
system that came apart because of its internal contradictions, contradictions typical of 
peripheral dependent development - no other socio-economic regulatory system has 
effectively replaced it. 
Any such new arrangement will need to harness the entrepreneurial potential of SMEs 
if it is to overcome peripheral dependency and its contradictions. An SME promotion 
policy will succeed or fail not primarily on its technical qualities but on the social and 
political conditions of its existence. It follows, therefore, that international 
benchmarking of SME promotion policies and institution building is useful for a 
political force aiming to overcome peripheral dependency if it produces knowledge of 
the relationship between SME promotion policies and corresponding socio-economic 
regulatory systems, understood in a reductionist technicist sense but as a complex of 
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social, political, economic and cultural elements. To produce such knowledge, 
benchmarking will need to be framed in terms of a theory of regulation. 
In the above quoted UCLA lecture of 2004, Evans, reflecting on his earlier confidence 
that dynamic and competent cadres of the developmentalist state with good links to 
industry could achieve significant - albeit dependent - development, admitted that 
often the rate of return to the national economy relative to the cost of attracting 
foreign direct investment was not worth it: "... they built a Ford plant in Bahia. It 
cost $400 million in government subsidies and created a few dozen jobs. That was not 
as good a rate of return. " Moreover, he now suspects that the importance he 
previously placed on securing the support of the local industrial bourgeoisie was 
misplaced: "The industrial bourgeoisie may be an undependable ally in a project of 
local transformation. It may want to ally with transnational capital and no longer 
focus on local transformation, which will make it less interested in cooperating with 
projects of the local state. " 
Although Evans does not actually employ the term "comprador bourgeoisie "19, this is 
what he seems to mean. In any case, he also observes that "... focus on the industrial 
bourgeoisie produces isolation form other social groups that make them see you as an 
enemy. This is a self-limiting political strategy. " Speaking about Brazil, he admits: 
"I was a little too mesmerized by the industrial transformation aspect of embedded 
autonomy and I should have thought a little more broadly about the implications of 
building different kinds of social ties. In the case of the Workers Party (President 
Lula's party in Brazil, JM) we have a political party with a broad-based mobilization 
that has an advantage in organizing embedded autonomy that needs more 
independence from the industrial bourgeoisie. They would have an extreme difficulty 
of pursuing a traditional industrializing strategy. " 
19 The term is notoriously used by Mao Tse-Tung in "Some experiences in our Party's history. Part of a 
talk with representatives of some Latin-American Communist Parties September 25,1956", Selected 
Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. V, Foreign Languages Press, Bejing, online edition 
http: //www. marxists. org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv554. htm. For a more 
rigorous employment of the term, see Vitalis' study of business groups in Egypt (1995) and Mouzelis 
on Greek merchant capital (1978: 20). 
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"Global neoliberalism is not only a threat but an opportunity. By making the futility 
of certain kinds of strategies inescapable it pushes Third World countries to seek 
other options. " 
What Evans is suggesting is that at least in certain conditions - where there is no 
solid, dependable national bourgeoisie -a popular democratic government ought not 
to exclude other development strategies, based on alliances other than with local 
industrial elites. He seems to suggest - but this is not made explicit -a popular 
alliance between industrial working class and other popular social groups in support 
of non-industrial development paths on the grounds that such a development (he 
refers to health projects and education by way of examples) cost less to the state but 
contribute more substantially than foreign direct investment to national productivity. 
This author is unable to assess how realistic this is, but it must be conceded that even 
if taken as a provocation meant to stimulate creative political thinking, Evans' idea 
does suggest that - as far as Malta is concerned - the need not to sacrifice the 
incorporation of the small entrepreneur into a new progressive historic bloc must be 
given top political priority by any political force with a serious development 
programme. 
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Chapter 4.0 Methodologies 
4.1 Overview 
The author has frequently expressed the view that an experiment such as the 
Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise (IPSE), namely a public-private 
partnership aimed at the restructuring of the private sector, led by the private 
sector and funded by government is probably unprecedented, or at least 
undocumented. This, together with the resources and opportunities available to 
the author as an employee of the same Institute, led to the adoption of a hybrid 
approach that attempts to combine the respective strengths of quantitative and 
qualitative methods while avoiding their weaknesses. 
This chapter details the methodology used for both the international survey of 
organisations supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in countries 
belonging to various national Fordist variants, and also for the participant 





The whole research project revolves around a participant observation review of 
the institute which can be found in Chapter 6.0. Other methods, namely a 
survey, were used at a later stage in order to test, and build on, observations 
made at the participant observer stage. ' Many of the observations related to the 
IPSE reported in this Chapter and elsewhere were gathered and analysed 
personally by the author during his work experience at the Institute. This phase 
of the research was guided by established principles for participant observation 
and contributed to many insights that are fundamental to this research project. 2 
I See Chapter 5.0 and Chapter 6.0. 
2 The objective of participant observation is that of displaying the social organisation of activities as they 
are revealed through involvement in the natural setting of the activity (Anderson 1994). 
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The fact that the author was an employee of IPSE during the period being 
researched made this model of social research the most obvious choice. 
The conclusions of the observatory phase of the project have been benchmarked 
against the results of the international survey carried out between March and 
June 2001. Besides supplying benchmarks against which the structure and 
approaches of IPSE could be analysed, the survey also provided the opportunity 
to compare the observations made by Peck and Tickell (1994) with empirical 
data, and to see whether further correlations could be proven. 
4.2 Surveying an international sample of SME-support organisation in the 
context of different national Fordist variants 
4.2.1 Coverage 
The survey was designed both to compare and contrast IPSE with similar 
organisations and to analyse whether similar organisations in different contexts 
were structured or behaved in a different manner. The survey's theoretical basis 
is chiefly provided by Peck and Tickell's argument that there exist different 
variants of the Fordist system depending on specific couplings between Fordist 
accumulation systems and Keynesian welfare modes of regulation. They 
identified nine such specific couplings (see Table 4a). These provide `ideal 
types' against which concrete situations can be compared. 
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Table 4a: National Fordist variants as identified by Peck and Tickell 
Type of Fordist regime Characteristics of coupling 
Classic Fordism - Mass production. 
(e. g. United States of America) - Mass consumption. 
- Social democratic welfare state. 
Flex-Fordism - Decentralised and federalised state. 
(e. g. [West] Germany) - Close cooperation between financial and industrial 
capital. 
- Facilitation of inter-firm cooperation. 
Blocked (Flawed) Fordism - Inadequate integration of financial and productive 
(e. g. United Kingdom) level of the nation state. 
- Archaic and obstructive character of working class 
politics. 
State Fordism - State plays a leading role in the creation of conditions 
(e. g. France) of mass production. 
- State control of industry (L' etat entrepreneur). 
Delayed Fordism - Cheap labour immediately adjacent to Fordist core. 
(e. g. Spain, Italy) - State intervention played a key role in the rapid 
industrial isation in the sixties. 
Peripheral Fordism - Local assembly. 
(e. g. Mexico, Brazil) - Export of Fordist goods. 
- Heavy indebtedness. 
- Authoritarian state structures coupled with movement 
for democracy. 
- Attempts to emulate a Fordist accumulation system in 
the absence of a corresponding mode of social 
regulation. 
Racial Fordism - Dualistic workforce. 
(e. g. South Africa under - Privileged minority with North American-style 
apartheid) working conditions and remuneration levels. 
- Authoritarian state structures. 
- Super-exploitation of the majority of the population. 
Primitive Taylorism - Taylorist labour process with an almost endless supply 
(e. g. Malaysia, Bangladesh, of labour. 
Philippines) - Bloody exploitation. 
- Huge extraction of surplus value. 
- Dictatorial state and high social tension. 
Hybrid Fordism - Profit-driven expansion based upon modified 
(e. g. Japan) Taylorism. 
- Truncated internal market. 
- Societal segmentation. 
- Under-developed welfare state. 
- Indirect wage indexation. 
Source: Peck and Tickell (1994). 
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Chapter 1.0 argued that Malta should be considered to be an example of 
peripheral Fordism, even though the Maltese case does exhibit some differences 
from this ideal type. It was decided to conduct a comparative study of SME 
support institutions coming from a number of different contextual backgrounds 
or national Fordisms3, and that this would be focused on the nine countries as 
illustrated in Table 4b. 
Table 4b: Countries selected for international survey 
National Fordist variant Country 
Classic Fordism United States of America 
Flex Fordism Germany 
Blocked/Flawed Fordism United Kingdom 
State Fordism France 
Delayed Fordism Italy 
Peripheral Fordism Malta and Poland 
Primitive Taylorism Tunisia 
Hybrid Fordism Japan 
A brief background on each country is given in Chapter 5.0. 
One notable departure from Peck and Tickell's list is in the country representing 
primitive Taylorism. Peck and Tickell point to South Asian countries as the best 
examples of this variant, but this project takes Tunisia as an example. This 
North African country has a relatively large labour supply that is governed by a 
regime that is essentially authoritarian. Although Tunisia is considered to be one 
of the safest countries in North Africa for foreign direct investment and western 
tourists, there is still a high degree of social tension within the country, even 
though the regime has managed to repress it throughout the years. Tunisia was 
3 Professor Tickell confirmed in an interview with the author that this is the first study of its kind to be 
carried out (see Appendix I). 
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preferred for two major reasons. First of all, Tunisia is considered by many to be 
one of Malta's main competitors in attracting foreign direct investment. 
Secondly, the geographical and to a certain extent cultural and linguistic 
proximity of the country to Malta makes eventual follow-up easier. 
It was also decided to exclude Spain (one of Peck and Tickell's two examples of 
delayed Fordism) and focus on Italy, where the author could rely on contacts 
established in the course of previous research projects. 
A further departure from Peck and Tickell is represented by the decision to 
include a second example of peripheral Fordism. This would enable a 
comparison not only between different countries within different Fordist 
contexts, but also a comparison between similar organisations in different 
countries belonging to the same context. Peck and Tickell provide two South 
American examples of peripheral Fordism. Once again it was decided to choose 
another country whose experience could be of more relevance to the project. The 
choice fell on Poland. 
Poland satisfies the pre-requisites of peripheral Fordism with the notable 
exception, as in the case of Malta, of an authoritarian state structure. 
Nevertheless, Poland is still a relative newcomer to liberal democracy, the first 
multi-party elections having been held after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. 
On the other hand, Malta has a longer democratic tradition, even though full 
autonomy in all policy sectors was secured only in 1979. Another reason for 
choosing Poland was its European Union candidate country status, which was the 
same as that of Malta at the time the survey was conducted. Furthermore, unlike 
other central and eastern European candidate countries4, Poland was somewhat 
divided on the membership issue, with a number of parties, especially left-wing 
and right-wing peasant parties, agreeing with membership only subject to the 
country being given favourable conditions. The conditions that these parties 
4 With the notable exception of Estonia. 
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wanted to secure have to do mainly with the principle of free movement of 
capital since they did not want Polish agricultural land to be made available for 
sale to foreigners. This issue made Poland one of the countries most similar to 
Malta when it comes to polarisation on the European Union membership issue. 
The racial Fordism variant was not pursued. Since the demise of the apartheid 
system in South Africa there is no civilised country that openly adopts such a 
system. Furthermore, the relevance of the analysis of such a system to a 
microstate economy such as Malta is questionable. 
It must be noted that in the case of a number of variants, such as blocked 
Fordism or flex Fordism, the situation in the countries in question has evolved. 
However, it is reasonable to argue that a survey of organisations in such 
countries is still worthwhile as it provides insights into the experiences of 
countries that have gone through blocked or flex Fordism. The transition of a 
country from one type of national Fordist variant to another, if at all possible, 
should be subject to further research. 
4.2.2 Choice of organisations 
The initial intention was to study just one organisation per country, selected from 
a list of national, government-related support organisations and/or membership 
in the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME, one of the main international organisations bringing together SME- 
support organisations around Europe), together with one main organisation from 
each non-European country. 
A pilot project was carried out on this basis (see 4.2.7 below). The results 
suggested that a wider survey, possibly of as many national SME support 
organisations as possible within the various surveyed countries, would be more 
appropriate. The requirements for an organisation to be included in the 
expanded sample were as follows: 
1. Organisations providing support to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
2. State-controlled, independent or non-governmental organisations. 
3. Organisations supporting enterprises at a national level and not being 
confined to the local or regional level. 
4. Organisations whose support is not limited to a single, narrow and 
specialised category but whose markets are wider in scope. 
A total of forty-one organisations satisfying these criteria were identified within 
the nine countries under examination. The organisations were traced by means 
of the author's formal and informal contacts (basically a process of 
`snowballing') and also through an extensive internet search. 5 
At first it was assumed that a much longer list of organisations would need to be 
surveyed, especially since some very large countries, such as the United States, 
were included in the sample. This did not happen in practice since the actions of 
most organisations are limited to local, regional or sectoral levels. 
4.2.3 Collection of data 
It was decided to base the survey on a questionnaire, to be sent to the 
respondents by electronic mail. These would be given ten working days to reply. 
If the email did not generate a response within this period, first and second 
reminders would be sent, again by electronic mail, at regular intervals of five 
working days. If this did not generate any response, then each individual non- 
respondent would be followed up by telephone. A second and a third telephone 
contact would follow at regular intervals of four working days. If there was still 
5A complete list of these organisations is provided in Chapter 5.0. 
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no response, an alternative respondent would be chosen. The process would be 
repeated all over again until organisations from each Fordist variant would have 
replied. 
Unanswered questions were to be followed up via electronic mail. If after two 
working days there was still no response, the (non-)respondent would be 
contacted by telephone. It was also decided to consult as well the various 
organisations' promotional material, literature and web pages in order to harvest 
any necessary additional information. This approach would also be adopted in 
case any doubt existed over answers given. If respondents declared themselves 
unable or unwilling to answer a particular question, the reply would be marked 
`No Reponse'. 
4.2.4 Covering letter 
A covering letter explaining the purposes of the survey and introducing the 
researcher was sent as the first part of the actual e-mail. The letter sought to 
reassure would-be respondents that any data provided would be used in 
confidence and strictly for the purposes of the survey. The covering letter also 
encouraged respondents to consult with colleagues within their organisation 
before answering questions, especially those where an opinion was being sought. 
The letter also specified a deadline, this being considered to be the best way to 
encourage timely responses. This deadline was set at ten working days from the 
date in which the e-mail was sent. The full name and contact details of the 
author were included to facilitate feedback and to give more credibility to the 
correspondence. As a rule the covering letter (see Table 4c) was addressed 




Table 4c: Covering letter sent with questionnaire 
Dear Mr / Mrs (name and surname), 
I would like to introduce myself as a researcher on issues related to small and medium-sized 
enterprises and to organisations offering support to such enterprises. 
I am currently reading for a Ph. D in Management Research at the University of Bristol (United 
Kingdom). My research deals with SME-support organisations, such as your own. 
I am focusing on support organisations in a number of countries, including (name of country). 
The aim is that of making a comparative analysis on a number of issues. 
I would be extremely grateful if, after consulting with whoever you deem necessary within your 
organisation, you could be so kind as to fill in and send back this questionnaire. 
All information will be kept strictly confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of 
this research. 
Feedback by (ten working days from email being sent) would be extremely appreciated. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if in need of further information. 
Best regards, 
Joseph Muscat B. Com, B. A. (Hons. ), M. A. 
52, Triq San Pawl Milqi 
Burmarrad SPB 08 
Malta 
Tel: +356 942 5074 
Fax: +356 21 571 265 
Email: jmuscat@crystal. com. mt 
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4.2.5 Questions and structure 
The questionnaire consisted of a total of 42 questions, 33 of which were factual, 
in the sense that they referred directly to facts that the respondent was deemed to 
have access to. The remaining nine questions were opinion-based, i. e. subjective 
questions that might yield different results even if asked to people within the 
same organisation, let alone different people within different organisations. It is 
possible that results may have been distorted if persons filling in the 
questionnaires did so without consulting their colleagues within the organisation. 
There are very few means of controlling this type of behaviour, but an attempt 
was made to pre-empt it by making an appeal through the covering letter for 
consultation within each organisation. 
Every effort was made to make the questionnaire as respondent-friendly as 
possible. It was hoped that this would raise the response rate and enhance the 
quality of data by minimising wording effects. Specific forms of wording and 
phrasing were preferred to more generic ones which could have confused 
respondents. At the same time, the language used was relatively simple. This is 
because even though most of the organisations being interviewed had a relatively 
good grasp of the English language, highly technical terms could have led to 
unnecessary confusion or misinterpretation. 
Leading questions were avoided and closed questions preferred as they are easier 
to process and facilitate comparisons and benchmarking. Closed questions also 
help reduce the degree of subjectivity in opinion answers in the sense that they 
confine such potential subjectivity to a restricted number of answers. Only nine 
questions were left open. These referred to matters where pre-coded answers 
would either not apply, or would have limited the collection of the necessary 
information. Nevertheless, seven of these questions were not completely open, 
in the sense that they referred to issues such as definitions or assistance 
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programmes. The other two remaining questions were completely open since 
they asked for information that could be classified into categories, such as the 
historical facts that led to the formation of the particular organisations. It must 
be noted that all these open questions related to mostly factual information and 
called for minimal subjective opinions. 
The questions can be classified into three main categories. The first set, located 
at the very beginning of the questionnaire, deals strictly with the details and 
background of the organisation under investigation. Questions then shifted to a 
more macro-economic and even political dimension. The final part of the 
questionnaire focused on the programmes and procedures being adopted by the 
organisation. Respondents were given the possibility of adding further 
information that they considered to be relevant to the scope of the research at the 
end of the questionnaire. 
4.2.6 Scope of questions 
1. What is the legal set-up of the organisation? 
One fact that was thought innovative about IPSE was its incorporation as a 
limited liability company. 6 This question would help determine whether other 
respondents had opted for the same model. 
2. Who are the organisation's shareholders? 
This information would help compare the role of government, of the private 
sector and of other potential shareholders in such experiments. It would also 
help identify the existence of different public-private partnership models. 
3. Who are the organisation's main stakeholders? 
6 The rationale behind this decision is further discussed in Chapter 6.0. 
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Stakeholders would be compared to shareholders, thus identifying potential 
discrepancies. 
4. What is the involvement of the private sector in the organisation? 
As in questions (2) and (3), the answer to this question would help identify the 
role of the private sector in each organisation. Thus, one would be able to make 
a number of observations linking the couplings identified by Peck and Tickell to 
the role associated with the private sector. 
5. What is the involvement of trade unions in the organisation? 
Workers are considered by the author as stakeholders in SME support 
programmes. Nevertheless, IPSE did relegate their representatives to a position 
of solely informal consultation. Thus, this question seeks to compare this 
attitude with that of other organisations. 
6. From what sources is the organisation financed? 
Appropriate funding is crucial for such organisations. The source of such 
funding is significant since it would help determine the effective commitment of 
each sector towards the organisations. The reply to this question would also 
indicate whether the financial commitment of each source corresponds to the 
actual shareholding. It would also help identify the actual financing sources 
throughout the various variants. 
7. Which type of funding is most difficult to obtain? 
This information would help identify trends, similarities or differences across the 
different national Fordist settings. 
8. What are (in order of importance) the declared aims of the 
organisation? 
This question makes it unnecessary to assume that the different organisations 
being interviewed have the same aims. Furthermore, since organisations are 
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being asked to rank their aims according to importance, this would help identify 
any convergence or difference in priorities. 
9. When was the organisation set up? 
This data is of historical value and helps place the establishment of the 
organisation within particular phases of a country's development. 
10. Whose initiative was it? 
This question helps determine which player actually got things moving and took 
the initiative to establish such an organisation. 
11. Historically, what can be considered the main factors that brought 
about the formation of the organisation? 
This question is directly linked with question (9) above, in the sense that it 
complements the historical investigation of the actual context in which such an 
initiative was taken. 
12. Was a pilot project conducted before launching the organisation? 
Modern management theory stresses the importance of pilot studies and the pre- 
testing of initiatives. The author's intention was to gather the necessary 
information in order to analyse whether such a textbook approach was in fact 
adopted. 
13. When has a formal and concrete national SME policy started being 
developed? 
This question asked for historic and `factual' data. It was hoped that this could 
help identify any temporal discrepancy between the introduction of a formal 
policy on SMEs and the actual setting up of the organisation. It is possible that 
some respondents may have stretched the argument by dating such policy 
developments to the first hint of laws relating to SMEs and not, as requested, to 
the actual formalisation of a proper SME policy. 
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14. Is there convergence between the main political parties' policies 
regarding SMEs? 
This is a factual question that was made necessary mainly by the highly polarised 
political environment present in Malta, where even the general attitude towards 
SME policy is divergent (or claimed to be so), mainly because of the different 
stands regarding European Union membership at the time. 
15. If not, what are the main divergences? 
This information to be collected in this question complements the preceding 
question (14) and helps map the main divergences between political parties, if 
any. 
16. Are there other similar organisations on a national level? 
The question is aimed at identifying the existence of other organisations having a 
similar role in the each particular Fordist variant. The purpose is that of 
identifying a possible trend or dissimilarity between the different settings. 
17. How can the relationship with these organisations be best described? 
This question is complementary to question (16) above, and was intended to help 
classify the general type of relationship between such organisations. The 
resulting data would be relatively subjective, even though closing the question 
helps reduce this subjectivity. 
18. Is there a formal definition of who is a client of the organisation? 
The intention is to tap whether the respondent organisations have felt the need to 
formalise their client base, or have instead adopted a more liberal stand. 
19. What is the formal definition of the organisation's client base? 
The actual differences and/or similarities between one organisation and another, 
and indeed between one variant and another can be best identified through 
answers to factual questions such as this. A formal definition of a client can also 
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help identify the different or similar priorities of the different organisations 
being surveyed. 
20. What is the definition of SMEs (if it is different from definition of 
client)? 
This response would help determine whether the client base of the organisation is 
wider than SMEs, particularly whether it includes enterprises that cannot be 
defined as such. In the same manner, when compared to the answer to question 
19 above, this information could also outline any possible SME sector that is not 
within the scope of the organisation. 
21. Is this the only working definition of SMEs used in the country? 
This question is intended to assess whether there is a convergence around one 
definition of SME definition in each national variant, or whether different 
organisations adopt different definitions for their operations. 
22. What is the definition of SMEs used by national government (if it is 
different from the organisation's definition of SME)? 
This question aims to benchmark the definition used by the organisation against 
that used by government. The identification of any differences can provide 
interesting insights into the nature of the different national variants and the role 
of government within each particular organisation. 
23. Is support limited to manufacturing enterprises? 
The information obtained from this question is to be analysed in relation to 
questions (19), (20) and (22) above relating to definition of clients and SMEs. 
The question was derived from IPSE's decision to focus solely on manufacturing 
and related enterprises as its target clients. The author intended to compare this 
decision with that taken by other organisations in similar and different contexts. 
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24. How is the level of cooperation between financial and industrial 
capital best described? 
This is the beginning of a series of questions based on characteristics that Peck 
and Tickell identified within the various national Fordist variants. The purpose 
of this and other questions to follow is mainly that of comparing the identified 
characteristics with the present situation as perceived by the organisations. 
These questions are some of the most subjective in the whole survey as they rely 
heavily on the opinion of respondents. This first question deals with the level of 
cooperation between financial and industrial capital, and tries to assess the 
strength and extent of the link between these two important parts. 
25. How is the level of inter-firm cooperation best described? 
The question is particularly relevant to the identification of any possible trends 
across the different variants. 
26. How is the position in general of SMEs in relation to other enterprises 
within the national economic set-up best described? 
This question attempts to tap perceptions on the position of SMEs within each 
national economic set-up. This would help understand better the context within 
which each organisation is operating. 
27. In general, how is the nature of the labour force best described? 
This question is again inspired by the characteristics identified by Peck and 
Tickell. The response would serve as a comparison with the observed 
characteristics on one hand, and also serve to compare the general nature of the 
labour force among the national Fordist variants under consideration. This is yet 
another question whose response is relatively high in subjectivity. 
28. How does the price of labour compare to that of competitor countries? 
This question complements the others preceding it and is aimed mainly at 
providing a more rounded context to the survey. 
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29. What role does the state play in the creation and facilitation of the 
right conditions to encourage production? 
The role of the state is central to Peck and Tickell's observations; responses to 
this question would help a comparison between the different national variants. 
30. Who is in control of the main industries? 
Like question (28) this is intended to provide `background' information. 
31. Does the organisation tailor different programmes of assistance for 
different clients? 
This question was intended to tap whether the SME support organisations under 
investigation differentiate between the various types of clients, perhaps giving 
more importance to certain sectors than to others. Lack of differentiation would 
provide motive for further investigation in itself. 
32. What are the main programmes of assistance and for whom are they 
aimed? 
This question seeks to get more information about the specific target sectors of 
each of the programmes of assistance implemented by each organisation. 
33. Does the organisation give grants to particular enterprises? 
There are two main approaches adopted by SME support organisations. One 
revolves around the provision of various forms of financial assistance to 
enterprises, while the other is more concerned with having the organisation fulfil 
a facilitation function. This question, together with subsequent ones, attempts to 
classify the different organisations within these two broad streams. 
34. Is assistance tied to the implementation of particular actions by the 
beneficiary enterprises? 
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The responses given to this question help identify the approach adopted by 
organisations when granting assistance. The aim is to distinguish between those 
that tie assistance to strict criteria and those that adopt more liberal terms. 
35. Does the organisation monitor the use of the assistance granted? 
This response would further confirm the result of question (34) above, in that it 
would give further information on the attitude adopted by each organisation. It 
would also help test whether there is any association between such an attitude 
and the type of national Fordist variant. 
36. What is the average span of this monitoring? 
Once again this response would give further insight on the liberal or less liberal 
attitude adopted by each organisation. The author's argument is that the longer 
the span of monitoring, the less liberal is the organisation's approach in granting 
financial assistance to SMEs. 
37. Does the organisation offer the service of its own experts to help the 
enterprises? 
While IPSE was still on the drawing board there was a lot of debate about 
whether the Institute should build up its own expert group to advise potential 
clients, or whether the institute should use the services of the existent private 
sector operators. The decision was taken in favour of the latter.? This question 
was intended to reveal where the respondent organisations stood on this issue. 
38. Does the organisation facilitate the use of existing expertise in the 
market? 
This question is directly related to question (37) above and complementary to it. 
39. Is there an evident link between the organisation's programmes and 
government's broader industrial and economic policies? 
% This decision is analysed in Chapter 6.0. 
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The aim here was to investigate the extent of the overall synergy between the 
organisation's goals and those of government. This question would help 
determine whether the organisation is part of a holistic economic strategy, or is 
rather working in isolation. 
40. Does the organisation carry out an evaluation of its work? 
Evaluation is an essential part of any project. Nevertheless, this crucial stage is 
sometimes omitted by a number of organisations. This question is aimed at 
identifying those respondent organisations that in fact go through such a process. 
41. How is this evaluation carried out? 
This question complements question (40) and was intended to provide 
information on the extent and nature of such an exercise, including whether it is 
conducted in-house or independently. 
42. Is the evaluation exercise available to the public? 
This question has two key aims. First of all, it helps determine the transparency 
of the organisation by assessing the extent of the availability of its evaluation 
exercise. Secondly, the author intended this question to help him get access to 
such exercise. 
4.2.7 Pilot studies 
Three pilot studies were conducted, the first two limited to one organisation 
each, while the third had a population of nine organisations. The organisations 
surveyed in the first two pilot surveys were not included in the actual survey 
since it was not considered proper to conduct the preliminary pilot studies with 
one or more of the potential final respondents. These provided essential 
information on respondents' likely reactions to questioning, helped identify 
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potential problems and allowed the necessary alterations to questions to be made 
in good time. 
The first pilot study was carried out in the very early stages of the project, before 
a final decision on whether or not to conduct the survey was taken, and consisted 
of a personal interview with a manager from the Bristol Enterprise Centre. The 
questions were set mainly with IPSE and its programmes of assistance in mind. 
The interview was very helpful in suggesting that there is no `ideal' way of 
doing things, but that various entities charged with the same mission may adopt 
different models or methods to fulfil their aims. Amongst other things, this first 
pilot study helped specify questions on the structure of each organisation and 
also on the link between the organisation and the consultancy service industry. 
The second pilot study was conducted once a second draft of the survey was 
ready and after a final decision to go ahead with the survey had been taken. This 
second pilot study was aimed at implementing the necessary amendments to the 
questionnaire and also to test the procedure to be used to in disseminating and 
following up questionnaires. The organisation chosen for this second test was 
the Petita y Medians Empress de Catalunya (PIMEC-SEFES), which is 
responsible for providing support to small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Catalunya, Spain. The author had fostered a working relationship with this 
institute through previous research projects he had conducted. 
An electronic mail was sent along with the covering letter. It took PIMEC- 
SEFES three working days to respond. One cannot really take this as an actual 
benchmark since this particular respondent already knew the author from 
previous research projects, and an initial relationship of trust had already been 
built. Nevertheless, the response time could be taken as indicative. This second 
test was again valuable in suggesting a number of alterations to the 
questionnaire, such as the inclusion of more questions referring directly to the 
SME sector in each particular country. 
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Following the receipt of the response, the contact person within the organisation 
was approached for informal feedback about the questionnaire. The contact 
person commented that the most labour-intensive questions were those regarding 
opinions on the cooperation between various fronts, such as financial and 
industrial capital. It was said that the answers to these questions could be 
subjective and that the organisation had no data in hand to measure such a 
relationship. 
Following these pilot projects, further amendments were made to the 
questionnaire in order to include eventual organisation evaluation exercises 
conducted by the individual organisations. It was thought that such a question 
would provide a valuable insight for the practical use of the findings. A third 
pilot survey was then carried out with nine organisations which would feature in 
the definitive survey (see Table 4d). 
Table 4d: Countries selected for international survey 
Country Organisation 
United States of America Small Business Administration (SBA) 
Germany Zentralverband des Deutshen Handwerks und 
Bundesvereinigung der Fachverbande des 
Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH und BFH) 
United Kingdom Prosper (Business Link) 
France Assemblee' Permanent des Chambres de Metiers 
(APCM) 
Italy Confederazione Nazionale dell' Artigianato e 
della Piccola e Media Impresa (CNA) 
Malta General Retailers and Traders Union (GRTU) 
Poland Chamber of Craft and Small Business (IZBA) 
Tunisia Agence pour la Promotion Industrielle (API) 
Japan Japan Small Business Corporation (JSBC) 
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All the results came in within twelve working days, and were taken into 
consideration for the final survey. Following this result, it was decided to carry 
on with the definitive survey, as illustrated in Chapter 5.0. 
4.2.8 Coding 
Once the filled questionnaires were sent back by the respondents and any 
information or response clarified as necessary, the coding exercise began. Since 
many of the questions were closed it was decided to code the replies manually. 
This involved the actual printing and reading of each response, and the marking 
on custom-made paper sheets. The results and resulting trends were also 
compiled manually. 
4.3 Participant observation in the study of Malta's Institute for the Promotion of 
Small Enterprise (IPSE) 
Though participant observations might have a higher degree of subjectivity than 
other methods of social research (making it less `reliable'), it is also known to 
provide a more in depth and less generalised insight (hence producing results 
that are more `valid'). In other words, the experiences of the social actors, are 
likely to be more `truthfully' observed. In order to better understand the context 
within which the research was conducted it is necessary to consider the author 
himself, the development of his relationship with IPSE, and the national context 
in which both the author and IPSE were embedded. 
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4.3.1 Biographical note 
The first issue to be considered is the author's family background, which 
probably overlaps, in one respect or another, with that of many IPSE clients. His 
father is self-employed, operating an artisan micro-enterprise (manufacture of 
fireworks) and he was raised in a rural environment where the dominant form of 
gainful employment is the small-holding tenant and to a much lesser extent the 
small-holding owner. He was educated at a private Catholic (Jesuit) secondary 
school renowned for its solid pedagogic thoroughness and as an effective vehicle 
of social upward mobility for the petty bourgeoisie. With this social and cultural 
background, values of individualism and aversion towards large organisations 
(be it state apparatuses or multinational companies) were bound to have a certain 
effect on the author's world-view. 
The second is the author's activism in the Labour Party in the run-up to the 1996 
elections. Unlike earlier electoral campaigns (especially in the 1960s and 1970s) 
Labour's campaign in 1996 was not focussed on its traditional blue-collar 
support (which was particularly strong in the densely populated and hyper- 
urbanised Harbour area, especially the Royal Navy towns of Birgu, Bormla and 
Isla) but had zoomed out to include all `working people'. 8 Small entrepreneurs 
and self-employed persons were explicitly and deliberately included in this 
broader definition of the `working classes'. Indeed, their role was emphasised. 
To small entrepreneurs, for whom the principal reference organisation was then 
the GRTU, the Labour Party promised the abolition of Value Added-Tax (which 
was substituted by a Customs and Excise Tax), even though the enterprises 
would have preferred the scrapping of the mandatory use of the cash registers. 
To those involved in manufacturing and industrial services it promised 
workshops at subsidised rent and planning permits for private industrial areas. 
8 The use of the Maltese version of the phrase `working people' ('nies tax-xoghol') instead of `workers' 
('haddiema) was totally new `political language' for the Malta Labour Party. 
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Coming to the Malta Labour Party at this conjuncture and from a background 
(anomalous by traditional Labour standards) that predisposed him favourably to 
the message of 'New Labour'9, the author bypassed the proletarian rites of 
passage implied by a militant's experience of a traditional election campaign and 
wholeheartedly (and it must be admitted, uncritically) embraced the freezing 
away of a whole cluster of moral, cultural, political and even aesthetic `old 
Labour' values. It must be remembered that amongst these values there is 
Labour's low-key type of patriotism. '0 
The working classes' dependence on the British for employment precluded the 
sort of long-drawn struggles against imperialism common in national liberation 
movements in at least some of the former colonies. Indeed the Maltese working 
class has not, historically, kept back from expressing enthusiastic support for the 
Empire. This sort of tradition did not provide fertile ground for negative 
attitudes on the part of the mainstream Maltese left towards foreign direct 
investment and foreign ownership of factories and commercial establishments, 
elsewhere referred to as neo-colonialism and economic imperialism. Hence, as 
Vella noted in his seminal paper on the `limits of development discourse in 
Malta', the complete absence of any serious critical reflection on the left and 
especially in the Labour Party on foreign investment and economic dependence 
as well as on `development' generally. This included the apparently blissful 
ignorance on the part of Maltese intellectuals of the implications of international 
political economic, sociological and anthropological debate for Malta's post-war 
development (Vella 1994: 60-61). As Professor Giddens observed, in his 
foreword to the collection in which Vella's essay appeared, 
9 'ne Malta Labour Party successfully adopted this term from its sister party in Britain, with which it has 
enduring historical ties. 
10 About one hundred and twenty years of strident anti-British propaganda by the pro-Italian class enemy, 
the self-employed, the professions, the clergy and the small-holder in the country-side, and an equally long 
dependence on Britain for employment, had taught Maltese workers to control their emotions when it came 
to nationalistic outbursts. When `necessary' they employed violence but sharply, briefly and with no 
residual and enduring hard feelings. The riots of 7 June 1919 and 28 April 1958 are cases in point. 
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"... Mario Vella discusses the position of Malta, as a post-colonial order, within 
the context of global development patterns. The idea of `development' today has 
become as problematic and controversial as have other key concepts in 
sociological thought. However, unless the analysis of Maltese society is situated 
in the context of these debates, it will be impossible to understand its own 
distinct characteristics, let alone relate these satisfactorily to the turbulence 
affecting the global order. " (Sultana and Baldacchino 1994: xxix) 
This author, however, having come `late' and as an `outsider' to the Labour 
Party has had the benefit of not being de-sensitised to certain issues, such as the 
limits of Malta's lumpen-development, to borrow Frank's eloquent phrase (Frank 
1974). This may help explain why the author chose to pursue graduate studies 
and research related to his country's development problems. It may also explain, 
together with his social background, his preference for small organisations: for 
the SME rather than for the large industrial establishment, of which the symbol 
in the Maltese working class lore is the Dockyard. It may also explain why 
unlike other Labour militants, he instinctively favoured locally-owned SMEs as 
opposed to large foreign-owned companies in his quest for a development 
alternative in microstate Malta. 
This same preference for individual initiative - and the freedom necessary to 
exercise it - and the visceral distrust that the small trader, the small 
manufacturer and the small-holding farmer exhibit towards the state, prevented 
the author from sharing traditional Labour trust in the paternalistic state, whether 
this was run by the colonial authorities or their Maltese successors. 
The author joined the Malta External Trade Corporation (METCO) in 1997 and 
soon after volunteered to join the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise 
(IPSE), then an organisation `in formation'. As a result he was transferred to the 
MDC, then perceived as a rival organisation of METCO (see Chapter 6.0), 
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where a task force was fostering the birth of IPSE. The Institute had a number of 
sources of inspiration. This included the fact that the Labour Party, returned to 
government in the general elections of 1996, had promised in its manifesto to 
give at least as much attention to small Maltese-owned enterprises producing 
goods and services for the domestic market as previous post-Independence 
Labour governments" had given to the generally larger, foreign-owned 
companies producing for export markets. Labour Prime Minister Alfred Sant had 
personally instructed the politically appointed Policy and Planning Coordinator, 
soon after Chief Executive Officer, at the Malta Development Corporation 
(MDC)12 to undertake whatever organisational and administrative measures were 
necessary to fulfil the Labour Party's electoral promise as effectively, efficiently 
and quickly as possible. 13 
The author's transfer was picked up by the press, which suggested that 
government, and more specifically the Prime Minister, wanted to place "trusted 
acolytes" in crucial places (The People on Sunday, 17 May 1997: 11; 31 May 
1997: 11). These reports affected permanently the author's role in the IPSE 
project. The author was in real terms first an executive14, and then a managerls, 
within a team of other people of his grade. Nevertheless, it was clear that his 
opinions carried a political weight that was disproportionate to his actual role 
within the organisation. One of the main reasons for this was that third parties 
associated him directly with the leadership cadres of the party in government. 
11 1971-1976,1976-1981 and 1981-1987. 
12 The sole government agency responsible for the promotion of economic development since its inception 
by an Act of Parliament in 1967. 
13 Personal communication, Mario Vella. As President of the Malta Labour Party (1994-2000), Dr Vella 
had contributed to the drafting of the party's manifesto, particularly its economic sections, for the 1996 
general elections. As a senior employee of MDC (1979-1980,1984-2000), he had an insider's view of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organisation. He was appointed Policy and Planning Coordinator for 
MDC immediately upon the swearing in of the new cabinet, and four weeks later the Corporation's new 
Board of Directors appointed him Chief Executive Officer. 
14 In the run up to the IPSE launch. 
15 When IPSE Limited was launched. 
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The erroneous impression of a larger-than-life political role of the author was 
dominant in the organisation. In fact, on a number of occasions, members of 
senior management requested his views about policy issues on which a mid-level 
manager within the organisation would not have normally been consulted. Some 
of his opinions might have influenced decisions, while others were unheeded. 
This situation persisted until 1998 when the Labour Party was heavily defeated 
in early general elections that had been called for September 1998.16 The 
atmosphere in the week following the general elections was almost that of tribal 
war, with some supporters of the new government burning billboards and 
threatening people. '? All of a sudden, the author stopped being perceived as an 
unofficial government representative, and started being considered as almost a 
`spy' instead. 18 The author found himself sidelined within the organisation and 
was at one time asked to give up his political activity in order to continue 
working with the Institute. This condition was later withdrawn. Over the 
following months, the author again forged a working relationship within the 
organisation, even though access to information was much more restricted. 
4.3.2 Problems associated with participant observation 
There are problems associated with participant observation. First of all there is a 
problem of scale. The larger an organisation gets, the more difficult it is to make 
the desired observations. This problem was largely avoided in this project since, 
during the period under observation, the size of the Institute and its area of 
16 Labour was crushed in the polls, in a result similar to the one of the 1992 general elections. 
17 Four Nationalist supporters actually broke into a house and beat the finance manager of a government 
corporation, whom they thought was a Labour supporter. 
18 Soon after the general elections, there was a leak of information into the media regarding a tender issued 
by IPSE. The author was immediately suspected of such a leak. Nevertheless, official investigation 
concluded that the author did not even have access to such information and identified the source of the leak 
elsewhere. 
151 
competence were still limited. Furthermore, all IPSE-related operations were 
contained in one office block, thus facilitating the logistics of observation. 
A second major problem is that of time. This type of research is frequently a 
prolonged activity that may stretch over a number of years. The lapse of time 
between observations, analysis and conclusions may prove to be uneconomic. 
The observations carried out for this research project range over five years. 19 
Such a prolonged participative observation process was possible only because of 
the author's full-time work assignment with the organisation under scrutiny. 
Some may consider the analysis of decisions taken as far as 1996 as 
uneconomical since the political context has changed significantly from that 
time. Nevertheless, the author argues that this project still has political 
significance for three main reasons. First of all, it provides a first-hand account 
of a very delicate phase in Maltese political and economic history. Secondly, it 
is the first account of the dynamics of a public-private partnership fostering the 
development of small and medium sized enterprises. Thirdly, it focuses on a 
period of almost traumatic political change for the microstate being observed and 
highlights the reactions of a particular institution, which in this case is IPSE. 
Within such a context, it is reasonable to conclude that the analysis is still 
economical and relevant. 
A third problem is the role of the researcher in itself. Participant observation 
requires that fieldworkers adopt non-interventionist approaches but, as already 
illustrated, the author was assigned with IPSE as an employee during the period 
under observation, a fact which was crucial for the implementation of this 
project. 20 To this must be added the researcher's background and his colleagues' 
perceptions of him (described above). These circumstances could lead to the 
19 Participative observation reported in this research project ranged from 1996 to 2001 
20 The author was employed as Market Intelligence Manager at IPSE Limited. 
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conclusion that the research was vitiated by fundamental departures from 
accepted protocols, but this was not in fact the case. 
It is possible that the researcher's interventions - which were confined to his 
contractual duties - may have influenced events, particularly as a result of his 
colleagues' perception of his `political' role. This fact might have biased some 
decisions being taken throughout the organisation. One example is the definition 
of clients. During certain periods there was a movement within IPSE for the 
inclusion of retailers within the Institute's client base. The author was one of a 
group that resisted this idea. The group believed that the Institute had to focus 
first on industrial and related enterprises, which were the most in need of 
restructuring because of the imminent liberalisation. Given the author's ascribed 
political weight, it is possible that his alignment with those proposing a narrower 
focus might have tipped the scales in their favour. At the very least is might 
have hastened their `victory'. Nevertheless, any such influence on events was 
purely unintended, and not the result of conscious decisions to influence IPSE's 
policy decisions. The author tried to keep his participant observation of IPSE as 
`open' as possible, in the sense that theoretical preconceptions were not allowed 
to suppress observations that would have required a revision of the theoretical 
framework. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the research methodologies applied in this project. 
In an effort to do justice to the nature of the phenomena being observed, a hybrid 
approach was adopted combining quantitative and qualitative methods. Although 
certain problems could not be totally avoided (especially those arising from 
researcher's political activities outside IPSE), this process of triangulation 
allowed observations made to be more rounded and certainly contributed to the 
validity of the results. 
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Chapter 5.0 A survey of SME-support organisations in the context of 
different variants of national Fordism 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on and analyses the results of an empirical study carried out amongst 
forty-one organisations from nine different countries representing the various national 
variants of Fordism observed by Peck and Tickell (1994). This chapter also draws on a 
personal interview with Professor Tickell and compares it with the evidence submitted by 
the respondents of the survey. 
The chapter starts by situating the survey in the context of the author's broader research 
interest and by outlining the theoretical rationale that guides the survey, and then moves 
on to the technical and operational details of the survey. Each section deals with the 
different questions posed in the questionnaire and submits an analysis of the findings. 
This provides a basis for the conclusions submitted in the final part of both this chapter 
and the whole project. 
5.2 The theoretical context: The New Deal, Europe and Regulation 
Even a cursory historical consideration of US programmes of assistance to small business 
suggests that small and medium sized enterprise plays a critical role in the system of 
institutional compromises that underpin regulation in capitalism. The historical roots of 
the US Small Business Administration (SBA) go back to the setting up of far-reaching 
and wide-ranging structures of intervention following the Great Depression. Although 
the SBA was launched by President Eisenhower in 1953 to "aid, counsel, assist and 
protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns" as well as to 
ensure a 'fair proportion" of government contracts and sales of surplus military property 
to small business, in fact it took over some of the functions of the Reconstruction Finance 
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Corporation (RFC)l, created by President Hoover in 1932 to attenuate the financial crisis 
and inherited by President Roosevelt as one of his pet projects. Although the RFC was 
essentially a federal lending programme addressed to both large and small business, its 
rationale was the protection of firms not big enough to threaten free competition through 
the imposition of a monopoly or the formation of cartels in alliance with other firms 
powerful enough to participate in the said cartels. 
This rationale also justified the setting up of the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC) 
in 1942. The latter was created by Congress to ensure that smaller businesses were 
enabled to participate in war production and compete for contracts for defence supplies. 
After the War, the SWPC was dissolved and its functions transferred to the RFC. `Softer' 
tasks, essentially educational activities and management advisory services aimed at the 
sole entrepreneur, were entrusted to the newly set up Office of Small Business (OSB) in 
the Department of Commerce. The Korean War led Congress to create the Small Defense 
Plants Administration (SDPA) to look after the interests of small business, essentially by 
certifying that wishing to supply work under government contracts were effectively 
capable and competent to do so and therefore qualified for RFC loans. In 1953, al already 
stated above, the RFC was abolished and its small-business related responsibilities taken 
up by the SBA. 
In 1958, following a Federal Reserve study confirming that small business was unable to 
obtain sufficient credit at affordable terms to advance technologically, the Investment 
Company Act empowered the SBA to licence, regulate and helped to fund private venture 
capital firms specialising in the provision of long-term debt and equity investment to 
high-risk small business. Eventually the SBA developed programmes to assist small 
business to compete in federal contract procurements as well as assistance to women, 
Olson, James S. Saving Capitalism: The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal, 1933- 
1940. Princeton U. Press, 1988 and Mason, Joseph R. "The Political Economy of Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation Assistance During the Great Depression. " Explorations in Economic History 2003 40(2): 101- 
121. 
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minorities and veterans to start their own business. Its current loan portfolio makes it the 
US largest small business financier. 
The RFC was one of many in the "alphabet soup" of New Deal programmes, most of 
which were shut down around 1943 but some which continue to exist today. To a large 
extent the complex edifice of regulatory intervention that ensures the reproduction of 
capitalism in the US is a creature of the New Deal. Most of elements of regulation 
developed within the framework of the New Deal were based on social and political 
compromise (in fact the term `New Deal' also refers to the liberal coalition woven 
together by Roosevelt to support his programmes) as well as bitter conflict in the House 
of Representatives and Senate, in the judiciary (notably the Supreme Court, whose 
condemnation of the New Deal as unconstitutional in 1934, was only reversed in 1942 
with the Wickard vs Filburn sentence) and in civil society, all of which can only be 
understood in terms of the various social and economic interests involved. 
5.2.1 Setting the context to facilitate comparisons 
The above reference to the historical roots of US small business promotion organisations 
in the socio-economic and political conflicts of interest evident in the wake of the global 
crisis of capitalism that erupted towards the end of the third decade of the 20th century is 
intended to highlight the importance of setting SME support organisations and policies in 
each country in their concrete socio-economic and political context before they can 
meaningfully be compared with each other. 
Ultimately a study of SME development programmes in contemporary capitalism needs 
to be grounded in a comparative analysis of socio-economic interests involved in the 
process of setting up what we have called the system of institutional compromises that 
underpins the structures of regulation in each country. Although such a study is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the following tentative remarks are in order to set the findings of 
the survey of SME support organisations and their respective policies within the 
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framework of the broader research agenda indicated above, an agenda this author intends 
to pursue. 
5.2.2 SMEs and the survival of Capitalism 
At a certain point in the development of capitalism, the survival of small and medium 
business is seriously threatened by'the process of monopolisation and centralisation of 
capital. At this point, the weaker fractions of capital (that is, the large firms in the less 
competitive sectors of the national economy, those that need protection and government 
contracts, such as heavy industry in Germany and Italy in the 1920s and 1930s) seek to 
co-opt the petty bourgeoisie (the self-employed as well as the white-collar employees, 
the old and new petty bourgeoisie respectively, in Poulantzas' terminology) into a 
reactionary social bloc. This bloc becomes the social and political foundation of an 
authoritarian system of regulation that guarantees the survival of capitalism through 
corporativism and autarky. 
In the case of the US and Britain, the existence of a vast internal market in the former and 
of a vast imperial market in the latter and, in the case of both, free and advantageous 
access to mineral resources including oil and coal, makes the authoritarian element 
unnecessary to set up a viable system of regulation. In the case of the US and Britain, this 
system also differs from that adopted in Germany and Italy inasmuch as it is driven by a 
social bloc whose mass support base is, in Britain, the working class, and, in the US, the 
heterogenous but popular alliance constituted by Roosevelt's Democrat New Deal 
Coalition (labour unions, Catholic and Jewish minorities, Afro-Americans, farmers, 
Southern whites). 
In both the US/British and Italian/German cases, the ultimate effect of regulation was 
survival of capitalism but only a reductionist perspective that sees political distinctions as 
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irrelevant and illusory can fail to see the difference between the two instances2. The 
decisive distinguishing factor between what we could tentatively term `progressive 
regulation' and `reactionary regulation' in 20th century capitalism is the social 
composition of the social blocs upon which the respective structures of regulation are 
built: the working class in the former and the petty bourgeoisie in the latter. Although an 
exhaustive analysis of SME support organisations and of various national SME policies 
today, would need to be set in a concrete analysis of the concrete socio-economic and 
political situations within which they are situated, it is already generally evident that in 
situations of intense economic crisis characterised by very high levels of unemployment 
in which capital is unable to `keep' labour locked into the ruling Keynesian/social 
democratic social bloc, one is to expect the resurgence of SME support policies. 
Again, here too, one must be wary of tempations to resort to simplistic and reductionist 
generalisations. The resurgence of SME support policies and the concomitant resurgence 
of petty bourgeois parties that one expects in such situations does not automatically 
translate into the resurgence of reactionary, authoritarian state forms. Hence the emphasis 
on the importance of the economic analysis and policy of the Italian Communist Party in 
the 1970s. The Italian case shows clearly that it is possible to construct national or 
regional structures of progressive regulation on the basis of social blocs that coopt both 
the working class and the self-employed petty bourgeoisie ; the case of the Reggio Emilia 
is a case in point. In such cases, failure from the part of the Left to take the political 
initiative to co-opt the petty bourgeoisie in progressive social blocs (whose 
progressiveness they must themselves ensure) and to undertake the required institutional 
compromises to make these blocs politically viable, will generally result in the initiative 
being seized by the Right : the case of the Italian North East (Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli 
Venezia Giulia) is evidence of this. Whereas the economies of both the Reggio Emilia 
and the North East regions are overwhelmingly made up of SMEs concentrated in sector- 
specific `industrial districts', the former is a `red' region and the latter is shared by the 
Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Bossi's xenophobic Lega Nord. 
2 It is interesting to note that Roosevelt's policies were attacked as both `fascist' and `communist' 
depending on the source and interest of the attacker. 
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This study shows how the failure of the short lived `New Labour' 1996-98 government in 
Malta is to a large extent attributable to its failure to coopt the self-employed in its project 
to reconstitute a developmentalist social bloc to rekindle the developmentalist drive of the 
1971-1987 Labour governments. The survey of SME support organisations and policies 
that follows, is to be considered as a preliminary exercise in view of this author's plan to 
undertake the analysis referred to above. 
5.3 Surveyed countries3 
5.3.1 France4 
The French Government's role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises is 
easily identifiable given its relatively interventionist approach to economic policy 
compared to its main European counterparts. Even though non-governmental 
organisations have an important role, the centrality of state-controlled organisations is 
quite evident. 
The formalisation of a comprehensive SME support policy emerged mainly after World 
War II. The kinds of support available under the French system are similar to those 
provided by other systems, two facts being of particular relevance. The first is the 
importance of direct financial assistance to enterprises under the French system, even if 
this type of assistance has been in (relative) decline given the increasingly restrictive 
European Union rules on state aid. The second is the particular importance that the 
French state gives to artisan enterprises which are seen by the state to have a high value- 
added, economic and national (read patriotic) value. 
3A brief on Malta is not submitted in this section since an exhaustive outline on the situation in the country 
is given in Chapter 3.0 and Chapter 6.0. 
° See also Chapter 2.0 for an overview on Fordism and the post-Fordist debate in France. 
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5.3.2 Germanys 
The first formal programmes supporting small and medium sized enterprises in Germany 
were launched soon after the end of World War II, in 1949. These programmes provided 
direct support for small enterprise and have flourished through the years. Today there are 
between 400 and 1,200 initiatives of the sort. Nevertheless, budgetary considerations 
have recently led to a rationalisation of these programmes. 
The German SME support system is characterised by strong government leadership, not 
only at federal, but also significantly at state and local level. Generally speaking, both 
public and private organisations are used to deliver this support in a decentralised 
manner. This degree of decentralisation is reflected in the apparent lack of federal central 
structures, even though coordination is evident. The different länder opt for different 
approaches, varying from relatively informal assistance channels to institutional 
solutions. 
There are various types of support. Indirect measures include the simplification of tax 
procedures for SMEs, and legislation simplifying hire-and-fire terms for SMEs. Direct 
support concentrates on giving SMEs access to external capital in the form of venture 
capital and subsidised credits. Research and innovation are also emphasised and special 
incentives are available in this sector. Consultancy and marketing are given lower 
priority. In general there has been a concentration on supporting start-ups in a bid to 
increase employment. 
One of the strong points of the German system is the way in which it brings together both 
the public and private sector in offering this type of support within a post-Fordist context. 
However, decentralisation has often allowed local and regional politicians to create SME 
support programmes as an end in themselves rather than as means to an end. The lack of 
coordination has also been underlined by the Commission of the European Union. 
5 Based on Welter (2001). 
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5.3.3 Italy6 
The Italian government has always been the main player in support policies, even though 
the role of business organisations, particularly as lobbyists, should not be underestimated. 
Italy stands out amongst the countries under examination as the one with the most 
laissez-faire attitude towards incentivising and supporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises, though policies have recently become more structured due to European 
Union regulations. 
Over the years the Italian system has evolved into what is possibly the best example of a 
post-Fordist policy approach that one can identify. In fact, rather than establishing 
institutions and fixed programmes, the Italian authorities have traditionally preferred to 
assist SMEs by simplifying procedures and using more general fiscal tools. This 
informality is seen even when it comes to definitions, with UNIDO remarking that 
"Italian law has never given criteria for defining and identifying SMEs. "7 Emphasis has 
traditionally been on the location of enterprises, with the economically lagging 
mezzogiorno or south being the part of the country where start-up assistance is most 
pronounced. This has led to discontent from entrepreneurs from other parts of the 
country, especially the north-east, home of the so called Third Italy industrial district. 
The Ministry for Industry is responsible for most, though not all, central government 
measures for the development of economic strategies regarding SMEs. The Ministry for 
Foreign Trade is responsible for support relating to export, while the Ministry for 
Research is geared towards facilitating research and development. 
6 See also Chapter 2.0 for an overview on Fordism and the post-Fordist debate in Italy. 
7 UNIDO: SME Italy -A Comparative Analysis of SME Strategies, Policies and Programmes in Central 
European Initiative Countries, website: www. unido. org 
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5.3.4 Japan 
If the Italian system has traditionally been flexible and sparse, the Japanese approach to 
SME support has been synonymous with extensive bureaucratisation and Fordist 
organisation, with the role of every institution being clearly defined at a national, regional 
and local level. The Japanese government takes a central and proactive role in providing 
momentum for this policy sector and regularly publishes white papers on the system. 
The facilitation of access to finance is considered to be of key importance, and the 
authorities openly acknowledge that SMEs are "unattractive loan recipients for private 
financial institutions. "8 The Japanese were amongst the first to recognise this fact, with 
government forming three financial institutions, namely the Japan Finance Corporation 
for Small Business, the National Life Finance Corporation and the Shoko Chukin Bank to 
cater for SMEs. The latter was established as early as 1936 `for the purpose of soliciting 
investment in the bank from SME associations as well as from the government, and 
providing general financial services to said associations and their members. "9 
The system also provides consultancy and information services through SME support 
centres on a local, regional and national level. The areas of competence of these 
structures are clearly marked. The local centres are geared to help start-ups and to iron 
out run-of-the-mill bureaucratic problems. Regional centres specialise in giving expert 
advice and evaluating project feasibility. On a national level, there are then other centres 
that help growing SMEs that want to expand even further by, say, getting listed on a 
stock exchange. 
Parallel to all this but with relatively less relevance given the exhaustive services offered 
by the state, are the non-governmental organisation that mainly limit themselves to 
dissemination of information and consultancy services to enterprises. 
8 Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI), Japan, website: www. chusho. meti jr) 
9 Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI), Japan, website: www. chusho. meti go n 
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5.3.5 Polandlo 
The Polish situation should be examined mainly in the light of political developments 
since 1989, the steps taken towards the establishment of a market economy and European 
Union membership in 2004. 
The first policy changes favouring SMEs were taken in 1988, some months before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, with the authorities consciously deciding to diminish state control 
of the economy and making the establishment of private enterprises easier. The impact 
of these changes was immediate with the number of Polish enterprises, mostly SMEs, 
almost doubling to 860,000 in just one year. Since then, Poland has developed an SME 
support system which is very similar to the mainstream post-Fordist model adopted in 
Western countries. 
Government drafted a strategy for SMEs and several institutions were set up to support 
them, with the main player being the Polish Foundation for Small and Medium Enterprise 
Promotion and Development which was established in 1995.11 This foundation, which is 
very similar to IPSE, was financed with European Union funds. Its programmes are 
intended to facilitate the flow of venture capital, to advice entrepreneurs and to facilitate 
access to preferential loans for the creation of new workplaces and for export promotion. 
One of the most significant achievements of the Polish system has been the support given 
to the development of SME's in rural areas through the introduction of a preferential 
credit system and the development of local credit guarantee funds. These developments 
have not spared the Foundation from criticism that it was making the development of 
programmes of assistance an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve a wider 
economic objective. 
10 Based on Marek (1999). 
" The Foundation eventually developed into the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PAED). 
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Worth noting is the proactive role of the private sector, with business organisations 
successfully tapping EU funds to offer financial assistance, albeit of a limited scope, to 
SMEs. 
5.3.6 Tunisia 
Tunisia stands out amongst the countries surveyed for this exercise as having a system 
that is more closely oriented to the needs of foreign investors than those indigenous 
SMEs. This is predictable given the specific characteristics of its Fordist variant. 
All the various forms of assistance on offer are available to enterprises established in the 
country, whether they are foreign owned or joint-ventures bringing together local and 
foreign entrepreneurs. Even though the system does not explicitly exclude local 
entrepreneurs from the outset, as a whole it is clearly geared towards foreign investors. 
This may have been the case in Malta at some points prior to the establishment of IPSE, 
or at least this was the general impression amongst small entrepreneurs. The foundation 
of IPSE was partly inspired by criticism of this type (see Chapter 6.0). 
Much of the assistance takes the form of grants to help exporters and enterprises 
established in economically disadvantaged areas. Special incentives are also available for 
investment in the agriculture sector. 
Non-governmental organisations, comprising local business organisations and joint- 
chambers, mainly the Italo-Tunisian and the French-Tunisian chambers of commerce 
(which form part of the Tunis chamber of commerce network) aim at facilitating access 
to the facilities offered by the Tunisian government. 
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5.3.7 United Kingdom 
The British government's support to SMEs is channelled mainly through the Business 
Link network. The approach used to assist SMEs is of a mainstream type but is more 
oriented towards creating value-added by means of research and networking. It is also 
one of the most well-organised SME support network among those examined in this 
survey. The direct involvement of non-governmental organisations was less pronounced 
at the time the survey was carried out. Nevertheless, the SME-support structures tend to 
be rather inclusive of these organisations representing the private sector. 
More recently, one could observe a proliferation of such structures on a regional level, 
with one of their core interests being the tapping of European Union funds, especially 
those for economically disadvantaged regions and the creation of regional networks. 
5.3.8 United States of America12 
SME support in the United States is characterised by a relatively large number of 
organisations that are predominantly non-governmental and private in nature. The state- 
funded support system is essentially limited to a single, albeit very strong, umbrella 
organisation, the Small Business Administration (SBA). The historical roots of the SBA 
go back, through its predecessor the RFC, to the Great Depression (see section 5.2 
above). Assistance delivered by the other numerous non-governmental organisations is 
scattered and not coordinated. In many instances, such assistance limits itself solely to 
advice, lobbying and referral to the SBA centres. 
SBA is present throughout US territory and runs a multitude of centres at a local, state 
and federal level. All of these follow a uniform approach and provide advice and a wide 
array of assistance programmes to various types of SMEs. Like the other organisations 
being examined, the SBA is concerned with facilitating access to venture capital and 
12 A thorough historical background to the setting up of the SBA is given in 5.2 above. 
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relieving enterprises from excessive tax burdens. Nevertheless, there are also a number 
of initiatives that stand out for their uniqueness, such as the standard assistance targeted 
at enterprises in areas that have experienced natural disasters. Straight-forward financial 
assistance is limited to this and other rather exceptional cases. The rest of the assistance 
is based primarily on the organisation's consultancy and advisory capacity. 
The SBA is also a strong lobby and adopts a rather paternalistic approach towards SMEs, 
or more precisely, US firms. US administrations have given considerable political 
importance to small business, and the SBA gets to present an annual report on `The State 
of Small Business' to the US Congress. This further projects SBA as the champion of 
SMEs. Moreover, all changes in this sector - including fluctuations and employment - 
are directly attributed to SBA, even though in some instances the connection is not that 
straightforward. 
5.4 Surveyed organisations 
This chapter reports on a survey of SME-support organisations. The methodology 
adopted for this survey is explained in Chapter 4.0. The forty-one organisations that 
have been surveyed are listed in Table 5a. 
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Table 5a: List of surveyed organisations 
Country Organisations 
United States of America Association for Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
Institute for Social and Economic Development 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 
US Chamber of Commerce 
Germany Bundesverband des Deustchen Exportbandes 
(BDEX) 
Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade 
(BGA) 
Zentralverband des Deutshen Handwerks und 
Bundesvereinigung der Fachverbande des - 
Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH und BFH) 
United Kingdom British Chambers of Commerce 
Prosper Group (Business Link) 
France Agence Francaise pour le Development 
International des Entreprises (UBI) 
Agence Pour la Creation d' Entreprises (APCE) 
Asemblee' Permanent des Chambres de Metiers 
(APCM) 
Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle 
(INPI) 
Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF) 
Italy Camere di Commercio d' Italia (Unioncamere) 
Confederazione Generale dell' Artigianato 
Italiano (Confartigianato) 
Confederazione Generale dell' Industria 
Italiana (Confindustria) 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Commercio 
del Turismo, dei Servizi e delle Piccole e Medie 
Imprese (Confcommercio) 
Confederazione Italians Esercenti, Attivita' 
Commerciali, Turistiche e dei Servizi 
(Confesercenti) 
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Confederazione Italiana della Piccola e Media 
Industria (Confapi) 
Confederazione Nazionale dell' Artigianato e della 
Piccola e Media Impresa (CNA) 
Ente per le Nuove Tecnologie, l'Energie e 
I'Ambiente (ENEA) 
Istituto per il Commercio Estero (ICE) 
I Istituto per la Promozione Industriale (IPI) 
Malta Chamber of Commerce (COC) 
Federation of Industries (FOI) 
General Retailers and Traders Union (GRTU) 
Ghaqda Imprendituri Maltin (GHIMA) 
Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise 
(IPSE) 
Malta External Trade Corporation (METCO) 
Poland Chamber of Craft and Small Business 
(IZBA) 
Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PAED) 
Polish Chamber of Commerce (KIG) 
Tunisia Agence pour 
la Promotion Industrielle (API) 
Tunis Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Japan Fuji Research Institute Corporation 
Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) 
Japan Small Business Corporation (JSBC) 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(JCCI) 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (METI) 
Smaller Enterprises Retirement Allowance - Mutual 
Aid Corporation 
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5.5 Findings and results of survey 
5.5.1 Legal set-up, shareholders and stakeholders 
Diagram Sb: Legal set-up of organisations 
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Diagram 5c: Overview of legal set-up of organisations 
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Many of the organisations surveyed are of a non-governmental nature and this is clearly 
reflected in the responses. 
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It is interesting to note that even when a key role by government is implied. these 
organisations prefer not to be labelled as public sector organisations. Generally, being 
recognised as an independent centre or institute is a preferred option in these cases. It is 
only in two cases that respondents classify themselves directly as a government 
department. This trend is identifiable across the various variants under examination. 
Also worth noting is the proliferation of non-governmental organisations in Italy. which 
to some extent reflects the more liberal attitude towards SME promotion adopted in this 
country 
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Analysis of shareholding in the organisations under investigation reveals that government 
involvement is actually greater than could he assumed on the basis of the legal structures 
of the organisations. This corroborates the observation (reported above) that even in 
cases where government involvement is evident, organisations prefer not to he perceived 
as a state entity. Of particular interest is the French situation, where one organisation 
describes itself as an independent centre but is fully-owned by government. Across the 
different Fordist variants studied there are no cases where government is not involved at 
shareholding level in at least some of the organisations. 
The United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the United States and Malta provide examples of a 
partnership situation, whereby national government teams up with the private sector. In 
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the case of IPSE, the private sector's power and influence on the board of directors is 
disproportionate to its miniscule share of capital (0.0 1%). In fact, the latter have the right 
to nominate two out of five directors and can also forward government a shortlist from 
which government chooses a chairperson for the organisation, thus giving the private 
sector a majority of seats on the board in real terms. 
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Small enterprises and the private sector are a common denominator as stakeholders for all 
the organisations surveyed across the different variants. Nevertheless, the various 
permutations that this shows are quite interesting. Many organisations in which 
government does not have a shareholding appear not to think of the main policy-making 
body as a stakeholder. One German organisation feels that its loyalty extends solely to its 
member enterprises and not to SMEs in general. 
The involvement of Congress in the case of the United States, and the priority given to 
foreign investors over local investors by the Tunisians (which can be said to be typical of 
a primitive Fordist system where a local business elite is not that evident) are both 
noteworthy. 
IPSE goes to lengths in trying to identify all the possible stakeholders, with the main line 
of thought being that anyone interested in the subject, even the general public, should be 
considered as a stakeholder. Interestingly enough, small enterprises are put at the bottom 
of the stakeholders' list. 13 
Italy and Japan can be singled out as systems where organisations are more attentive to 
the needs of particular parts of the private sector, rather than to privately-owned business 
as a whole, while French organisations do confirm an affinity with government, in line 
with Peck and Tickell's observations. 
13 The questionnaire did not specify that stakeholders should be listed in any particular order. 
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5.5.2 Private sector involvement 

















  Consultative 
Q Shareholding 
O. erall Pnwte Sector 
Irnwdwmecl 
2291, )649/o 
The private sector was involved in all of the organisations surveyed, either directly 
through a shareholding or indirectly in a consultative capacity. Organisations in which 
government is a major shareholder seem to concur that they must give at least a 
consultative status to the private sector. This system does not work the other way round. 
In the case of the United Kingdom and Malta, one can also notice that apart from a 
consultative status, government also gave part of the shareholding to the private sector in 
what can be interpreted as a bid to co-opt the sector in a Fordist mode of regulation. 
Thus, the link with the private sector exists, in one way or another, throughout the various 
models of national Fordisms. 
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5.5.3 Trade union involvement 
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There is practically no trade union involvement throughout the various systems. liven 
though small enterprises are the major employers in practically all the countries under 
examination, the workers' representatives are in almost all cases not even consulted by 
these organisations. 
The sole exceptions are found in two organisations in the United Kingdom and the United 
States where trade unions are given a consultative function. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, this was a conscious policy decision taken when the organisation was 
established. In the case of the Institute for Social and Economic I)evclopmcnt (l lnited 
States), the organisation is of a more socially-oriented nature, with its main aims 
including helping the unemployed starting their own business. 
While government controlled organisations generally did not consider the possibility of 
such an involvement, most non-governmental organisations (read private sector 
representatives) view trade unions as antagonists. There is convergence on this aspect 
throughout the national variants. 
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5.5.4 Sources and availability of financing 
Diagram 5h: Sources of financing 
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The sources of financing are various, with shareholders being direct contributors. 
National government financing is present in a significant number of instances, to varying 
degrees. Non-governmental organisations depend almost exclusively on private sector 
financing which often derives from member enterprises. The contribution of' the 
European Union can be seen in all EU member states (and candidate countries) surveyed. 
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Diagram 5j: Availability of financing 
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There is no clear trend as to which sort of financing is the most difficult to obtain. What 
is most interesting is the fact that the organisations within European Union member states 
(and then candidate countries) seem to concur that EU financing is the most difficult to 
get. The fact that a number of organisations opted not to answer this question might he of 
significance. 
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5.5.5 Declared aims 
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There is a certain convergence of aims across organisations in the different models of 
national Fordisms. The modernisation and fostering of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, together with the creation of new opportunities, are the key aims. These are 
attempted by means of specific assistance programmes and more generic initiatives, such 
as legal and financial advice and the provision of training programmes. 
A substantial number of organisations view lobbying as one of their main, sometimes 
unique, raison d'eire. This involves voicing the interests and concerns of SMI'. s with 
government and in other fora. This is particularly true of non-governmental 
organisations in Germany, Italy and Malta. 
The aims of the Polish and Maltese organisations, which could he said to derive from 
similar peripheral Fordist systems, are remarkably similar. The main difference is that 
Maltese organisations seem to be more operationally focused on the internal restructuring 
of SMEs, while their Polish counterparts are more geared towards helping, enterprises 
expand to new markets. 
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Of particular interest is the case of the US Small Business Administration, which has as 
one of its aims the prevention of excessive competition. This may sound as something of 
a contradiction in a classic Fordist coupling, in the sense of a mainstream, popular 
outlook of a capitalist system. This aspect is also visible in the Japanese case, where the 
support organisation also helps SMEs to get involved with government sub-contracting 
projects. In the Japanese system one can again observe that the organisations under 
examination have different core competences and in a way there is less room Ihr 
duplication of resources and `inefficient' competition between SME support 
organisations than in other systems. 
Another fact that needs to be pointed out is that Italian, Japanese and American 
organisations give major importance to the promotion of technology amongst SMEs. 
5.5.6 Establishment of organisations 
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The dates of establishment are various. The oldest organisation surveyed is Malta's 
Chamber of Commerce14, which was established sixty odd years before similar 
organisations in countries with a more classical type of Fordism. Most of' the 
14 Now renamed Malta Chamber of Commerce and Enterprise. 
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organisations surveyed were established during three main periods, that is towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, in the post-World War II period and in the post-('old War 
period. 
Some of the recent additions, namely Prosper (1995), the Polish Agency for [nterprise 
Development (1996) and IPSE (1998) can be said to have relatively similar 
characteristics. Another point worth noting is that the earliest initiatives were taken by 
the private sector and are in the form of non-governmental organisations. State 
involvement came at a later stage. 
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The private sector emerges as the prime mover. This is natural in the case of non- 
governmental organisations. Nevertheless, government still played an important role 
independently of the national Fordist model. In the case of Poland, government even had 
an important role in bringing together private enterprises. When following up this issue 
with IZBA, the author was told that government had acted as a catalyst bringing together 
various small enterprises to start up the organisation. Congress features once again in the 
case of the United States, given its role in the establishment and maintaining of the SUA. 
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There are very few instances in which a pilot project was carried out, irrespective of the 
national Fordist context. It is interesting to note that the organisations that have gone 
through such a preparation process are mainly government-owned or controlled, and of 
recent establishment. Non-governmental organisations do not seem to give this process 
the same importance. 
It should be pointed out that even though IPSE did not formally conduct any pilot project, 
its setting up as an MDC department in 1997 could be considered as an extended pilot 
project. 
5.5.7 Formal SME policy and policy convergence between political parties 
In almost all cases, the launch of a formal SME policy preceded or coincided with the 
establishment of the majority of the organisations. The only notable exceptions are Malta 
and Poland, which hail from the peripheral Fordist model. The Tunisian organisations 
were not in a position to supply a reply. 
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The replies show that a general consensus exists on the importance of'small and mcdiLutm- 
sized enterprises across the political spectrum, and that this transcends the dillcrent 
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national variants of Fordism. The emphasis or the focus might be different, but there is 
practically no political force that argues that small enterprises should not be fostered and 
promoted. 
In the case of Germany, Italy and Malta, the political orientations of the organisations 
surveyed could have encouraged the respondents to point out divergences. A vociferous 
example is that of one particular Italian organisation that made it a point to stress in its 
response that the Italian centre-right pay lip service to small enterprises and artisans, but 
in fact consider them to be second-class members of the business community. 
With regards to the Maltese case, one can attribute the policy divergence that was 
remarked to the considerable political divide on the European Union issue, and the 
impact that this had on public perceptions of the parties' positions in other areas. 
One should interpret the no reply from the Tunisian organisation in the light of the de 
facto one-party system that exists in that country. 
5.5.8 Relationship with other organisations 
All the countries being investigated have more than one SME-support organisation. This 
reflects a pluralist approach to the sector in all the different national Fordist models. 
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Diagram 5q: Relationship with other organisations 
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The absolute majority of organisations across the various systems state that the 
relationship with other similar organisations is of a cooperative nature. At the same time, 
one has to highlight the relatively high number of non-responses. 
Once again, the British and the Maltese organisation tend to converge on the tact that the 
relationship with similar organisations tends to be volatile and range from cooperative to 
competitive and detached according to the organisation and the situation. The 
relationship between the various players in the Maltese context is thoroughly examined in 
Chapter 6.0. 
5.5.9 Definition of clients and SMEs 
All the surveyed organisations have adopted a formal definition of a client. these 
definitions vary from the very open ended, such as in the case of France and Poland, to 
the highly technical ones as per the EU definition of SMEs. One must also note that a 
number of Maltese, Italian, Tunisian and Japanese organisations specify the types of 
SMEs they consider as their clients, namely manufacturing, agricultural and commercial. 
There are also organisations grouping together other smaller, regional or sectoral 
organisations, such as chambers of commerce, that represent SMEs from certain sectors 
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or certain region. Of particular interest is also the fact that the SBA would not consider 
innovative small enterprises which are capable of succeeding in the market as its direct 
clients. Instead, more fitting to a classic Fordist context, it is willing to help the more 
vulnerable ones likely to encounter difficulties. 
This Fordist characteristic, even though to a lesser scale, is a distinctive factor in Malta's 
case in that the definition of a client by IPSE is directly linked to the particular 
company's need to restructure. According to this definition, an SME that does not need 
to restructure does not qualify as an IPSE member. 
In three cases, namely the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, organisations define clients 
and SMEs as one and the same. At the same time, the survey also confirmed the 
existence of a number of parallel definitions of SMEs in each country surveyed. 
It is evident that in the majority of cases, the definitions used by the organisations are the 
same as those used by national government. Furthermore, where these definitions are not 
the same, they are still significantly similar. 
These trends can be observed across the different Fordist variants. 
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5.5.10 Support to manufacturing enterprises 
Diagram 5r: Support limited to manufacturing 
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This is an important question since it aims to establish whether the organisations being 
questioned focus their operations exclusively on one type of enterprise, namely of the 
manufacturing type, or whether their support is also available to the service and retail 
sectors. One can notice that practically all organisations do adopt an all-encompassing 
approach. 
Only four out of the forty-one organisations exclude service providers from their list of 
potential clients. Of these four, only the Maltese Federation of Industry is a non- 
governmental organisation. 
One should note that IPSE qualifies the type of service industries that are eligible for its 
support by requesting that such enterprises be directly linked with manufacturing 
enterprises. In other words, the service providers must have a productive relationship 
with the restructuring manufacturing enterprises, which are the Institute's main target. 
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5.5.11 Cooperation between financial and industrial capital 
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Although the considerable degree of subjectivity in these answers must be outlined. these 
replies do provide some important indications. In general, one can say that there are 
grounds for a healthy relationship between the two important elements of financial and 
industrial capital. It appears that the respondents may have played down on the real 
extent of the cooperation since they, in one way or another, represent the part that is 
asking for the financing. Once again the similarity in trends between the two peripheral 
Fordist systems, that is Malta and Poland, is significant. 
One must also remark that the outlook of state-owned or controlled organisations is more 
positive than that of non-governmental organisations, especially those championing 
certain sectors. 
A comparison of these answers with Peck and "I'ickell's findings shows that they do 
reflect the general characteristics and trends of the national Fordist models as identified 
in that particular study and as outlined by Professor 'I'ickcll in his interview with the 
author. 15 
15 Reported in Appendix I. 
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5.5.12 Cooperation between enterprises 
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Organisations tend to have a negative outlook on the degree of cooperation between 
firms. This is particularly significant because practically all of them have the promotion 
of inter-firm cooperation as one of'their main aims. 
Despite the subjective nature of both the replies by the respondents, and to a certain 
degree the observations in the original study, one can identify a certain degree of 
convergence between the two. 
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5.5.13 Position of SMEs in relation to other enterprises 
Diagram 5u: Position of SMEs in relation to other 
enterprises 
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In general, SMEs are considered to be able to compete with other enterprises vtiithin the 
national context. The notable exceptions are the United Kingdom and Malta, where some 
organisations consider small and medium-sized enterprises as lagging behind. In both 
cases, it is state-owned enterprises that share this opinion. 
By way of contrast, one must note that the American Association for Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship considers SMEs to be leaders in their particular national context. 
188 
5.5.14 Labour force 
Diagram 5v: Nature of labour force 
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The overall impressions of the working class are somewhat positive and not even one 
organisation defines the working force as being obstructive. This is in contrast with an 
earlier reply in which many of these same respondents considered trade unions as 
antagonists. 
Of relevance is the fact that respondents in the primitive and hybrid Fordist systems share 
the same apparent enthusiasm about the labour force. The answers do to a certain degree 
confirm Peck and Tickell's observations. 
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These findings are again in line with the study of the national Fordist variants. The 
different answers confirm in many instances the observations of Peck and "lickell on each 
individual national Fordist set-ups. 
5.5.15 Role of state 
Diagram 5x: Role of state 
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Many players acknowledge the diminishing role of the state, even though it is obvious 
that it still plays an active role in many systems. Of particular interest is the reply by the 
Italian CNA that points out that the role of the state has changed to a somewhat more 
passive one through the years. 
Nevertheless, the state is acknowledged to be an important player in the creation and 
facilitation of the right conditions to encourage production. These replies indicate that 
Peck and Tickell somewhat underestimated the role of the state in all the different 
national variants. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind the different perceptions of 
the role of the state. 
Professor Tickell considers this question as being somewhat problematic. When asked 
by the author about the role of the state in the creation and facilitation of the right 
conditions to encourage production in the different variants, he states: 
"Difficult to answer: state in US not an active manager in terms of regulation although 
liberal economists would argue that, in setting competitive environment, far more 
effective than hands-on managers. From a social democratic position, the alternative 11 
argument would be made. , 
16 
16 See Appendix I. 
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5.5.16 Control of main industries 
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Globalisation is making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between local and foreign 
ownership of enterprises. Furthermore, the process in itself' has led to a more pluralistic 
ownership base in each country. 
The United States and Japan still report more local ownerships, while Malta and Poland 
have more enterprises that are foreign owned. This is typical of peripheral l ordist 
systems hosting export geared assembly plants of foreign transnationals. 
Symptomatic of primitive Taylorism, the state retains control on the main industries in 
Tunisia. 
When taking into account a number of factors, including the privatisation trend in many 










5.5.17 Programmes of assistance 
Diagram 5z: Tailor-made assistance programmes 
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Most of the organisations surveyed, especially those in which the state is not directly 
involved, do not offer assistance in the form of specific programmes. In fact, such 
organisations view themselves more as champions and lobby groups rather than sources 
of financial and related assistance. 
Assistance through tailor-made programmes is available mainly from government- 
controlled organisations. Only a minimal number of the Italian organisations surveyed 
offer such tailor-made programmes. This could be due to the more holistic and macro- 
oriented approach towards SME support in the Italian system. 
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Even though a variety of nomenclatures is used to define and brand them, the 
programmes of assistance offered by the different organisations in the various systems 
can be grouped into seven main categories. 
Practically all organisations focus on helping SMEs to restructure and grow by means of 
technologically, financially and export-focused programmes. The support organisations 
also offer training and programmes focused on helping new start-ups. Other programmes 
include those which help enterprises to comply with higher standards, such as ISO 
certifications and EU standards. 
IPSE stands out as the only organisation which aims its assistance programmes at 
enterprises of different sizes. Other organisations do not differentiate between enterprises 
of different sizes. 
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As a general rule, non-governmental organisations tend not to offer financial grants as 
part of their assistance programmes. On the other hand, ten out of fourteen state 
controlled organisations offer some form of financial assistance. 
Access to finance in Italy is limited almost exclusively for research, development and 
environmental purposes, while there does not seem to be a supply of such grants, at least 
from the organisations surveyed, in France and Germany. 
Prosper (United Kingdom) pointed out that even though it does not offer grants, it 
envisages its role as that of facilitating access to other sources of finance from both state 
and European Union sources. 
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Diagram 5cc: Monitoring of assistance 
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All organisations that offer financial grants monitor the assistance given by them. lay 
default this means that practically all state controlled organisations monitor the assistance 
given. Other organisations giving non-financial assistance do not seem to find it 
necessary to carry out such an exercise. 
IZ1A (Poland) is the only non-governmental organisation that carries out such an 
exercise and this is tied to the fact that the organisation gives financial grants. Prosper 
remarked that part of the monitoring is required by kuropean Union regulations in the 
case of enterprises that benefit from EU financing. 
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Many of the organisations that both give and monitor financial assistance seem to carry 
out this monitoring on a rather erratic basis. 
Poland and Malta are again similar when it comes to a rather definite span of monitoring. 
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Practically each and every organisation from all the different national Fordist set-ups 
offers its own in-house expertise to clients, irrelevant of the presence of such expertise on 
the market. There is no difference in attitude between state-controlled and non- 
governmental organisations, or the ones offering financial assistance and those that do 
not. 
Diagram 5ff: Facilitation of procurement of expertise 
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On the other hand, the facilitation of access to expertise available on the market does not 
seem to enjoy the same widespread consensus as access to the organisation's own 
expertise. Nevertheless, 65% of the surveyed enterprises do facilitate such access. 
Government organisations seem to be more willing to offer such a service. On the other 
hand, non-governmental organisations such as the Italian Confapi are highly zealous of 
its membership base, and would not encourage members to make use of expertise other 
than its own. 
The organisations in the United Kingdom, Poland and Malta commented that this 
facilitation exercise is limited to a number of consultants that have gone through an 
accreditation process. IPSE added that this is done in order to assure that clients are 
getting a good quality service. 
In the case of API (Tunisia), the organisation does not offer in-house expertise but 
facilitates access to expertise available on the market. 
5.5.19 Link between organisations' programmes and government policies 
Diagram 5gg: Link with government policies 
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In almost all cases, organisations and governments seem to be moving in the same 
direction, policy-wise. This is facilitated by the fact that there is a broad consensus 
amongst nation states and supra-national organisations on the importance of' small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
Nevertheless, there are organisations that have given a negative reply. In the German 
case, one can connect this reply with an earlier reply on divergences on SME policies 
between the main political parties. From this link, one can conclude that /DE und 131] 1 
were highly critical of then German social-democratic government, which they claimed 
gave more importance to larger enterprises. 
The lack of reply in one case in Italy can be given the same interpretation. 
In the case of Malta, both GRTU and GFIIMA were known to be critical of government's 
policies. GRTU's disagreement was on broad economic policies while (; I LIMA opposed 
government's European Union membership bid. 
5.5.20 Evaluation 
Diagram 5hh: Evaluation 
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All the organisations do carry out some sort of evaluation exercise on their programmes 
and operations. 
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In-house evaluation is carried out in all organisations. Furthermore, ten out of lourteen 
state-controlled organisations also use independent consultants to assess their 
performance. This is also the case of German 1DEX which is a non-governmental 
organisation. 
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The surveyed organisations do not seem to be very keen on publishing the results of the 
evaluation exercises. This is particularly true in the case of non-governmental 
organisations. Furthermore, one can note that there are state funded centres, such as 
IPSE, whose evaluation exercises are not available for public scrutiny. 
5.5.21 Comparison with Peck And Tickell's findings 
The original study by Peck and Tickell was not based on formal `scientific' observation 
but on a more generalised search for broad structural similarities. '? Despite the fact that 
the original study generated a lot of interest, there was no attempt to prove and/or 
challenge Peck and Tickell's arguments by means of empirical research. This survey is 
the first scientific and empirical research carried out to substantiate or otherwise the 
characterisation of the different national variants of Fordism. 
The author had asked Professor Tickell to give his feedback on particular questions 
directly relating to his original study and which feature in this survey. In the exercise 
below, Professor Tickell's replies are plotted and superimposed against the answers 
supplied by the various organisations. Both are taken to have a certain degree of 
subjectivity. 18 
Such an exercise facilitates the comparison between Peck and Tickell's general 
conceptual approach and the empirical countercheck carried out in this survey. 
17 Prior to the commencement of this survey, the author interviewed Professor Tickell at Bristol University. 
This meeting was followed up by correspondence and a questionnaire via electronic mail. The answers to 
the questionnaire are reported in Appendix I. 
18 In order to carry out this comparison, the various categories are given a value and are then plotted into 
different graphs. 
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Diagram 511: Superimposition of results: Cooperation between 
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National Fordist Variants 
The similarities between Professor Tickell's answers and the findings of the empirical 
study are strong, even though the values are different from one another. 
19 In general, the 
results of this survey corroborate many of Peck and Tickell's observations on the wider 
characteristics of the different models of national Fordisms. It is evident, however, that 
there can be more categorisations beyond and `in between' those originally identified. 
° 
5.6 Conclusions 
There are three main observations which emerge from the results of this survey and 
which are of direct relevance to this dissertation. 
First of all, the study evidences that these organisations proliferated as the Fordist crisis 
became more evident in their particular national setting. Thus, these observations can be 
interpreted in the context of the Fordist / post-Fordist debate. 
Secondly, one can state that broadly speaking the observations made by Peck and Tickell 
(1994) on the different categories of Fordisms can be to a certain extent correlated with 
empirical data. These conclusions are drawn from two different sources. It is certainly 
significant that the observations made by Professor Tickell to the author on the general 
nature of the different Fordist variants tend to find a significant degree of resonance in 
the opinions submitted by the respondents. The latter broadly confirm the different 
characteristics of the Fordist variants in which they are operating. These trends are 
further confirmed when the responses by the SME-support organisations are compared to 
the replies supplied by Professor Tickell himself. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that situations may vary across time and systems may mutate 
from one variant to another. Furthermore, it becomes obvious that it is difficult to fit all 
19 Professor Tickell provided no answer regarding the relationship between financial and industrial capital, 
and cooperation between enterprises in the case of the peripheral Fordist and primitive Fordist variants. 
20 In his answers to the author's questionnaire, Professor Tickell stated that other national Fordist variants 
are "almost certainly" identifiable. 
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countries comfortably in such categorisations. This might mean that there exist many 
other intermediate or transitional categories which have not been identified by Peck and 
Tickell in their seminal study, and which need to be identified and examined. 
The third observation is that while SME-support organisations hailing from the different 
Fordist variants tend to vary in structure, the strategies they follow in this sector are in 
many cases similar to each other, and in specific instances identical. Thus, specific 
national couplings are likely to influence the structure of organisations - namely the 
degree of direct or indirect government involvement, even though this is not the sole 
difference - but they do not seem to have any specific 
impact on the tools used by these 
organisations. These are basically the same throughout: financial grants, consultancy 
services, assistance for upgrading, training and setting-up new businesses. Peck and 
Tickell themselves had hinted at this phenomenon when they that "What is striking about 
local strategies at the present is just how unlocal they are. " (Peck and Tickell 1994: 
284). Furthermore, another of their observation finds resonance, namely that "Local 
regulatory bodies, to be sure, have a role to play, but they have to be understood for what 
they are. [... j there seem to be just a handful of genuinely innovative local experiments 
and a raft of pale imitations" (Peck and Tickell 1994: 298). This trend is most noticeable 
in the case of organisations that are not directly related to, or dependent on, government, 
even though it is not limited to them. It is where the state's role is more significant that 
divergences seem to be more accentuated. 
This leads back to one of the points made when outlining the theoretical context in which 
this survey was made, namely that although an exhaustive analysis of SME support 
organisations and of various national SME policies today, would need to be set in a 
concrete analysis of the concrete socio-economic and political situations within which 
they are situated, it is already generally evident that in situations of intense economic 
crisis characterised by very high levels of unemployment in which capital is unable to 
keep labour locked into the ruling Keynesian/social democratic social bloc, one is to 
expect the resurgence of SME support policies. 
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There are other trends that beg some attention. Apart from the aims that are classically 
associated with SME-support structures, many of the organisations surveyed consider 
advocacy to be an important part of their functions. In other words, many of the 
organisations feel the need of not only assisting their clients, but also of representing 
them with the authorities, which in many cases mean government and other agencies. Of 
particular interest is the fact that this is so even for government-related organisations. 
These tend to detach themselves from their governmental role to act as the advocates of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The private sector's role, as well as government's involvement (especially in the early 
stages of the support initiatives), is evident in many of the Fordist variants. In many 
instances, this role is directly related to the shareholding or legal structure of the entity. It 
is only in the Maltese case that one can find a situation where government forks out the 
entirety of the capital, holds virtually all shares but grants the private sector a majority in 
the board of directors. This is an obvious and blatant attempt at co-option in a Fordist 
sense which is duly examined in Chapter 6.0. 
On the other hand, trade unions tend to be left out of the whole process even though they 
represent an important factor of production. This omission is done despite the fact that 
many of the organisations admit that the nature of the labour force is relatively volatile. 
In this context, it is perhaps relevant to note that labour in small and medium-sized 
enterprises tends to be less unionised than in the case of the labour force engaged by 
larger corporations. 
The approach within the different national contexts is a pluralistic one and there are other 
players apart from the organisations being surveyed. Thus, there is no centralisation of 
the support structures in just one entity. Nevertheless, there is a general convergence in 
attitudes and programmes with those of national government. At the same time, some of 
the organisations are selective when it comes to supporting SMEs. In fact, in a number of 
instances, support is limited only to manufacturing enterprises. 
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Chapter 6.0 Stakes and stakeholders: The case of Malta's Institute for the 
Promotion of Small Enterprise (IPSE) 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have moved from placing this research within the context of the 
Fordist and post-Fordist debate, to discussing SME support policies and institutions in a 
number of countries covering the Fordist variants identified by Peck and Tickell (1994). 
Observations have been made on how policies and programmes to promote the creation 
and expansion of SMEs by means of training, consulting, technical and financial 
assistance have been adopted in the countries surveyed. Practically all countries have set 
up an institution to coordinate their policies for SMEs, with the private sector and 
constituted bodies generally setting up complimentary support structures. 
The observations confirmed that there is a mainstream of identifiable activities in this 
sector, which is in line with Peck and Tickell's statement that "What is striking about 
local strategies at the present is just how unlocal they are" (Peck and Tickell 1994: 
284). 1 
Before venturing into the details of the Maltese experience, it should be pointed out that 
the current concern about medium-sized enterprises is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Though SMEs are today considered to be important elements in the economy, it was not 
until the mid-1970s that they began to receive the attention due to them, in what can be 
identified as the 'epoch' of the Fordist crisis. Up to that time they had been seen as an 
endangered species facing extinction due to their small size, relatively poor management 
and lack of technology. This perspective changed with the crisis of the Fordist system 
I This can be further confirmed by data resulting from papers submitted to United Nations Economic and 
Social Council: Economic Commission for Europe. See UNECE (SME) web page: 
httn //www unece. orQ/indust/sme/ece-sme. htm 
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that crippled some of the largest enterprises, but that were survived by the smaller firms. 
These small and medium-sized enterprises appeared to offer an alternative production 
mode based on the concept of 'flexible specialisation" (Piore and Sabel 1984), within the 
"brave new world" (Hall 1988) post-Fordism. These points are thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 2.0 and Chapter 3.0. 
The debate on these issues in Malta surfaced in the public domain a decade later. This 
chapter illustrates the beginning of this debate and gives an ethnographic review of one of 
the most tangible results of this debate, namely IPSE. Some conclusions are also drawn. 
6.2 The setting-up of IPSE 
Typical of peripheries, interest in fostering the small and medium-sized enterprise sector 
on its own merits and the need to establish a central agency focused on SMEs and local 
manufacturing enterprises was recognised relatively late when compared to the countries 
mentioned above. The first to make concrete proposals in this direction were Danish 
consultants Ramboll, Hannemann and Hojlund (henceforth referred to as Ramboll) in 
their Study and Action Plan for the Restructuring of Malta's Manufacturing Sector, 
commissioned by the Malta Chamber of Commerce and Malta Federation of Industries, 
but financed by the EU. 2 The final report was published in June 1996.3 
Ramboll proposed that government should establish an Enterprise Development Agency4, 
as a public-private sector joint venture, so as to act as a one-stop shop in helping micro, 
2 Although a number of individuals were involved in the work leading to the writing of the report, the 
actual text was principally the fruit of a British consultant, Simon Armstrong. See The Times of Malta (21 
October 1997). p. 9. 
3 An addendum to the report was published in 1997. -_, 
4 Also referred to as the Malta Enterprise Agency in Annex I of Ramboll (1996). 
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small and other manufacturing enterprises5 needing to restructure. Furthermore, the 
report suggested guidelines for the operation of this agency (Ramboll 1996: Annex 1). 
The then Nationalist government seemed to have accepted this recommendation even 
though it did not make any public commitment on the subject .6 
6.2.1 IPSE as a Malta Development Corporation department 
The Ramboll report was published just four months prior to the general elections held in 
October 1996.7 The Malta Labour Party, that eventually won these elections, had already 
expressed its broad agreement with Ramboll 's analysis and recommendations, with the 
one exception being the suggestion to cap any further expansion of STMicroelectronics. 8 
An analysis of this context is given in Chapter 1.0 and Chapter 3.0. Labour's return to 
office after nine years in opposition also meant the 'freezing'9 of Malta's application for 
membership of the European Union. 
The new administration decided that ownership of the project should temporarily remain 
in the hands of the Malta Development Corporation (MDC), which continued to pursue 
the Enterprise Development Agency Project. Thus, the Institute for the Promotion of 
Small Enterprise was born as a department of the MDC manned by the corporation's 
5 Ramboll implied that local manufacturing enterprises are of a relatively small size. 
6 Nevertheless, the Malta Development Corporation (MDC) took the initiative of earmarking and starting to 
convert premises to house this agency. 
7 These general elections were held approximately ten months before the expiry of the government's 
statutory term in office. 
8 ST Microelectronics is one of the top ten semiconductor suppliers since 1999 and runs sixteen production 
and four non-production sites world-wide. It has been present in Malta since 198 land is now quoted on the 
New York Stock Exchange, on Euronext Paris and on the Borsa Italiana in Milan. Over the years, this 
multinational corporation has accounted for about half of Maltese exports. 
9 This term was widely used in Malta to mean that the membership bid was not being pursued in an active 
manner. The Labour government never actually withdrew Malta's application. This enabled a relatively 
quick re-activation by the Nationalist government in 1998. 
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existent staff. IPSE was officially launched as an MDC department on 27 May 1997 by 
the Prime Minister himself. In his speech at the opening ceremony, Prime Minister 
Sant'° said that the Institute would cater specifically for the needs of the smaller" 
manufacturing enterprises (The Times of Malta, 28 May 1997: 1). With the benefit of 
hindsight, one can say that this might have been a premature decision that marked IPSE's 
existence. 
The extensive media coverage given to this launch contributed to a considerable response 
by local enterprises, many of which were disenchanted with MDC's lack of interest in 
them. The enterprises that looked for IPSE's help at that point in time were typically 
micro, heavily protected, engaged in sectors with inherent over-capacity, and asking to 
lease industrial space12 at a subsidised rate. 13 These enterprises were disappointed to 
learn that the Institute could not meet their needs, in the same manner that the Malta 
Development Corporation did not meet them before. The only difference was that 
instead of filing their requests at the MDC headquarters, they would be filing them at the 
IPSE office. MDC promotional material indicated that the Institute's only products were 
the provisions of the Industrial Development Act (IDA) that until then made no particular 
reference or offered no particular incentive for the smaller local enterprises. The Act was 
first amended to this effect six months later. Thus, IPSE's first impact with these 
entrepreneurs was somewhat negative. On the other hand, this 'premature' launch set the 
ball rolling for a national debate on restructuring, by signalling the urgency with which 
the new government wanted to tackle this process. Furthermore, government had already 
decided that this arrangement was only a transitional step. Nevertheless, this message 
10 See Appendix II for abridged biographical note of the then Prime Minister. 
II At this point in time, IPSE did not adopt any formal definition of 'smaller' enterprises. 
12 The demand for such space in Malta is considerably more than its naturally limited supply. 
13 Author's interview with IPSE (MDC) manager, Wally Vella Zarb. August 1997. 
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was never conveyed publicly. The author learnt from MDC sources that this was done 
consciously for what have been termed as "tactical purposes". 14 
It is worth noting that at this stage the Institute had neither a strategy nor a business plan. 
In November 1997, the IDA was amended thus providing the first legal framework for 
the definition of a small enterprise in Malta, namely an industrial enterprise employing 
not more than ten employees, having a turnover of not more than EUR 105,000, a balance 
sheet total of not more than EUR 54,000, and a maximum investment of EUR 33,000.15 
IPSE adopted this as its definition for SMEs. Nevertheless, it was still unclear, to the 
department itself, who actually were its clients. 16 A month later, government circulated a 
position document that had been prepared by the Malta Development Corporation, and 
that government had adopted as its own, to the constituted bodies'7. The Strategic 
Guidelines for Industrial Restructuring set the government's goal of negotiating a five to 
seven year process of progressive, reciprocal but chronologically asymmetrical 
dismantling of trade barriers between Malta and the European Union. 18 The document 
argued that profound restructuring was necessary if local manufacturing industry was 
going to meet the challenges and opportunities of a free industrial trade area and pointed 
to IPSE as the 'focal one-stop agency" for the promotion of the restructuring process 
(MDC [A] 1997: 2). 
One of the document's proposals, namely the appointment of an 'Advisory Board for the 
Institute, was to prove an important turning point in IPSE's development. The Board 
would be put in charge of reviewing a five-year strategy and one-year business plan 
14 Author's interview with former MDC high official given on condition of anonymity. 
15 According to Section 24(2b): Small Enterprises (Threshold Levels) Regulations of the amended IDA, at 
least two of these four criteria had to be satisfied. 
16 Author's interview with IPSE (MDC) manager, Wally Vella Zarb. August 1997. 
17 Namely the Malta Federation of Industry, Malta Chamber of Commerce and the Malta General Retailers 
and Traders Union. 
18 With the exception of trade barriers protecting the agricultural sector. 
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prepared by MDC for IPSE and overseeing the Institute's transformation into a limited 
liability company by end March 1998. This was the first time that it became public 
knowledge that IPSE's status as an MDC department was merely a transitional 
arrangement. Therefore, this proposal for structural changes a mere six months after the 
launch of IPSE by the Prime Minister himself could have also been interpreted as an 
indication of government's own dissatisfaction with the Institute's work. Indeed, it is 
only on the basis of internal information that one can conclude that these changes had 
been part of government's plans all along. This makes the choice of launching in May 
1997 appear even more questionable, considering the critical changes that government 
proposed soon after this launch. 
The Strategic Guidelines for Industrial Restructuring also proposed an action timetable 
specifying January 1999 as the deadline for IPSE to begin targeting enterprises with a 
maximum of fifty employees, a further and voluntary departure from the IDA thresholds 
just adopted, thus driving in the message that IPSE was not there for just the smaller 
enterprises. Targeting of other larger enterprises was to start a year later (MDC [A] 
1997: 5). Putting its money where its mouth was, the Labour government also formalised 
its commitment that twenty percent of the sale of forty percent of the assets of Maltacour 
and the Malta International Airport would finance the restructuring process (MDC [A] 
1997: 3). To these one had to add the funds from the fourth financial protocol between 
Malta and the European Union. This was the first formal and budgetary commitment by 
a Maltese government in favour of industrial restructuring since the 1970s. 19 The 
constituted bodies signalled their general agreement with these guidelines. 
19 The Nationalist government (1987-1996) had said that it would put aside the income from protective 
levies so as to help in the restructuring process. Worth noting is the fact that the Nationalist government 
never spelled out plans on how these funds for restructuring would be used. Eventually these funds were 
used for purposes other than industrial restructuring. 
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6.2.2 The advisory board 
Ramboll had proposed that IPSE be an independent body receiving its direction from 
both government agencies and constituted bodies (Rambr ll 1996: Annex 1,1). The 
composition of the IPSE Advisory Board reflected these recommendations. In fact, 
reminiscent of mainstream Fordist practices of co-option, the Advisory Board consisted 
of representatives of both the government agencies and constituted bodies 2° Another 
first for Malta was that the government proposed that the Chair of the Board would be 
appointed from a shortlist drawn up by the constituted bodies. The constituted bodies 
submitted their list and government chose a prominent member of the Chamber of 
Commerce as Chairman of the Advisory Board. 
This move can also be interpreted as willingness from Labour to do away with past 
conflicts with the constituted bodies, and try to brush aside lack of a national consensus 
on European policy. A Labour government had to work hard so as to get these non- 
governmental organisations on-board its restructuring project, even though it was 
basically carrying out what the Federation's and Chamber's consultants had suggested. 
The effects of this strategy appear to have been positive, and senior officials of the 
constituted bodies have privately admitted to the author that they were pleasantly 
surprised by Labour's attitude to those who were previously considered as its hostile 
opponents. This co-option move also helped diminish eventual hostility against the 
restructuring project by getting possible opponents on board. Indeed, 'political, 
economic and strategic interests make strange political bedfellows. "(Frank 1981: 218) 
On the other hand, there were two notable absences from the Advisory Board. First of 
all, the trade unions had no representatives. Thus, the labour force that was going to be 
hit directly by the restructuring process was not in any way present during the discussions 
on IPSE's role. Furthermore, it was a Labour government that made this choice. The 
20 The members were representatives of the Malta Development Corporation, Ministry for Finance, 
Ministry for Economic Services, Federation of Industry, Chamber of Commerce, General Retailers and 
Traders Union. 
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matter was discussed extensively by decision-makers. It seems that the presence of both 
the business associations and the trade unions was seen as a potential obstacle to the 
effectiveness of the Advisory Board, by turning it into a forum for conflict between the 
two sides. Ramboll too had not foreseen a role for the trade unions in the context of IPSE 
(Rambell: 1996: Annex 1,1). Oddly enough, the trade unions did not object to their 
exclusion. Their acquiescence may have made political sense. Restructuring without job 
losses is difficult to envisage. Thus, it is possible that the trade unions feared that their 
presence on the Advisory Board would have cost them the allegiance of their members 
who would be hit by restructuring. However, one can trace a contradiction at this point. 
While the IPSE project was going on without the participation of trade unions, the then 
Prime Minister stressed that "The restructuring project cannot possibly succeed without 
the unions' active participation at every stage of the process. They must be involved at 
the very outset including at the stage where the course is being plotted and planned. " 
(Muscat 1998: 85) 
6.2.3 The absence of METCO 
The other notable absence was that of the Malta External Trade Corporation (METCO), 
the government agency responsible for export promotion. The reasons for METCO's 
omission are various. Officially, it was excluded because of potential conflict of interest 
since the corporation would later become a service provider to IPSE and IPSE clients. It 
was also said that IPSE would not be geared just towards export, thus there was no role 
for METCO on the Advisory Board that would eventually shape the new Institute. This 
explanation was considered to be far-fetched by many. After all, a re-orientation of 
locally-oriented units towards export markets appears to have been considered by most 
observers as a major component of the restructuring process over which IPSE was to 
preside. In practice, the institutional rivalry between MDC and METCO was seen to be 
the main reason for the latter's exclusion from the IPSE Advisory Board, piloted by MDC 
itself. 
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Set-up in 1989, METCO grew out of the MDC's Export Promotion Department, taking 
over and expanding its activities, as well as members of staff. Since then, there has been 
a historic rivalry between the two. METCO had had its eyes on IPSE during the drafting 
of the Ramboll report, and its ambition to 'own' the organisation was one of the worst- 
kept secrets in the local business scene. The report had suggested that IPSE's 
organisation should be based on the METCO model, with participation by the constituted 
bodies. The constituted bodies have nominal shareholding in METCO and their 
representatives are in a minority (Ramboll 1996: Annex 1,3). 
Soon after the Ramboll report was published, METCO offered part of its premises to be 
used by the proposed Institute. It also proposed that the Institute for the Promotion of 
Small Enterprise be an equity joint venture between itself and MDC, with the constituted 
bodies having nominal shareholding. Furthermore, METCO showed that it did not 
appreciate "half measures or token gestures" of its involvement in IPSE. 21 
METCO was kept out of IPSE and eventually started treating the latter as its rival. This 
antagonism deepened alongside speculation that the new IPSE would eventually take 
over METCO. This rivalry had ripple effects in the political scene. The Nationalist 
party, which had given birth to METCO, accused Labour of duplicating functions, 
wasting resources and corrupting IPSE's original role (In-Nazzjon, 14 August 1998: 
Sections IV and V). This marked the start of a popularly politicised perception of IPSE, 
which started to be labelled as a `Labourite' institution. Furthermore, the Nationalist 
Party stated that a future Nationalist government would assign METCO a post on the 
Board of Directors of the Institute. With hindsight, one can state that METCO's omission 
from the Advisory Board and eventually from IPSE's Board of Directors yielded mostly 
negative results and created unnecessary rivalry, in a situation where resources were 
relatively limited. 
21 Letter from the METCO General Manager, to the MDC Chief Executive Officer, 25 March 1998. 
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6.2.4 Debate on the definition of IPSE clients 
The Malta Development Corporation presented drafts of a five-year strategy and a one- 
year business plan that reflected suggestions made both in the Ramboll report and the 
Strategic Guidelines for Industrial Restructuring. These documents argued that IPSE 
would need to introduce three main programmes of assistance, namely the Enterprise 
Formation and Growth Programme22, International Competitiveness Programme23, and 
the Manufacturing Enterprise Restructuring Programme24 (Rambr ll 1996: 6). One of the 
first issues to be debated was the naming of the new body. 
As explained previously, entrepreneurs were already disillusioned with IPSE as an MDC 
department. Thus, the representatives of the constituted bodies proposed that IPSE be 
given a new name so as to mark a break with the MDC past. The other members did not 
agree with this change, while the Malta Development Corporation argued that a change in 
name after less than a year would give a negative signal to the business community. 
Although inconsistent with the decision to launch IPSE and then change its function after 
just a few months, MDC's argument was accepted and there was no change in name. 
In the meantime, a delegation from the Advisory Board also met with a delegation from 
the Nationalist Party in opposition to explain first-hand what the whole process was all 
about. Government did not object to this consultation with the opposition, which could 
be interpreted as another mild sign of extrapolated Fordist co-option. 
A second important debate was that concerning the definition of IPSE clients. ' The 
constituted bodies were split on the issue.. The Federation of Industry, Chamber of 
Commerce and government agreed that IPSE's clients, at least at first, should be 
22 Aimed at helping existing micro and small enterprises to grow and support the establishment of new 
enterprises. - 
23 Aimed at improving the international competitiveness of all manufacturing enterprises. 
24 Aimed at assisting with the restructuring of manufacturing enterprises deemed to need it. 
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manufacturing enterprises (MDC 1998: 4). Furthermore, as expressed in the IPSE Five- 
Year Strategy, there should be no size threshold. The General Retailers and Traders 
Union was opposed. The GRTU, whose members are mainly retailers and service 
providers, wanted the Institute to count these sectors among its clients from the 
beginning. Furthermore, it insisted that the greatest emphasis should be put on the micro 
enterprises (L-Orizzont, 8 March 1999: 9). The GRTU threatened to pull out of the 
whole process if its requests were not accepted. The disagreement went public, and the 
GRTU and the FOI/COC started exchanging media releases loaded with heavy 
statements (The Malta Independent, 21 July 1998: 5). The 
latter made it clear to 
government that they were not ready to make any concessions. Historically, this was one 
of the very few times that Labour found itself on the same side with the Federation of 
Industry and Chamber of Commerce. 
This was a considerable dilemma for government since GRTU's anti-VAT stand had been 
very important to its electoral victory in 1996. GRTU members were part of Labour's 
new electoral base, and thus there were political calculations to be made. Numerous 
negotiation sessions took place. The Minister for Industry involved himself personally in 
these talks, saying he wanted to "serve as a catalyst between the GRTU and IPSE [... ] 
and hopefully to arrive at a solution. " 
(The Times of Malta, 11 August 1998: 12) The 
Labour government also tried to show some goodwill by nominating GRTU's President 
to METCO's Board of Directors. Even though the conditions for an agreement seemed to 
exist, this was not reached and eventually the GRTU pulled out of the Advisory Board 
and IPSE itself. The retailers association's actions can be 
better understood if interpreted 
in the light of the incumbent general elections, with media saying that the organisation 
was playing an "electoral card" (The Malta Business Weekly, 23 July 1998: 36). 
Through its inflexible position, the GRTU managed to get both main parties to 
favourably address its demands, on IPSE and other issues, in their electoral programmes. 
The Labour Party pledged the formation of an institution, similar to IPSE, taking care 
specifically of the needs of operators 
in the service industry and retailers (L-Orizzont, 7 
August 1998: Section 28). On the other hand, the Nationalist Party fully endorsed 
GRTU's view that the Labour government had corrupted IPSE's original role by focusing 
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it specifically on manufacturing enterprises. 25 Thus, it pledged to return the Institute to 
"its original role... of helping the smaller enterprises" (In-Nazzjon, 14 August 1998: 
Section V). This shows that GRTU's hard bargaining bore fruit. The difficulty to find an 
agreement in a small system such as Malta contradicts the notion that there can be more 
rational policies in a microstate because there are fewer interests to reconcile. 
6.2.5 The incorporation of IPSE as a limited liability company 
As a result of the decisions taken by the Advisory Board as inspired by MDC's 
suggestions, the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise was incorporated as a 
limited liability company, on the lines of the METCO model, in July 1998. The timeline 
was two months behind that indicated in the action timetable of the Strategic Guidelines 
for Industrial Restructuring. This marked the beginning of the second phase of the IPSE 
project. 
The IPSE Limited's shareholders were the Malta Development Corporation with 99.9 per 
cent of shares, and the FOI and the COC holding a token 0.05 percent each. 
Nevertheless, the constituted bodies effectively held the majority on IPSE's Board of 
Directors26 because the Chair was nominated from a shortlist submitted by the constituted 
bodies. Mr A. Lino Callus, who had served as Chairman of the Advisory Board, was 
nominated as IPSE's first Chairman, and provisions were made, "leaving the door open" 
for an eventual entrance of GRTU as a shareholder (The Malta Business Weekly, 23 July 
1998: 36). The way in which the Institute was now set up reflected to a large extent 
Ramboll's proposals, which included IPSE being "entirely, independent" of government 
(Ramboll 1996: Annex 1,1). In fact, the private sector held a majority of votes in the 
25 One should note that Ramboll (1996) referred all the time to the "industrial sector". 
26 The Board of Directors of IPSE Limited was composed of a representative each from the Malta 
Development Corporation, Ministry for Finance, Federation of Industry and Chamber of Commerce, 
together with the Chairman. 
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Board of Directors. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that it was government that 
financed the institution. 
Even though its terms of reference as a limited liability company obliged IPSE to focus 
on manufacturing and directly related services, the debate on the Institute's client base 
was far from concluded. A broad agreement matured in the Advisory Board for IPSE to 
focus on helping enterprises that would be adversely hit by the removal of protective 
levies. 
Unfortunately for the Institute's credibility, it was once again caught up in a party 
political game. IPSE's incorporation was turned into an electoral campaign photo 
opportunity. Worse still, the Institute's first official activity consisted in its newly- 
appointed Chief Executive Officer presiding over the presentation of letters of intent for 
industrial plots to twenty one small entrepreneurs. Given that locally the allocation of 
industrial plots is considered a controversial matter, with public perception being that this 
is done within the context of political patronage, such a public activity, just fifteen days 
prior the general elections sent the wrong signal. It was considered by many to be an 
intervention in the electoral campaign participation by an institution that was supposed to 
be `national' and above party politics (The Malta Independent, 21 August 1998: 5). 
6.2.6 Re-definition of IPSE's role 
An early election was held in September 1998, after only twenty-two months of Labour 
government. The higher utility rates that had just been introduced, the deteriorating 
economic scenario, internal squabbles within the Labour Party and general discontent 
within its grassroots contributed to Labour's defeat (The Malta Independent on Sunday, 
24 October 1999: 17). The newly elected Nationalist government, unlike its Labour 
predecessor, systematically sidelined all high profile officials that had been nominated by 
the previous government, irrespective of their political affiliation. At one point, IPSE 
seemed to be immune from this search for the pound of flesh, although some newly- 
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elected Ministers pressed for the sidelining of Labourites within the organisation. 
Nevertheless, they could not order this since the majority of Board Members who came 
from the private sector and constituted bodies would not give their consent. The 
Chairman and these members refused to act in such a manner and stressed that IPSE was 
an independent and private sector-driven organisation where there was no place for such 
policies. 27 Nevertheless, a degree of sidelining started taking place in the following 
months. 
The return of the Nationalist Party to office also meant the reactivation of Malta's bid for 
membership in the European Union. Even though the liberalisation of trade had been an 
equally important part of the Labour proposal for a free trade area, the time frame was 
completely different. 28 Thus, the time-tables proposed by the Strategic Guidelines for 
Industrial Restructuring were abandoned. Nevertheless, the newly-elected government 
committed itself to the industrial restructuring project (The Times of Malta, 24 
September 1998: 16). The trade unions called on government to hold talks with them on 
the subject (The Sunday Times of Malta, 27 September 1998: 1). Typical of the 
incrementalist approach preferred by Nationalist governments, which historically 
criticised Labour's proneness to draft plans, no alternative timetable was produced. It 
was only after increased pressure by the European Commission in its updated opinion on 
Malta's application (European Commission 1999) and the subsequent update reports, that 
an industrial policy started to be developed (The Sunday Times of Malta, 6 June 1999: 
10; The Times of Malta, 29 July 1999: 13). A White Paper on the subject was issued 
very late in the day, in December 1999. 
"Restructuring" resurfaced as one of the main buzz words, and began to be used and 
misused. Even the sale of state-owned ý Mid-Med Bank to HSBC was termed as 
restructuring (The Malta Independent, 11 May -1999: 11). Standard -and Poor's credit 
27 Private conversation with IPSE Chairman, Mr A. Lino Callus, November 1998. 
28 Labour wanted to set up a free trade area within five to seven years, starting from January 1999, while 
the Nationalist Party aimed at full membership by 2003. 
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rating agency commented that restructuring is used as "a very vague term" in Malta (The 
Times of Malta, 28 May 1999: 5). 
The role of the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise was bound to change in 
line with the altered political landscape. First of all, IPSE's role had been closely related 
to the establishment of a free trade area, a concept that had been superseded by full 
membership. Secondly, the Nationalist electoral programme pledged the return of IPSE 
to "its original role... of helping the smaller enterprises" (In-Nazzjon, 14 August 1998: 
Section V). IPSE was subject to some harsh criticism by government. The newly- 
appointed Minister for Economic Services described the Institute as a good idea but said 
he was not pleased with its implementation, claiming that he had found that "it lacked 
long-term plans and had very nebulous ideas" (The Malta Independent, 28 January 1999: 
5). On another occasion, the same Minister described IPSE as an "empty carcass" (The 
Malta Independent, 24 June 1999: 5). The Labour Party reacted to this criticism and 
strongly defended the setting-up of the Institute stating that it had worked hard to pave 
the way for industrial restructuring (The Malta Independent, 25 June 1999: 5). The 
Shadow Minister for Economic Services claimed that IPSE staff were being demoralised 
by the government's continuous criticism (The Malta Independent, 6 July 1999: 4). 
This was a critical point, and many rumours were in circulation about the institute's 
impending dissolution and replacement by a new organisation. IPSE's salvation lay in a 
policy decision that had been taken earlier on, that is the full involvement of the 
Federation of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce from the very beginning of the 
process. Both constituted bodies gained ownership of the project and did not want it to 
be sacrificed as part of a political game. Moreover, the combined FOI and COC had the 
political weight necessary to force government to review its plans. 
Government started exerting pressure on IPSE's Board of Directors to change the name of 
the institution so as to mark a break with the past. Politically, such a move would have 
helped the Nationalist government to found 'its own' IPSE, but the constituted bodies 
opposed this idea. The Board argued that a change in name just a few months after 
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IPSE's incorporation would send the wrong signal to the European Union, which was 
forking out part of the expenditure for the Institute's programmes. 
During the same period, government said that it would give a place on the Institute's 
Board of Directors to its METCO rivals. It also started having discussions with the 
GRTU with a view to the association joining the Institute. Publicly, the Institute lost a lot 
of the political status it had before. During the Labour administration, IPSE, as MDC's 
direct associate, enjoyed what can be termed as a preferential status. The then Prime 
Minister, a former MDC Deputy Chairman himself, gave paramount importance to 
industry and its restructuring and fully supported initiatives taken by IPSE and MDC. 
This positioning was lost with the election of a Nationalist government that not only 
considered the tertiary sector to be more important - one can say that it was not post- 
Fordist enough for its tastes - but also considered IPSE to be a `Labourite' institution. 
The Institute's Board of Directors embarked on a bout of intense lobbying in the hope of 
proving the Institute's relevance to the new decision makers. This campaigning, 
especially by the constituted bodies, appears to have convinced the new government that 
IPSE never, in fact, lost its original role of helping the smaller enterprises. Furthermore, 
the new decision-makers agreed that industry was a priority and that IPSE should first 
focus on the manufacturing and related sectors rather than on the retailing and services 
sectors, as stressed by the General Retailers and Traders Union. The GRTU's reaction to 
government's change of heart was a harsh one. Government was att acked for not keeping 
its word and accepting the "arrogant" line of thought of the Federation and Chamber (L- 
Orizzont, 8 March 1999: 9). GRTU did not take up its place in IPSE and said that this 
institution had been "hacked" by the Federation of `Industry and the Chamber of 
Commerce (L-Orizzont, 8 March 1999: 9). Government tried to bridge out by proposing 
to pass a Small Businesses Act offering assistance to those enterprises not catered for by 
neither IPSE nor the MDC (The Times of Malta, Business, 7 October 1999: 1). ' GRTU 
did not join IPSE. 
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6.2.7 The IPSE programmes of assistance 
Taking the Ramboll report and the five-year strategy adopted by the Advisory Board as 
starting points, IPSE began focusing on further defining its client base and giving its 
programmes of assistance a concrete form. First of all a decision had to be taken about 
the Institute's role, following the change in government's European policy. IPSE saw that 
it could not limit itself to encouraging start-ups and assisting manufacturing enterprises to 
tackle difficulties arising from the lifting of protective measures. It had also to branch 
out into facilitating compliance with the European Union's acquis communautaire, 
including the adoption of the Common External Tariff (IPSE 1999). 
Even though some two years had passed from the appointment of the Advisory Board 
that led to IPSE's creation, there was still no concrete definition of IPSE's client base or 
market. The only clear, albeit controversial, point was that these enterprises had to be 
engaged in manufacturing and related sectors. The internal debate within the 
organisation turned to whether the Institute should adopt the European Union's definition 
of a small and medium-sized enterprise. 29 It was pointed out that although such a 
definition existed, European Union member states themselves had different definitions 
suiting their reality best. At the same time, the definition given in the Industrial 
Development Act was completely ignored. Instead, the definition of the client base was 
linked directly to the programmes of assistance that were being drafted. This meant that 
at the end of the day there was no single definition of an IPSE client, but rather a wide set 
of criteria. 
The first type of clients consisted of micro enterprises employing up to ten persons in the 
manufacturing and related sectors, and wanting to expand their operations and increase 
their workforce up to fifteen employees over a three-year period. Manufacturing and 
related enterprises in the start-up stage that intended to employ up to fifteen employees 
within three years were also considered to be IPSE clients (IPSE 1999). Even though 
29 For the most recent version of this often-updated definition, see the European Commission 
Recommendation (2003/361EC). 
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these criteria are relatively restrictive, the decision-makers at the Institute identified a 
further criterion that practically opened the Institute's door to the whole indigenous 
manufacturing sector. In fact, IPSE said that it also considered as its clients all those 
enterprises operating within the manufacturing and related sectors that need to carry out a 
restructuring exercise. 30 In a way, this criterion reflected views expressed in the Strategic 
Guidelines for Industrial Restructuring that was scrapped by the incumbent government 
(MDC 1997: 5). Thus IPSE could also assist clients that classically do not fall into the 
general notion of a small and medium-sized enterprise, even though their presence is very 
limited in the Maltese economy. Furthermore, at no stage did the Institute limit its 
services to just locally-owned enterprises. Initial drafts of the definitions show that the 
Institute considered local ownership as an essential characteristic of its clients. However, 
during a meeting with IPSE, European Commission representatives pointed out that such 
a distinction was not acceptable, mainly on the grounds that Maltese and European Union 
nationals had to be treated on the same level upon Malta's adhesion to the European 
Union. 
Back to the drawing board IPSE was concerned that a very liberal definition would end 
up diverting much of the assistance to projects involving foreign direct investment. The 
solution was found by going back to the basics of the Ramboll report, where it was 
pointed out that the foreign direct investment present in Malta was already competing in a 
liberalised market and did not necessitate IPSE-assisted restructuring. Thus, by inserting 
references to enterprises needing to restructure as part of the client base, one was 
theoretically opening the doors to foreign-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, in practice 
the story was different. 
In the meantime, the business community started to become more interested in getting to 
know what the long-promised assistance was all about (The Times of Malta, Business, 8 
April 1999: 1). Rather than enthusiasm, the result was anxiety within the Institute. The 
policy makers knew that these initiatives had been long waited for and that many 
30 IPSE defined 'restructuring' as "a planned series of business activities carried out by enterprises which 
are negatively affected by the removal of levies and/or need to comply with European Union directives, and 
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prospective clients were looking forward to a rather one-sided 'snatch-and-grab' 
relationship whereby IPSE's role would simply be that of giving grants, industrial plots 
and cash handouts (L-Orizzont, 3 July 1999: 7). The Institute therefore, began stressing 
the need for restructuring not only the economy and industry, but also "business 
mentalities" (Vella Bonnici 1999). 
The fact that resources were scarce and that these could not be wasted in any manner led 
IPSE to opt for the Canadian model of basing its assistance on the submission of a 
business plan. 31 Although business planning ought to be one of the keys to successful 
business practices, it is generally alien to a very large majority of Maltese enterprises, at 
least in its formal representation. It is a well-known fact that not even some of the larger 
and most important locally-owned enterprises have proper business plans. From the 
outset IPSE deliberately designed its assistance programmes so that they would be 
offered within the framework of a business plan. Part of the assistance was devoted to 
helping the client draft a business plan with the assistance of a qualified consultant, 
accredited and registered as IPSE service partner. 32 The business plan had to be 
presented according to a set of guidelines approved by IPSE and include modules relating 
to operations, human resources, marketing and financial requirements (IPSE 1999). This 
exercise was intended to lead the enterprise to discover for itself the areas where it needs 
assistance. IPSE and the enterprise then had to agree on an action plan, on the 
implementation of which depended the assistance being given. Apart from acting as a 
framework for granting assistance, the business plan requirement was also introduced to 
discourage less professionally organised enterprises, which ironically were many times 
the smaller ones. IPSE also made it clear that it was not there to help "lame ducks" 
survive (L-Orizzont, 3 July 1999: 7). 
where such compliance will have significant impact on their operating costs" (IPSE 1999). 
31 Strategis Canada web page: www. strategis. ic. gc. ca 
32 IPSE reimbursed up to fifty per cent of the cost of preparing a business plan, with the maximum IPSE 
contribution being EUR2,400. 
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In formulating its assistance programmes, IPSE did not begin from the framework set in 
the Ramboll report. Instead, the thinking process was started afresh and a number of 
alternatives were put forward. These included both a single assistance programme for all 
enterprises, and programmes aimed at enterprises of specific sizes. When these 
alternatives where thoroughly examined, it was concluded that there should be three 
programmes of assistance targeted at micro enterprises and start-ups, restructuring 
enterprises with little export experience, and restructuring and exporting enterprises that 
are still dependent on the local market, respectively. These were basically equivalent to 
the programmes that had been suggested by Ramboll, that is the Enterprise Formation 
and Growth Programme, the Manufacturing Enterprise Restructuring Programme, and the 
International Competitiveness Programme (Ramboll 1996: 6). 
The programmes, which were given more marketable names were similar to mainstream 
ones provided by SME-support organisations in different national Fordist variants 33 
They provided for operations34, human resource35 and export market development36 
assistance together with access to credit guarantee facilities. Through this assistance, 
IPSE intended to help tackle the structural weaknesses of Maltese enterprises identified 
by the European Commission, namely distance from export markets, machinery operating 
below capacity, a tight labour market and lack of expertise in management and sales 
promotion, and limited access to finance (The Times of Malta, 17 July 1999: 4). In all 
cases, IPSE assistance was given on a reimbursement basis and could add up to a 
maximum of fifty per cent of consultancy, training and implementation costs. A basic 
33 The Enterprise Formation and Growth Programme became 'Small is Beautiful - Is-Sahha fiz-Zghir; 
Manufacturing Enterprise Restructuring Programme was called 'Choosing to Compete - 11-Futur fil- 
Kompetittivita"; while the International Competitiveness Programme was named 'Going for Growth 
Inkabbru u Nesportaw'. 
34 This included assistance in the areas of quality improvement, product development, technology 
improvement, management consultancy, allocation of industrial plots, upgrading of information and 
communication technologies, compliance with environment and health and safety requirements. 
35 Assistance in the areas of human resource consultancy, management training, and skills and 
competencies identification. 
36 Assistance in implementing field market research, overseas channel development and product 
adaptation. 
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difference between the three programmes was the maximum amount of IPSE's 
contribution and the suggested assistance weighting of the different modules. 37 It was 
also decided that the operations of IPSE and its programmes would be subject to external 
evaluation. A decision on whether this evaluation would be published was not taken. 
A suggestion put forward in the Strategic Guidelines for Industrial Restructuring, namely 
that of having these assistance programmes included in the Industrial Development Act 
(MDC 1997: 5) was duly considered. A decision was taken to the contrary mostly on 
grounds of the difficulty in finding a sufficiently early slot in an already crowded 
parliamentary timetable. Thus, it was decided to go for something less formal. IPSE 
launched its programmes of assistance on 8 July 1999, almost twenty months after the 
establishment of the Advisory Board and a year after its incorporation -a considerable 
length of time. Nevertheless, one has to take in consideration the political turbulence, 
change in government policies and attendant uncertainty. Some two hundred prospective 
IPSE clients attended the launch, which attracted extensive media attention (The Times 
of Malta, 9 July 1999: 12). 
6.2.8 Reactions to the IPSE programmes of assistance 
Reactions to these programmes were mixed. Predictably, . the Minister for Economic 
Services backed them fully. The Federation of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce 
were undoubtedly pleased. The media too reacted positively and said that they were "a 
step in the right direction" (The Malta Independent, 13 July 1999: 13). On the other 
hand, the GRTU was consistent in its criticism that the smaller enterprises, retailers and 
service providers were not catered for. The association said that the programmes 
, 
were 
"menus" and "road shows" and that rather than offering assistance, IPSE. "should serve as 
a focal organisation that zeros in on specific problems and then draws up tailor-made 
37 As an example one can say that the International Competitiveness Programme gives more assistance in 
export-related activities, while the Manufacturing Enterprise Restructuring Programme lays more stress on 
the operations and human resource aspects. - 
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programmes of assistance". It also criticised the Institute for simply creating "a market 
for consultants" (The Times of Malta, Business, 15 July 1999: 1). 
The Labour Party opined that the assistance was much too focused on exporting 
enterprises and that the local-oriented ones would receive little or no help. This is in 
contradiction with the attitude the party had adopted some months before when in 
government. However, most surprising of all was the cold shower given 
by the 
Parliamentary Secretary for Economic Services who described the number of businesses 
applying for IPSE assistance as "disappointing" (The Malta Independent, 3 August 1999: 
10). This attack can be attributed to two factors. First of all, the Parliamentary Secretary 
wanted to portray himself as a defender of micro enterprises and retailers, having been 
one of their number prior to his election. Secondly, there was a well-known political 
rivalry between the Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary, who both represented the 
same electoral district in one of Malta's multi-member constituencies. 
6.2.9 Loss of European Union funds 
IPSE and the whole industrial restructuring exercise were dealt a hard blow when the 
media revealed that the European Union would not be allocating the fourth financial 
protocol funds to Malta. 38 It had been envisaged that these funds, approximately EUR 15 
million, would finance one-third of IPSE's programmes of assistance. 39 Government and 
the opposition started blaming each other for the loss of these funds 40 The whole 
38 One News, Super One Television, 9 July 1999. 
39 About one third of the finances needed to fund the programmes were coming from the fourth financial 
protocol between Malta and the European Union. 
40 The fourth financial protocol between Malta and the European Union was due to expire in 1998. The 
Labour government decided to ask the European Commission for a one-year extension, which was granted. 
The Nationalist government continued pursuing these funds. When the final applications were made, the 
European Commission decided that it would not allocate the funds earmarked for restructuring to Malta 
since the country had never used any funds that were previously allocated. Instead, these funds went to 
finance part of the European Union's mission in Kosovo. On the other hand, the Commission allocated 
EUR 5 million for scholarships and statistical compliance projects. Malta was told that it would be able to 
get funds as part of an EU pre-accession strategy, which 
it did. Nevertheless, these funds were not spent on 
industrial restructuring. 
229 
industrial restructuring project was put into doubt. Government was aware that this 
would create great uncertainty. Thus, it declared that the project was a priority and that 
"it will do its best to find the necessary funds" for the exercise (L-Orizzont, 28 July 1999: 
1). Internally, government informed IPSE that it would be forking out the extra funds 
itself if no other source of finance was found. 
6.2.10 Removal of protective import levies 
Soon after the launch of IPSE's programmes of assistance, government published the 
schedule for the removal of protective levies. Such a move had long been awaited. 
These levies had been imposed unilaterally by Malta in 1991 and contradicted the letter 
and the spirit of the Association Agreement between Malta and the European Union. The 
Nationalist government had already breached an agreement with the Commission 
whereby it had to remove a large part of these levies by 1996.41 The Labour government 
had informed the European Commission that it would not honour this agreement and that 
instead it wanted to negotiate a five to seven year process of progressive, reciprocal but 
chronologically asymmetrical dismantling of trade barriers, between Malta and the 
European Union. A strategy for doing so had already been drafted and was being 
negotiated with the constituted bodies so as to face the European Commission as a united 
front (MDC [B] 1997). By reactivating its membership bid, the Maltese government 
shortened the levies removal period from seven to three years42, with the last batch being 
removed in 2003 (The Times of Malta, 17 July 1999: 4; The Malta Independent, 17 July 
1999: 11). The Federation of Industry, Chamber of Commerce, General Retailers and 
Traders Union, and the Malta Employers -Association all agreed on government's 
proposals (The Malta Independent, 11 October 1999: 4). 
41 The then FOI President, Mr Joe Caruana Curran said that government had not informed the constituted 
bodies about this agreement. Interview on Elfejn, Super One Television, 24 February 1999. 
42 With the exception of levies related to the agriculture and agro-industry sector that were to be removed 
over a longer period according to a separate timetable. 
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Nevertheless, in October 1999, within the context of the draft Accession Partnership, the 
European Commission listed the elimination of levies on imports from the European 
Union as a short-term measure to be taken by 2000. The Labour Party interpreted this as 
a political 'straw man', claiming that the Nationalist government knew that its proposals 
for levy removal by 2003 were acceptable to the European Commission but wanted to 
give the impression that its negotiators had gained an extra three years. In this way it 
would attempt to discredit the Labour Party's claim that it had no bargaining power with 
Brussels (KullHadd, 17 October 1999: 1,3). 
IPSE itself called for the import levies removal schedule to be published as quickly as 
possible (The Times of Malta, 24 April 1999: 12). The Institute believed that publication 
of this schedule would signal to enterprises that they ought to start thinking seriously 
about restructuring with the assistance of IPSE. It is important to point out that 
government did not consult the Institute regarding the levies removal schedule. 
The general reaction was relatively different, at least in some sectors. The micro and 
smaller enterprises in sectors protected by levies started protesting not only against the 
proposed schedule but also against the concept of the removal of levies. The way in 
which carpenters and furniture makers greeted government and IPSE representatives at a 
sectoral meeting is emblematic. They complained that they would never be able to 
compete with imported furniture once the levies were removed, as production costs 
abroad were much cheaper than in Malta. One specialised sofa producer pointed out that 
he had to import large part of his raw material, unlike his foreign competitors. He said he 
could import semi-finished material, but that would mean that he would have to lay off 
one of his two employees (The Malta Independent, 7 August 1999: pp. 1,6). 
6.2.11 Criticism to government strategy 
A considerable number of the smaller enterprises protected by import levies, such as 
furniture producers, felt that the Federation of Industry was not defending their interests 
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adequately. This led to a number of resignations from the FOI and the formation, 
together with some previously unorganised enterprises, of the Ghaqda Imprendituri 
Maltin (GHIMA)43 - the Association of Maltese Entrepreneurs - in September 1999. 
GHIMA called on government to retain the levies, at least for the time being (The Malta 
Independent, 1 November 1999: 12,14). The focus of the association's criticism was 
government, rather than IPSE (The Times of Malta, I1 October 1999: 12). In fact, 
GHIMA said that the Institute was on the right track but it did not have enough funds to 
tackle the restructuring process correctly. The association questioned what happened to 
the approximately EUR 240 million that had been collected through levies and that 
government had pledged to devote to restructuring. 44 
During this same period, another association was formed to defend the interests of 
vintners and vine-growers. Contrary to GHIMA members, these enterprises did not 
resign from the FOI. Instead, they described the setting up of the Malta Wines and Vines 
Association as complementary to their membership in the Federation and their first media 
conference was held at the FOPs headquarters. Nevertheless, it was clear that the thirteen 
local wine producers formed the association because they were not satisfied with the way 
in which FOI was defending their interests 45 The association's perspective on the future 
was less catastrophic than GHIMA's, even though it expected that the removal of levies 
would open the way to tough foreign competition. The Malta Wines and Vines 
Association did not think that a liberalised market would destroy the local wine sector. It 
predicted that with a commitment from both government and growers, progress would be 
registered and self-sufficiency in grape production achieved (The Times of Malta, 28 
October 1999: 16). .. -, 
43 'Ghima' (pronounced 'aye-mah') is a Maltese homophone for 'ouch'. Mr Charles Falzon, GIIIMA 
promoter, explained his association's name by saying that "All those in pain cry out'G}IIMA' (ouch)" (L. 
Orizzont, 23 October 1999: 7). 
44 This revenue was spent by government on other items. 
45 Malta Wines and Vines Association is an FOI associate member, not a sub-sector of it. The association says it wants to "retain the necessary independence" (The Times of Malta, 28 October 1999: 16). 
232 
The FOI sensed that its members were not all too pleased with what was going on and 
with its own stand. Letters of resignations arrived at the Federation's headquarters, and 
GHIMA membership grew more than expected. The latter claimed that it had some 300 
member enterprises, employing a total of 2,000 persons (L-Orizzont, 23 October 1999: 
7). This led the Federation to start taking a harsher stand on government and its 
liberalisation plans. It also started criticising IPSE, claiming that it was not moving fast 
enough (The Malta Independent, 10 October 1999: 5). The Minister for Economic 
Services was quick to answer that the Institute was private sector driven and FOI had 
"the full faculty to influence and participate directly in the direction and speed of 
implementation of the programmes" (The Malta Independent, II October 1999: 4). 
The FOI's sudden criticism of the liberalisation and restructuring process revealed a 
certain nervousness resulting from the increasing pressure exerted by those of its 
members who were now facing the reality of protection removal. These members were 
criticising the Federation not only for its lack of reaction to government's plans, but also 
because IPSE did not seem to be meeting their expectations - basically providing cash 
handouts and allocating industrial real estate. Such an analysis suggests that the trade 
unions may have been wise not to insist on joining IPSE. The Chamber of Commerce 
did not have as many problems as the FOI since the Chamber's members, being mostly 
importers, expected to benefit from liberalisation of imports. GHIMA even spoke of a 
"conspiracy theory" whereby unidentified interests wanted to weaken the local product so 
as to strengthen the importation element (L-Orizzont, 23 October, 1999: 7). _ 
However, 
there was a COC off-shoot just the same, when a group of enterprises from the island of 
Gozo joined forces to form the Gozo Chamber of Commerce. Lead by one of the main 
agro-industry producers, the Gozo Chamber had some initial divergences with the main 
Chamber of Commerce. These problems were, later on, ironed out and the Goio 
Chamber became a COC associate member. 
Criticism of the proposed levy removal schedule continued to mount. The Labour Party 
did not criticise the concept of the removal of levies (which after, all had been part of its 
programme too), but hit out at "the timing, the rhythm, the strategy", and claimed that, 
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government's strategy threatened some seven thousand jobs (The Malta Independent, 2 
October 1999: 6). Shortly after one of the main local furniture producers announced the 
dismissal of fifteen employees as a first step towards restructuring in view of the removal 
of levies (KullHadd, 31 October 1999: 1). Notably, the enterprise, considered as a leader 
in its sector, took this step without using any of IPSE's assistance programmes. 
6.2.12 Government's reaction to criticism 
This criticism left its mark. IPSE hastily announced that it was going to carry out a report 
on the furniture industry and the implications of the removal of levies and the adoption of 
the acquis communautaire (The Malta Independent, 24 October 1999: 4). The 
commissioning of sectoral studies had long been on IPSE's books but the timing of this 
communication yielded more negative rather than positive effects. The Institute was 
criticised for having this report commissioned only after the levies removal schedule was 
published. Moreover, this exercise was undermined by Labour's allegations of unethical 
conduct in the adjudication process (It-Torca, 7 November 1999: 1). The opposition 
focused its attacks on government rather than on the Institute. Government and IPSE 
rebutted these allegations (It-Torca, 14 November 1999: 3). 
The Federation immediately fell back in the IPSE ranks but the criticism from other 
sources did not diminish. In the meantime, the Ministry for Economic Services together 
with the Federation of Industry started working within the Institute's Board of Directors 
with the aim of launching a further initiative aimed specifically at enterprises bcing 
affected by the removal of levies. A number of policy makers at IPSE tried to resist this 
move, claiming that this would send the wrong message to the business community. 
They feared that enterprises would interpret the launch of a further programme as the 
Institute admitting that its three original programmes were not effective enough. But the 
political pressure was too strong. Government wanted to be seen to be taking initiatives 
aimed directly at helping those enterprises facing liberalisation. Initiatives that had long 
been on the Institute's agenda, such as a Business Incubation Centre and a venture capital 
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scheme were sidelined. Instead, virtually all the resources were devoted to the drafting of 
what was to become the Fast Track programme of assistance. This programme offered 
reimbursements of up to 65 per cent of costs related to market consolidation activities, 
including expenses related to training46, on the condition that a business plan was 
presented to and accepted by IPSE, and that liberalisation effected at least half the sales 
turnover of the enterprise. Moreover, the enterprise had to reduce its prices by at least 15 
per cent as a sign it wanted to compete with foreign products. Significant is the fact that 
present for the launch of this new programme, apart from the IPSE Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, there were the Minister for Economic Services and the then FOI 
President (L-Orizzont, 30 December 1999: 3). 
Criticism persisted just the same. The fact that the Institute launched the Fast Track 
Programme just two days before the removal of the second batch of protective import 
levies was interpreted by the Labour opposition as a sign that government was panicking 
and implicitly proof that its earlier criticism of the levies removal. strategy had been 
correct. It was "too little, too late" (L-Orizzont, 31 December 1999: 4). One here has to 
note that once again Labour criticised government rather than the Institute, even though it 
was the latter that launched the initiative. Thus, the Labour Party maintained its approach 
of keeping IPSE out of its criticism as far as it could. GHIMA too criticised government 
rather than IPSE. Again, the liet motif was that government was panicking. Apart from 
that, the Association of Maltese Entrepreneurs said -that they did not agree that the 
reduction of 15 per cent in prices should be a pre-condition for assistance 47 
It is interesting to point out that even though Labour's policy on industrial restructuring 
was sidelined, restructuring was in full swing by January 2000, as ' earmarked by the 
above mentioned policy (MDC 1997: 5). 
46 IPSE reimbursed up to 90 per cent of employees' wage bill (maximum of EUR 5,000 per employcc) 
throughout their training period. 
47 One News, Super One Television, 31 December 1999. 
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6.3 Conclusions 
The experience of the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise confirms Chiu's 
observations that the development of a small state within a peripheral Fordist context 
such as the Maltese, is less spontaneous than that of other systems (Chiu et al 1997: 6). 
This may be restated as follows: a peripheral Fordist state must necessarily be a 
developmentalist one and must act as the major agent of socio-economic transformations. 
Indeed, the major agent of development (albeit dependent and peripheral) after 
Independence and especially under the 1971-87 Labour governments, exhibited all the 
characteristics of a developmentalist dirigisme as identified in the literature on the 
developmentalist state. 
A thorough observation of the decision-making process in the state agencies concerned 
makes clear the practical problems posed by conflicting internal and external interests, 
the effect that these problems may have on decisions being or not being taken, and the 
management - or mis-management - of crises. One can also observe that the specific 
programmes proposed in Malta were very similar to most of its counterparts in other 
systems. The strategies adopted to assist SMEs are confirmed to be "unlocal" (Peck and 
Tickell 1994: 284), as can be observed by comparing these observations with the results 
of the international survey (Chapter 5.0). 
At the same time, the local situation is unique in the way that representatives of the 
private sector are given the majority of seats on the board in spite of their micro- 
shareholding. This is the most visible attempt at co-option within a Fordist context. 
Other similar initiatives can be traced. The author submits that even the financial 
assistance given to SMEs to source expertise from the market was an attempt to co-opt a 
traditionally conservative-leaning consultancy sector, not only in this process but also of 
a new hegemonic political bloc. 
Paradoxically, this movement towards co-option may be due to the very importance of 
the state in the Maltese economy. This notion might have made it more pressing for the 
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state to advertise and confirm the technocratic and non-partisan credentials of the new 
agency, particularly in view of the intention to attract EU funding to the project. 
Moreover, the fact that IPSE saw the light of day under the watch of a Labour 
government makes it possible to interpret this development as an attempt at hegemony- 
building going beyond the forms of co-option that have been observed in previous 
chapters. The Labour Party has never been the `natural' party of government, and, 
necessity being the mother of invention, had more incentive to experiment with 
innovative structures, and in this case less to lose. The decision to cede the majority on 
the board to the private sector and the Labour Party's agreement to the exclusion of the 
unions from the same board while publicly recognising their importance may indicate a 
wish to strengthen Labour's leadership credentials by projecting it as a broker between 
social partners, maybe even pro-business. This should be seen within the context of 
efforts to consolidate for the long term the electoral support that had won the 1996 
general elections for Labour. 
In other words, the Labour government's attitudes to IPSE can be tied to efforts to turn 
the party's majority in the 1996 elections into a hegemonic bloc capable of carrying the 
weight of economic restructuring in a peripheral situation. This can be interpreted as a 
conscious attempt to come up with a "new institutional fix" (Peck and Tickell 1994) 
necessary to support the Fordist mechanism at a local level. The first results of this co- 
option process can be observed in the way the constituted bodies took ownership of the 
IPSE project and practically saved it. Further attempts to create a new hegemonic bloc 
were to be cut short by the Labour Party's defeat in the premature elections of September 
1998. Indeed, this is reminiscent of the Italian experience referred to in Chapter 2.0, 
whereby the success or failure of such a project will depend on the political strength of its 
promoters and the political ability of a critical mass of stakeholders to coalesce around 
such a programme. 
Indeed, it could be this reading in the light of an active search for a "netiv inslitutional 
fix", that makes the experiment of IPSE in microstate Malta a "genuinely innovative local 
experiment" rather than one of "a raft of pale imitations" (Peck and Tickell 1994: 298). 
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The findings from these observations re-enforce the main theses of this study, namely 
that the political promoters of the IPSE underestimated the social and political 
significance of their project. It was tackled as a merely technical issue, and therefore an 
inadequate attempt at tackling the Fordist crisis. 
Chapter 7.0 Provisional Conclusions: 
7.1 The regulationist approach, the developmentalist state and the social bloc: 
Conceptual tools to understand the social compromises and social conflicts of 
dependent capitalist development 
This study is an attempt to explain Malta's post-war `development' - whereby the 
notion of development employed in it is a rigorously non-teleological one - in terms 
of a frankly eclectic approach (`ecumenic' is the term used in Chapter 3.0) 
dominated by what is perhaps not very aptly referred to - as its canonical advocates 
have not unreasonably argued (see Chapter 2.0) - in the English-language literature 
as `regulation theory'. Although important elements of this `theory' can be traced to 
Gramsci's outline of a study of Fordism - his imprisonment and death prevented 
tackling a broader study of the various regulatory mechanisms that `saved' capitalism 
in the US with the New Deal (some of which mechanisms were opposed by Ford 
himself), in Britain and elsewhere through the so-called Keynesian/Social Democratic 
route, and via the path of authoritarian and corporatist autarky in Germany and Italy - 
the school of "la theorie de la regulation" proper begins with the first (1976) edition 
of Michel Aglietta's Regulation et crises du capitalisme. Today, although elements of 
this theory may be found in a broad range of sociological, political-economic and 
radical geographic work, the doctrinal center of Regulation-theoretical orthodoxy is 
the Association Recherche et Regulation attached to LEPII-CNRS at the Universit6 
Pierre Mendes France at Grenoble and presided by Robert Boyer. The latest (2002) 
edition of the collegial Theorie de la Regulation - L'etat des savoirs, edited by himself 
and Yves Saillard, summarises this school's `state of the art'. 
Although there is evidently a sustained effort on the part of the school - whose 
internal hierarchy is, typically, evident and effective - to defend its autonomous 
theoretical niche, there is also an equally sustained and programmatic effort to 
construct a pedigree that whilst not reneging its Marxist roots (via Althusser) goes 
beyond them, and, with reference to the contemporary `other's', the school attributes 
great importance to reaching towards other currents such as the New Economic 
Sociology (especially the French representatives, of it, mainly Bourdieu-inspired), 
Institutional Economics and International Political Economy. 
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This study has shown, in this author's view, that the regulationist approach - critically 
applied within a broader theoretical framework (as spelt out in Section 2.5 
Introducing the task and the conceptual tool box) - is the most satisfactory one as 
far as the Maltese case is concerned and, probably, in all cases where unless we 
postulate the institutionalization of complex class compromises (social or historic 
blocs, in Gramsci's sense), it is difficult if not downright impossible to explain the 
success of developmentalist strategies - understood as national (capitalist) 
development projects that are driven by the state (hence a `developmentalist state') in 
the absence of a national bourgeoisie willing and capable (socio-economically, 
politically, technically) of leading such a project. Such developmentalist strategies 
need not necessarily aspire to self-sustaining, `independent' capitalist development 
such as been achieved by the OECD national economies; the developmentalist state 
could, and more often than not does, `merely' aspire to ensuring the social, economic 
and political viability of peripheral capitalist dependent development, of development 
that is export led and foreign investment and foreign technology driven. 
The developmentalist state may `merely' aim at: 
(i) creating the conditions of existence necessary for the national economy over which 
it has jurisdiction to insert itself in a subordinate position in the world economy (a 
position that makes it possible for transnationals to extract more value out of that 
national economy than they have invested in it), 
(ii) maintaining those conditions in the face of competition from other national 
economies in the same sort of subordinate, peripheral and dependent position, or that 
are aspiring to be inserted in such a position. 
These conditions include that which foreign direct investment location consultants 
refer to as acceptable levels of social and political risk, an industrial work ethic, 
pragmatic trade union practices, flexible hire and fire regulations and conditions of 
employment legislation generally. Whatever national entrepreneurial socio-economic 
groups support the developmentalist state within this latter sort of strategy, will tend 
to be either satisfied with rents they can extract from the traditional economy (for the 
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economy in such countries is generally of the `dual' type with the `traditional' part 
consisting mainly of low-technology production of goods and services by locally 
owned small and micro-enterprises for the protected local market, and the `modern' 
part consisting principally of foreign owned export oriented medium and large firms 
with - but not necessarily - high-technology means of production) or quite content to 
act as the subordinate local `comprador' partner of the transnationals. In other words 
the local entrepreneur is, in these situations, either confined into a protected backward 
local compartment of the economy or cast into a subordinate role in a global system. 
The usefulness of the regulationist approach in these situations follows from the fact 
that the developmentalist state needs to regulate the national economy. Inasmuch as 
this is a complex task embedded in institutions and incarnated in social relationship 
(concretely class struggles and class compromises, struggles between fractions of the 
same class and compromises between such fractions or between a fraction of one class 
and a fraction of another class within the same social formation - between different 
social and economic interests), it cannot be envisaged as a purely `economic' task, 
even less as a pure `technical' issue (whatever the rhetorical camouflage, whether of 
the managerial or the `good governance' sort); it is always and necessarily a social 
and political task, whereby the range and type of regulation techniques available to 
the personnel actually driving the developmentalist state is determined by the concrete 
balance of political and social forces on the ground. Hence the insistence throughout 
the unfolding of the multi-layered theoretical arguments and historical narratives in 
this study on the permanent state of crisis (even if sometimes `only' latent) of a 
regulated social formation (ultimately the object of regulatory policy and action is the 
concrete social formation not its constituent modes of production, as these in any case 
never exist in a pure disembodied state separate from real concrete social formations). 
Hence, also, the insistence throughout this study that the foundations of any regulation 
project by any developmentalist state lie in the historically concrete social bloc (a 
cluster of class-transversal institutional compromises) that constitutes the social and 
political condition of existence of that particular regulation system or accumulation 
regime. 
The Maltese example, set against the backdrop of a post-colonial situation and, 
historically, one of the first developmcntalist experiences in the British 
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Commonwealth, exceptional only because of micro-dimensions of the state and of the 
territory under its jurisdiction (a factor that, when one considers the dimensions of the 
Singapore case, is only of relatively limited impact on the theoretical considerations 
arising from the study), more than adequately illustrates the usefulness of "la theorie 
de la Regulation" critically employed for the purposes discussed above. The table 
below summarises the succession of social blocs (dominant as well as subordinate) 
that underpin the development of the Fordist regulation system that flourished in 
Malta between 1971 and the mid 1980s (whose roots, however, go back to at least the 
immediate post-war years and especially the 1950s), a system that, as this and other 
studies have amply demonstrated, was certainly effective and delivered high-growth 
dependent capitalist development of the ELIFFIT type (to use Sklair's useful 
acronym). The very success of the Fordist system however foundered under the 
weight of the contradictions upon which it was based (the institutional compromises 
that make regulation systems possible are, in the last instances, merely managed or 
temporarily defused contradictions... regulation is crisis management or, in Boyer's 
words, "the resolution or postponement of the distortions and disequilibria to which 
the process continually gives rise" 2002) and the post-Fordist period in Malta (simply 
understood as the period following the successful Fordist management of its economy 
and society) has been characterised by the absence of any regulatory project (the 
failure of the 1996-1998 Labour attempt to reconstitute a viable regulatory system -a 
failure that brought the government down - identifies, as this study demonstrates, the 
objective difficulties besetting any such project). 
7.2 The dual economy, transnationals and SMEs: Labour's failure to integrate 
SMEs in a new developmentalist project in 1996-1998 
This study was primarily concerned with the definition and defence of two closely 
interlocking theses: 
" That the 1996-1998's Maltese `New Labour' government's SME promotion 
and development programme and the political project of which it was an 
integral part, indeed the thrust of the 1996-1998 Labour government's strategy 
and the social energies that propelled it into power after nine years in 
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opposition, can best be understood as elements of an ultimately inadequate 
attempt at a solution to the crisis of a Fordist system, a system that had 
functioned especially well from the second year of the first Labour legislature 
(1971-1976) to the third year of the second Labour legislature (1976-1981), 
under Dom Mintoff s premiership. As a matter of fact, the `best results' of the 
Fordist accumulation regime - measured in terms of inward foreign direct 
investment) mainly originating in the United Kingdom, United States, (the 
then West) Germany, Japan, France and Italy), exports and GDP growth - arc 
particularly evident in the period 1972-1979. Mintoff's Fordist regulation 
system depended on `old' Labour's ability to co-opt and mobilise the 
industrial working class, particularly the employees of the former Admiralty 
dockyard - its traditional source of mass support - into a developmentalist 
project based on a progressive social bloc that included a socially weak local 
industrial bourgeoisie and promoted Malta's transformation from an economy 
dependent on employment with and rent from foreign military bases into one 
dependent on employment with an taxation income from foreign owned export 
industries. The success of this project -a project that effectively transformed 
the Island into a modern sovereign state and a productive economy - can only 
be understood with reference to a longer term political project on the part of 
the Maltese Labour party, a project that must be traced back to, at least, the 
years of post-war reconstruction. The crisis and collapse of the project -a 
collapse that did not, however, lead to a rupture with the paradigm underlying 
Maltese development policy, ELIFFIT - was precipitated by an cxtcmal event, 
the second oil shock of the 1970s in 1979, but needs to be comprehended in 
terms of a number of closely related but distinct elements. 
Firstly the characteristics of Labour's working class base in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s: the Dockyard workers were mainly skilled shipwrights, 
metalworkers (skilled in sheet metal and fabrication work, pipe-workers, 
turners and tool-makers, welders), electricians, carpenters and a myriad of 
other rapidly obsolescent trades, forming a male corporatist community of 
crafts-centred sub-communities that had never in the long history of the former 
naval Dockyard had to deal with private capitalist owners (except for a brief 
period when the Royal Navy had attempted to transfer it to a British firm), and 
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that had never undergone a successful reorganisation of work practices and 
productivity-indexed wage determination along Fordist lines. Although 
Mintoff s developmentalist project produced a `new' working class - mainly 
machine operators in foreign owned Fordist industries, a very significant 
number of which were females - it was less successful at co-opting these in its 
progressive social bloc. 
Secondly, the characteristics of the local industrial entrepreneurs co-opted in 
its progressive social bloc: ultimately, Mintoff's devclopmentalist project 
failed to transform most of these from the typical `traditional' manufacturer 
trapped in the narrow logic of low added value production for a protected local 
market (in Malta's case, moreover, a micro-market that invalidated any 
possible recourse to a classic infant-industries strategy) into - at the very least 
- subordinate partners of `modem' foreign owned export industries. They did 
not advance beyond to local market logic and in many cases finally reverted to 
an even more backward state, that of importers and distributors, namely the 
dominant element of the social block that - with the self-employed and the 
public sector white collar employees as its mass support base - opposed and 
ultimately defeated Mintoff's developmentalist project in (Labour governed 
with a majority of seats but a minority of votes in 1981-1987 and lost the 
majority of seats in 1987). 
" That the New Labour government 1996-1998 underestimated the social and 
political significance of its own SME development and promotion programme, 
and that this emerges with particular clarity from its political mismanagement 
of the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise (IPSE), an organisation it 
itself created. Although New Labour's electoral victory in 1996 indicated the 
beginning of a successful bid to incorporate the self-employed and significant 
swathe of white-collar employees into a reconstituted dcvclopmcntalist 
strategy, and the IPSE project could have been instrumental to institutionalise 
a compromise of social and economic interests including a wide range of 
`progressive', elements of large and medium enterprise (comprising those 
traditionally not averse to Labour's developmental ism), namely: 
(i) foreign-owned export industry and 
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(ii) the few surviving elements of the industrial bourgeoisie of the `Mintoff 
bloc', together with 
(iii) significant elements of merchant capital - traditionally against Labour's 
emphasis on industrialisation (they had opposed its experiments with import 
substitution in the late 1970s and early 1980s) - as well as 
(iv) small and micro-enterprise, also never Labour's natural supporter. 
The `New Labour' government succeeded in bringing into IPSE (set up to 
support small business and to administer a restructuring programme aimed at 
concretely assisting productive enterprises oriented principally towards the - 
up to then protected - local market to upgrade its competitiveness with a view 
to better withstand the lifting of tariff and other barriers to imports from the 
European Union), as its `partners', the Federation of Industry [representing - 
but not only - elements (i) and (ii)], the Chamber of Commerce [representing 
- but not only - element (iii)] but failed to convince the General Retailers' & 
Traders Union GRTU [representing element (iv)] to join. Inasmuch as 
enterprises employing 10 and less make up for the bulk of enterprises in Malta 
(although they are almost totally geared for the local market), the GRTU's 
absence from IPSE indicated that New Labour was proving incapable of 
incorporating small and micro-enterprise into a new social bloc, a bloc without 
which its neo-developmentalist project was doomed. The tactical winning-over 
of the self-employed to Labour in the run-up to the 1996 elections - achieved 
by promising to abolish the then recently introduced VAT - was not 
transformed in their strategic incorporation in a long-term project. This, 
together with New Labour's alienation of significant elements of its traditional 
working class base, constituted the social conditions that made possible its 
defeat in Parliament in 1998 (where Labour had only a one scat majority with, 
ironically, former Prime Minister, and party leader Minton' voting against 
government on a critical issue) and, immediately after, at the 1998 general 
elections. Certainly the New Labour government, under its I larvard Business 
School trained Prime Minister Alfred Sant, tended to sec IPSE as a primarily 
technical issue, as merely a coordinating organisation charged with the 
implementation of SME promotion programmes set up to free MDC from the 
distracting task of catering for local enterprise so it could concentrate on the 
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more important task of promoting foreign direct investment. There was 
insufficient appreciation of its critical political importance; in fact there was 
insufficient appreciation of the critical importance of founding a 
developmentalist project on a social bloc that supports it and makes it 
politically possible. 
The political moral of the tale is that if SME promotion policies in a peripheral 
economy are to be sustainable and effective, they must correspond to a political 
strategy aimed at incorporating the small entrepreneur in the social bloc represented 
by the political party or alliance of parties proposing and implementing the said 
promotion policies. Following the breakdown of the Fordist institutional fix that made 
possible Malta's industrialisation in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, no other 
socio-economic regulatory system has effectively replaced it. 
The international survey of SME promotion policies and organisation undertaken as 
part of the research for this study showed, amongst other things that in themselves the 
technical solutions in the various countries studied are conspicuously "unlocal" - as 
has also been noted by Peck and Tickell. What further research needs to illustrate is 
that although the technical policies and the institutional tools arc remarkably similar, 
their social and political viability in each concrete case cannot be read off a priori 
from the nature of the technical policies and institutional tools, but can only be 
determined in terms of the local socio-economic and political context and the concrete 
manner in which that locality is inserted in the world economy. 
In comparative perspective, the survey indicated that like most other governments (or 
institutions of `civil society' acting in lieu of the state, and therefore in an 
Althussserian sense, acting as proxies of the state, as `state apparatuses'), the Maltese 
government of 1996-1998 resorted to SME development and promotion and the 
launching of an organisation of a dedicated SME promotion organisation, to make up 
for the inability of Fordist large enterprises to secure sufficient national economic 
growth and employment. It also showed that the Maltese government was 
comparatively bolder than most inasmuch as it gave a much broader margin of 
initiative and managerial control of the new organisation and the programmes it was 
tasked to implement to civil society organisations representing employers and the 
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business world. With the wisdom of hindsight, this attempt at creating consensus for 
itself amongst the representatives of the larger enterprises may have jeopardised its 
developmentalist project, thus contributing to its premature downfall. Both the 
Federation of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce, in fact, welcomed and 
encouraged the Labour Government in late 1997 and early 1998 to exclude the trade 
unions from the so-called joint `task-force' entrusted with coordinating economic 
restructuring and liberalisation (a programme of which the setting up of IPSE was an 
integral apart) and to resist the modifications to IPSE's statute demanded by the 
GRTU, the representative of micro-enterprise, as a condition to join and support IPSE. 
Diagram 7a (Illustration of regulatory developments in Malta) below 
contextualises historically the composition and decomposition of social blocs and 
regimes of accumulation in Malta from 1945 to date, benchmarking them against 
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Appendix I Questionnaire answered by Professor Adam Tickell in March 2000 
(Original version) 
Q: Was any particular year or period taken as a basis of your observations? 
A: From memory, we didn't use any scientific observation, but chose a more 
generalised approach which looked for broad structural similarilities. Formally, we 
found that most of the literature talked about the Fordist period as being 1945-1973 
(i. e. framed by both the Second World War and the oil crisis). However, alternative 
accounts start in 1951 and/ or end in 1968/9. My own view is that if you can identify 
a transition, it is always going to be fuzzy. 
Q: Do you think that other national Fordist variants are identifiable? 
A: Almost certainly, although I haven't done the basic research. The argument 
that I would make is that the macro political and macro-economic order was Fordist- 
Keynesian, which would influence social relations in those countries which articulate 
with the global political economy. Therefore, although France or even Zambia may 
not have been classically Fordist in the American sense, they had Fordist features. 
These are influenced by local factors and the exigencies of time and space. 
Q: What was the general feedback and criticism received? 
A: There was a lot of interest: I suppose that the main criticisms were that 
transition models do not work in a messy world. Other criticisms are that regulation 
theory is too simplistic in its understanding of culture, space and the state. I'd share 
these criticisms (now) but probably argue that in new regulation theory (Bob Jessop 
calls it `third generation ) many of these problems are overcome. See, for example, 
the work of Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Gordon MacLeod, Jane Jenson. 
Q: Do you think that this model of national Fordist variants can be used as 'a basis 
to compare and contrast policy areas in different countries? 
A: Yes - with the caveat that policy is as much a response to local politics, 
economic circumstances and economic history. 
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Q: Do you think that there are similarities between organisations and/or functions 
in different countries within the same national variant? 
A: Not quite sure about the question. If it means that will, for example, the form 
of the financial regulator be the same in England and Germany during Fordism, the 
answer must be no. 
Q: Has any research ever been conducted on this aspect? 
A: Research has been carried out on particular organisations - though not, as 
far as I'm aware, through the regulation theoretic lens. 
Q: Has any follow-up to your work ever been done? 
A: Not to my knowledge. 














However, cooperation may not be the best means of getting results in all 
circumstances. For example, the, kereitsu in Japan caused real difficulties up and 
down the chain in the post-Fordist period. 
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This changed over time. For example, the `Third Italy' in the 1970s had strong 
cooperation between small firms. 
Q: How is the position in general of SMEs in relation to other enterprises within 
the national economic set-up best described? 
A: Don't know. 
National 
Fordist variant 
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Peripheral X 
Primitive X 
Hybrid X X X 
Change over time. 
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Q: What role does the state play in the creation and facilitation of the right 
conditions to encourage production? 
A: Difficult to answer: state in US is not an active manager in terms of regulation 
although liberal economists would argue that, in setting competitive environment, far 
more effective than hands-on managers. 
From a social democratic position, the alternative argument would be made. 
National 
Fordist variant 




















Blocked X X 
State X 
Delayed X X 
Peripheral X X 
Primitive 
Hybrid X X 
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Appendix II Key figures in Maltese politics and policy-making within the 
context of this study 
Amery, Leopold (1873-1955): Conservative Member of Parliament between 1911 
and 1945, he served as under-secretary to Lloyd George's war cabinet in 1916-18, was 
First Lord of the Admiralty 1922-24, Colonial Secretary 1924-29 and Secretary of 
State for India during the Second World War. He espoused a world view based on the 
neo-imperialist ideas of John Seeley and George Parkin. A believer in imperial unity, 
Amery argued that the empire should be transformed into a commonwealth of equal 
nations under allegiance to the British crown, with England as the first amongst 
equals and not as mother country. He regarded economic and military development 
as imperial issues. He believed that the Conservative party ought not to define itself 
by its anti-socialism but, rather, to present itself as the champion of a social 
imperialism. His views on the Maltese workers and the riots of 1919, in the second 
volume of his autobiography (1955) reflect this doctrine. 
Balogh, Thomas (1905-1985): Hungarian born, he moved to England in 1930 where 
he was mentored by Keynes and settled in Oxford as a Fellow of Balliol College. A 
close friend of Harold Wilson, economic adviser to the Cabinet in 1964, Balogh was 
also consulted by various British Labour leaders in Britain as well as by a number of 
foreign governments, such Australia, India, Jamaica and Malta. He authored, along 
with Dudley Seers, a strategic development policy document for Prime Minister Dom 
Mintoff in 1955, in the run-up to the 1956 referendum on a proposed integration with 
Britain, which he and Seers supported, and Labour advocated. . The referendum 
showed a clear "yes" vote but was sidelined by London given that not a clear majority 
of all those entitled to vote was achieved. He was elevated to the peerage in 1968 as 
Baron Balogh of Hampstead in Greater London and became a Minister of State for 
Energy from 1974 to 1977. A first biography, The Life and Times of Thomas Balogh: 
A Macaw Among Mandarins by June Morris, is scheduled for publication in 
November 2006.., 
Boffa, Paul (1890-1962): Born in Vittoriosa on 30 June 1890, Paul Boffa graduated 
as a Medical Doctor in 1912. During World War I he served with the Royal Medical 
Corps in Malta, Salonika and on hospital ships. Paul Boffa entered politics when 
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Malta was granted self government in 1921 and joined the Labour Party in 1923. He 
was returned to Parliament under the Amery-Milner Constitution in 1924,1927 and 
1932. He was elected Leader of the Malta Labour Party (MLP) in 1927 and 
immediately began to instil in the workers the need of rightfully equal representation 
in government in order to have a say in their own affairs. He was in coalition with 
Lord Strickland's party in government (1927-32). In 1932 Paul Boffa was the only 
Labour Party candidate elected to the Legislative Assembly until it was dissolved in 
1933. He was nominated as a member of the Executive Council from 1936-1939. 
During World War II Paul Boffa served with distinction as district Commissioner and 
ARP Medical Officer and was awarded the Order of the British Empire in 1941. In 
the 1945 elections, Dr Boffa was again elected in the Labour Party's interests. Boffa 
reached the acme of his political career in November 1947 when, he became the first 
Labour Prime Minister leading a majority government of 24 Labour members. In 
1949, following the Labour Party's ultimatum to Britain concerning financial help, the 
Labour Party split up but Dr Boffa continued as Prime Minister and later founded and 
led the Malta Workers' Party (MWP), which lost the 1950 elections. Boffa was re- 
elected in 1951 and in 1953 and joined a coalition government with the Nationalist 
Party (PN) led by George Borg Olivier, assuming the portfolio of Minister of Health 
and Social Services. The MWP did not contest the 1955 elections and in the same 
year he resigned for health reasons. Boffa was created a Knight Bachelor in the 1956 
New Year's Honours List in recognition of distinguished public services. He was also 
awarded the 1914-18 Star, the General Service Medal, the Victory Medal, the 
Coronation Medal and the Defence Medal. Boffa was instrumental in obtaining 
recognition for the Maltese Language in the law courts, and the introduction of 
compulsory primary education and old-age pensions. 
Borg Olivier, George (1911-1980): Born in Valletta on the 5 July 1911. He 
graduated Doctor of Laws in 1937 and was elected to the Council of Government two 
years later. With the return of responsible Government in 1947, Dr. Borg Olivier was 
elected to the Legislative Assembly and was later Deputy Leader of the Opposition. 
He succeeded Enrico Mizzi as leader of the Nationalist Party, Prime Minster and 
Minister of Justice in a Minority Government on the latter's death in December 1950. 
After the general elections held in May 1951, Dr Borg Olivier formed a coalition 
Government with the Malta Workers Party. Dr Borg Olivier was Head of the new 
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Government, he retained the Ministry of Works and Reconstruction. He was again 
returned to office in 1953 and was head of a coalition Government with the MWP 
until he was defeated in 1955. He led the Nationalist Party delegations in June and 
September 1955 for the Malta Round Table Conference and in November 1958 he led 
the Party delegation for talks in London about the restoration of self-government. 
Following the February 1962 election, Dr Borg Olivier accepted to form a 
Government after obtaining important amendments to the Constitution. In June he 
made a formal request for independence, which was officially granted on 21 
September 1964 following a referendum. He won the 1966 general elections but lost 
those of 1971 and 1976. Dr Borg Olivier died on 29 October 1980. 
Fenech Adami, Edward [Eddie] (1934- ): The son of a customs officer, he was 
educated at the Jesuit college and the University of Malta, where he first studied 
economics and the classics and later law. He was called to the bar in 1959. He joined 
the PN in the early 1960s, establishing a reputation as a reserved but determined and 
capable constituency official. He entered parliament in 1969. Eight years later he 
succeeded Dr Borg Olivier as party leader. Under his direction, younger and more 
open-minded and socially conscious elements were brought into the PN. Dr Fenech 
Adami's style of leadership immediately generated great support amongst the 
electorate, and in the 1981 elections the PN obtained an absolute majority of the vote, 
even though not a majority of seats. He became Prime Minister in 1987 and won a 
landslide re-election in 1992. During this period, the country's physical infrastructure 
was completely overhauled as were the legal and business structures. Liberalisation 
and government over-spending brought about nine years of economic growth 
averaging 5 per cent per annum. Malta also applied to join the European Union in 
1990. His party lost the 1996 elections in part because of disgruntlement following 
the introduction of Value Added Tax. In September 1998, following what can be 
described as Mr Mintoff's toppling of the Labour government, Dr Fenech Adami led 
the PN to another electoral victory, this time winning its largest majority since the 
World War II. He immediately reactivated Malta's EU application and succeeded in 
fully concluding negotiations by December 2002. In April 2003 Dr Edward Fenech 
Adami was again confirmed as Prime Minister, in an election which was seen as a 
second referendum on EU membership. On the 23 March 2004, Dr Edward Feneeh 
Adami resigned his premiership as, well as his parliamentary seat and was elected 
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President in what was a highly criticised first move by his successor, Lawrence 
Gonzi. 
Gonzi, Lawrence (1953- ): Born on 1 July 1953 in Valletta, Lawrence Gonzi is the 
nephew of the late Archbishop Michael Gonzi. His interest in politics wakened 
during his Law Studies at the University of Malta from where he graduated as a 
lawyer in 1975. Following that he practiced law in a private firm and later on worked 
as a company lawyer with the Mizzi Organisation for whom he served as Group 
Chairman between 1989 and 1997. Soon after his graduation as a lawyer, Lawrence 
Gonzi actively engaged himself in the voluntary sector, particularly in the sectors 
related to disability issues and mental health issues. He was also the General 
President of the Malta Catholic Action Movement between 1976 and 1986. He failed 
to get elected in the first elections he contested on the Nationalist Party ticket, in 
1987, but was still appointed Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1988. 
During the tenure of this post he managed to gain respect for the way he managed the 
often ill-tempered debates. He was re-appointed in 1992. Lawrence Gonzi was 
elected to Parliament in 1996 and rose within the ranks of the Nationalist Party, first 
as Secretary General and, after the 1998 elections, as Deputy Leader. On 23 March 
2004 he succeeded Edward Fenech Adami as Prime Minister. He also holds the 
finance portfolio. 
Gonzi, Michael (1854-1984): Born in the working class harbour town of Vittoriosa 
and grew up in nearby Kalkara, he was knighted in 1946. He studied at the Royal 
University of Malta and in Rome and was ordained in 1908, he taught Hebrew and 
Holy Scriptures at the University of Malta and was chaplain at Mtarfa military 
hospital during the First World War. He attended the founding meeting of the 
Camera del Lavoro (later to become the Malta Labour Party) on 7 October 1921, and 
was elected as a Labour senator in the second district (inclusive of the industrial urban 
harbour area). In 1922 he was appointed private secretary to the then Archbishop 
Don Mauro Caruana. Resigned from the Senate in 1924 when he was appointed 
Bishop of Gozo. Succeeded, with Britain's approval, Archbishop Caruana as 
Archbishop of Malta upon the latter's death in 1943. Archbishop Gonzi was the main 
protagonist of the so-called `politico-religious war' between the Maltese Church and 
the Labour Party 1960-1969, during which he excommunicated all Labour officials, 
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Members of Parliament and election candidates as well as its youth league and 
declared voting for Labour and readings its newspapers a mortal sin for Catholics. 
The peace between the Church and the Labour Party in 1969 contributed significantly 
to the 1971 Labour victory and Gonzi actively supported Mintoff government's bid to 
obtain a better financial deal for Britain in the run-up to the closure of all military 
bases in 1979. 
Mifsud Bonnici, Carmelo [Karmenu] (1933-): Graduated Doctor of Laws in 1954. 
In 1968 he completed a course at the University College of London University in 
Taxation and Industrial Law. During his student days he was an active member of the 
Catholic Social Guild and later with the Young Christian Workers Movement to 
which he was its legal adviser. He was also a member of the Editorial Board of the 
newspaper Il-Haddiem published by the Young Christian Workers Movement. In 
1969, Dr Mifsud Bonnici was appointed local consultant of the General Workers' 
Union. In this capacity he played an important role in the successful struggle by the 
GWU and the Labour Party against the enactment of the Industrial Relations Bill, as 
proposed by the then Nationalist Government, which included a provision of 
imprisonment of striking workers. On 29 May 1980, the Prime Minister Mintoff 
proposed Dr Mifsud Bonnici to be appointed Deputy Leader of the Labour Party 
responsible for Party Affairs. This proposal was unanimously, approved by the 
General Conference of the Labour Movement. On 15 October 1982, on a motion put 
forward by the Mr Mintoff, the General Conference of the Labour Party and the 
General Workers Union (GWU) appointed Dr Mifsud Bonnici as Designate Leader. 
He took an active part in the bitter dispute between the Government and the Church 
on the introduction of the controversial reform of free education for all. He was 
sworn in as Prime Minister on 22 December 1984, following the announcement of Mr 
Mintoffs resignation on the same day in Parliament., His investiture was witnessed by 
Mr Mintoff himself. Following two successive electoral defeats in 1987 and 1992, a 
period during which he started modernising the structures of the Labour Party, he 
resigned the leadership post but kept an active interest in politics. In 2000 he founded 
the Campaign for National Independence, 'a lobby group vociferously against, 
European Union membership. He strongly opposed Labour's acceptance of EU 
membership and change in foreign policy during the 2003 Extraordinary General 
Conference. Dr Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, a bachelor, has two sisters and three 
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brothers, one of whom is a Nationalist Member of Parliament and another is an 
Archpriest. 
Mintoff, Dominic [Dom] (1916- ): Architect and civil engineer, studied at the Royal 
University of Malta (in 1937 he graduated B. Sc. and two years later, in 1939, B. E. 
and A. & C. E. ) and, as the 1939 Rhodes Scholar from Malta, at the University of 
Oxford , where 
he obtained an M. A. in Engineering Science. He was General 
Secretary of the Labour Party in 1936-7 when he resigned to continue his studies in 
Britain. In 1941-1943, he worked as Civil Engineer in the UK, and as architect in 
Malta from 1944 onwards. Returning to Malta in 1944, he was again elected as 
General Secretary and then Deputy Leader. Was elected to Parliament in 1945 and 
appointed Minister for Public Works and Reconstruction in 1947. Following the split 
with Boffa in 1947, Mintoff became leader of the Labour Party (a position he held 
until 1984) and Boffa founded the Malta Workers' Party. In 1945, he was elected 
member of the Council of Government and the Executive Council. Mintoff formed 
part of Labour delegations to London in 1945,1947,1948 and 1949. Elected in 1947, 
he was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Works and Reconstruction during 
1947-49 but resigned in 1949. Prime Minister during 1955-1958, he resigned in 1958. 
Mintoff was again elected in 1962 and 1966, and served as Leader of the Opposition 
during 1962-1971. He was Prime Minister in 1971-1976,1976-1981 and 1981-1984. 
In 1971, he requested immediate negotiations with the British Government for the 
dismantling of military bases in Malta. Final agreement was reached Following 
difficult negotiations, in March 1972 a seven-year agreement was reached with 
Britain and NATO leading to closure of all bases in Malta by 1979. He negotiated a 
treaty of friendship and economic cooperation with China in 1972; joined the Non- 
Aligned Movement in 1973; transformed Malta from a monarchy into a parliamentary 
Republic in 1974. Mintoff resigned in 1984 handing over leadership of the Labour 
Party and the premiership to Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici. 
Mizzi, Enrico [Nerik] (1885-1950): Born in Valletta on the 20 September 1885, he 
was the son of Fortunato Mizzi, founder of the Partito Nazionale. lie graduated from 
the Royal University of Malta and read law at the Universities of Rome and Urbino 
from where he obtained his LL. D. degree in 1911. Mizzi was first elected to the 
Council of Government from Gozo in 1915 as Member of the Comitato Patriottico. 
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While Mizzi was striving to obtain a liberal Constitution he was arrested at his 
residence on 7 May and court-martialled on charges of sedition in 1917 under the 
Malta Defence Regulations for writings and statements against the British. He was 
sentenced to a year's imprisonment with hard labour, the loss of civil rights and the 
withdrawal of lawyer's warrant. The sentence was commuted by Governor Methuen 
to a 'severe censure', while his civil rights and warrant were restored following the 
cessation of hostilities in 1918. He was one of the founders and co-Leader with Sir 
Ugo Mifsud (1926-42) of the Partito Nazionalista. On 30 May 1940 while Mizzi was 
at the printing press responsible for printing the Nationalist newspaper, Malta, he was 
arrested and together with another 47 Maltese citizens, was interned for their alleged 
Italian sympathies and later deported illegally to Uganda in 1942. He was repatriated 
on 9 March 1945 and resumed his seat in the Council of Government. After the 1950 
elections, Nerik Mizzi was asked to form a minority government and in September 
1950, he became Prime Minister, only to die three months later at his residence in 
Valletta. Antonio Gramsci makes a reference to Mizzi in his Quadern! del Carcere 
(Gramsci 1934,1975: 1027 [#140]) where he notes that he needs to check whether 
Mizzi is also a member of the Partito Nazionale in Italy. 
Mizzi, Fortunato (1844-1905): Born in Valletta, he graduated in law at the 
University of Malta in 1865. He was President of various social and voluntary 
organisations as well as of the Chamber of Advocates. In 1880, Dr Mizzi founded the 
Anti-Reformist Party which soon became known as the Partito Nazionale, later Partit 
Nazzjonalista or Nationalist Party. He opposed the Royal Commissions of Sir 
Penrose Julyan and Patrick Keenan, tasked with reporting on the civil service and the 
education respectively, arguing against any Anglicisation of Maltese society and 
culture whilst championing Italian language and culture. He was returned in all 
elections between 1880 and 1904. In 1883 he founded the newspaper Malta. In 1888, 
accompanied by the then young Gerald Strickland which he appears to have held - at 
least initially - in some esteem, he travelled to London to submit proposals for 
constitutional changes, some of which were eventually included in the Knutsford 
Constitution. In 1899 accompanied by Salvatore Cachia Zammit, Mizzi again went to 
London to submit a petition for, constitutional. In 1905, shortly before his death, 
Mizzi was elected President of the newly formed Associazione Politica Maltese. 
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Sant, Alfred (1948- ): Born on 28 February 1948, Alfred Sant, graduated as 
Bachelor of Science in Physics and Mathematics at the Royal University of Malta in 
1967 and as Master of Science in Physics in the following year. In 1970, he read for a 
Diploma of the Institute International d' Administration Publique in Paris. After 
serving with the Maltese diplomatic corps in Brussels, he pursued his studies at 
Boston University where he graduated Master of Business Administration in 1976. 
He was awarded a Harvard Business School research fellowship and graduated 
Doctor of Business Administration in 1979. Between 1980 and 1982, Dr Sant was 
Executive Deputy Chairman of the Malta Development Corporation. Elected 
President of the Labour Party in 1984, he was co-opted to Parliament in 1987 and was 
elected Leader in 1992. He won the 1996 elections with a significant majority of 
votes but only one seat more than the opposition. He decided to go back to the polls 
only 22 months later when Dom Mintoff repeatedly voted against the Labour 
government, accusing it of betraying its traditional social principles. During this short 
period in government, substantial progress was registered in the attraction of foreign 
direct investment and in the tourism sector. Labour also lost the 2003 elections, 
mainly due to its position against immediate membership of the European Union. 
Upon this defeat, the party's policy developed to one of acceptance of the status quo. 
Dr Sant has been Leader of the Opposition since 1998 and has since been confirmed 
in this position twice. 
Seers, Dudley (1920-1983): After serving with the Royal Navy in 1941-45, he took 
up a post as Senior Lecturer in Economic Statistics at the University of Oxford. It 
was during this period that he accepted, together with another Oxford economist, 
Balogh, to advise Mintoff - who had himself been at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar 
shortly before the War - on Malta's development prospects. Seers then worked with 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (1957-1963), as 
Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (1963-1964) and as 
Director General of Economic Planning at the British Ministry of Overseas 
Development (1964-1967). He advised several governments worldwide, the World 
Bank, OECD and the United Nations. He was President of the European Association 
of Development Institutes. Sir Dudley Seers, who listed "teasing bureaucrats" as one 
of his hobbies in the Who's Who, was Professorial Fellow and Director of the Institute 
of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (1967-1972). 
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Strickland, Gerald (1861-1940): Studied in Malta, Britain and Italy. Active in 
Maltese politics, began by supporting the pro-Italian leader Fortunato Mizzi with 
whom he submitted to London a scheme for a legislative assembly, elements of which 
were incorporated in the so-called Knutsford constitution of 1887. Mitzi led the so- 
called Partito Anti-Riformista in the Council of Government, whose policy was 
essentially that of refusing to approve any public work expenditure (and of taxes 
specifically to partly fund such expenditure) required to upgrade the miserable state of 
the island's infrastructure (water, drainage, roads) as well as public education and 
health, unless government favoured the use of the Italian language. In 1887, 
Strickland was elected to the Council of Government as representative of the nobility 
and land proprietors. Between 1888 and 1902 he was Principal Government 
Secretary. He was Governor of the Leeward Islands in the West Indies (1902-4), 
Tasmania (1904-9), West Australia (1909-12) and New South Wales (1912-17). 
Upon his return, his first public intervention was to side with the nobility, other 
proprietors and members of the clergy in opposition against the introduction of a 
succession tax. In 1921 he allied himself with Gusto Bartolo, founder of the Anglo- 
Maltese Party and owner of the Malta Chronicle (its printing press and editorial 
offices were ransacked during the June 1919 riots but he was compensated for the 
damage by the Colonial authorities). Months after the Anglo-Maltese Party was 
dissolved and reformed as the Constitutional Party under Strickland's leadership. The 
Strickland family founded The Times of Malta (published to-date) in 1935, thus 
making the Malta Chronicle redundant (it ceased publication in 1940). He was 
Leader of the Opposition in Malta in 1921-27. In 1924, Lord Strickland won the seat 
for Lancaster for the Conservatives in the House of Commons. Following the 
"compact" with the Labour Party in 1927, he had a majority in the Legislative 
Assembly and became Head of Ministry (as the Prime Minister was called between 
the summers 1927 and 1930). In 1928 he was elevated to the peerage. One of the 
most important projects under his premiership, under pressure from his Labour allies, 
was the beginning of building works for St Luke's Hospital, which is still the country's 
main hospital. He also succeeded in pushing through a number of public works in 
spite of the opposition from the pro-Italian party. His clash with the ecclesiastical 
authorities led to the suspension of the Constitution in 1930. He was Leader of the 
262 




Aboites, Jaime (1989). Industrializacion y Desarrollo Agricolo en Mexico. Un Analisis 
del Regimen de Accumulacion en el Largo Plazo: 1937 - 1987. Mexico: Editorial 
Trillas. 
Aglietta, Michel (1979). A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience. 
Translated by David Fernbach. London: NLB. 
Althusser, Louis and Balibar Etienne (1979). Reading Capital. With a Glossary by Ben 
Brewster. London: Verso. 
Althusser, Louis (1977). Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London: NLB. 
Amery, Leopold (1955). My Political Life: War and Peace 1914 - 1929. London: 
Hutchinson. 
Amin, Ash (1994). "Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of Transition. " In 
Amin, Ash ed. Post-Fordism: A Reader: Studies in Urban and Social Change. pp. 1- 40. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Amin, Ash and Robins, Kevin (1990). "Industrial Districts and Regional Development: 
Limits and Possibilities. " In Pyke, F, Becattini, G and Sengenberger, W. eds. Industrial 
Districts and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy. pp. 185 - 219. Geneva: International 
Institute for Labour Studies. 
Anderson, Robert J. (1994). "Representations and Requirements: The Value of 
Ethnography in System Design. " In Human-Computer Interaction, 9: 2, pp. 151-182. 
Anderson, Perry (1983,1984). In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
264 
Anderson, Perry (1980). Arguments within English Marxism. United States: Schocken 
Books. 
Anderson, Perry (1976). Considerations on Western Marxism. London: Verso. 
Angher, R. et al eds. (1978). Almanacco PCI '78. Roma: Sezione Centrale Stampa e 
Propaganda PCI. 
Armstrong, Harvey and Read, Robert (1995). "Western European Micro-States and EU 
Autonomous Regions: The Advantages of Size and Sovereignty. " In World 
Development, 23: 7, pp. 1229-1245. 
Asheghian, Parviz (1998). The Multinational Corporation: Environments and 
Operations. New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Assmann, Georg et al (1983). Woerterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Soziologie. 
Berlin: Dietz Verlag. 
Bader, Heinrich et al (1977). Oekonomisches Lexikon H-P. Third Edition. Berlin: 
Verlag Die Wirtschaft. 
Baldacchino, Godfrey (2000). "The Challenge of Hypothermia: A Six-Proposition 
Manifesto for Small Island Territories. " In The Round Table, 353, pp. 65-79. 
Balogh, Thomas and Seers, Dudley (1955). The Economic Problems of Malta: An 
Interim Report to the Prime Minister. London: HMSO. 
Bagnasco, Arnaldo and Sabel, Charles F. eds. (1995). Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises. London: Pinter. - 
265 
Bannock, Graham and Albach, Horst (1991). Small Business Policy in Europe: Britain, 
Germany and the European Commission. London: Anglo-German Foundation 
Publications. 
Barbadoro, Idomeneo (1977). Enciclopedia del Sindacato. Milano: Teti Editore. 
Barca, Luciano (1978). "Development, Reforms, Revolution: Some Reflections on the 
Ways Out of the Structural Crisis in Italy. " In World Marxist Review, 21: 4. pp. 31 - 36. 
Blackman, Courtney N. (1979). "The Economic Development of Small Countries: A 
Managerial Approach. " In Ince, Basil A. ed. Contemporary International Relations of 
the Caribbean. St Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of 
the West Indies. 
Bocca, Giorgio ed. (1978). Moro, Una Tragedia Italiana: Le Lettere, i Documenti, le 
Polemiche. Milano: Bompiani. 
Boissevain, Jeremy (2005). Saints and Fireworks: Religion and Politics in Rural Malta. 
Second Edition. Valletta: Progress Press. 
Boissevain, Jeremy (2004). "Hotels, Tuna Pens and Civil Society: Contesting the 
Foreshore in Malta". In Boissevain, J. and Selwyn, T. Contesting the Foreshore: 
Tourism, Society and Politics on the Coast. pp. 233 - 260. Amsterdam: ' Amsterdam 
University Press. 
Boissevain, Jeremy (1979). "Network Analysis: A Reappraisal". In Current 
Anthropology. Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1979. pp. 392 - 394. 
Bonefeld, Werner (1993). The Recomposition of the British State during the 1980s. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Group. 
266 
Bonefeld, Werner and Holloway, John eds. (1991). Post-Fordism and Social Form: A 
Marxist Debate on the Post-Fordist State. London: Macmillan. 
Bonnici, Guze' (1990). Storja tal-Partit tal-Haddiema. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba 
Socjalisti. 
Bonnici, W. (1998). "Inspector of Hospitals Ralph Green and the Plague in Malta of 
1813". In Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 144(1): pp 40 - 45. 
Borg Bonello, Benny (2001). "Industrial Struggle: A Means to Resisiting Change in the 
Social Contract. A Maltese Case Study. " In South-East European Review for Labour 
and Social Affairs. Volume 4, No. 1. Hans Bockler Stiftung. 
Borges, Jorge Luis (1993). Other Inquisitions 1937-1952. Austin: University of Texas 
Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1996). The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Boyer, Robert (1988). The Search for Labour Market Flexibility: The European 
Economies in Transition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boyer, Robert and Saillard, Yves (2002). Regulation Theory: The State of the Art. 
London: Routledge. 
Brenner, Neil (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of 
Statehood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M. and MacLeod, G. eds. (2003). State / Spacc: A 
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 
267 
Brincat, Mario (2006). Export-led Industrialisation and Development in Malta 1955- 
2000. University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science: 
Unpublished Draft Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology in 
the Faculty of Economics. 
Brincat, Mario (1986). Continuity and Change in Maltese Development Planning. 
University of Malta: Unpublished Dissertation for the degree of BA (Hons. ) on Public 
Administration in the Faculty of Management Studies. 
Briguglio, Lino (1985). "Small Island Developing States and their Vulnerability. " In 
World Development, 23(9), pp. 1615-1632. 
Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory and Weder, Beatrice (1998). Institutions in 
Transition: Reliability of Rules and Economic Performance in . 
Former Socialist 
Countries. World Bank: Working Paper 1809. 
Bruscagin, Mauro (1995). Ascesa e Declino dell'Eurocomunismo: Cause Endogene ed 
Esogene del Fenomeno. Universitä Cattolica di Milano, Faculty of Political Sciences: 
Unpublished dissertation. 
Buckley, Peter J. and Mucchielli, Jean-Louis (1997). Multinational Firms and 
International Relocation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Buttigieg, Eugene (2004). "Challenges facing Malta as a Micro-State in an Enlarged 
EU. " In Bank of Valletta Review, 29, pp. 1-15. 
Cassar, Anton (1991). Il-`Compact'. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti. 
Cattaneo, Carlo (1975). Saggi di Economia Rurale. Milano: Einaudi Editore. 
Central Bank of Malta (1972 - 2004). Annual Reports. Malta. 
268 
Chircop, John (1991). The Left within the Maltese Labour Movement. Msida, Malta: 
Mireva Publications. 
Coopers and Lybrand Europe (1991). The Effect of EC Membership on Industry in 
Malta. Malta: Federation of Industry. 
Corbetta, Giovanni (2000). Le Medie Imprese. Milano: Egea. 
Corbetta, Piergiorgio; Parisi, Arturo and Schadee, Hans (1988). Elezioni in Italia: 
Struttura e Tipologia delle Consultazioni Politiche. Bologna: 11 Mulino. 
Coriat, Benjamin (2004). "Droits de Propriete Intel Iectuelle". In Revue d' Economie 
Industrielle, No. 99: Les Droits de la Propriete Intellectuelle: Nouveau Domaines, 
Nouveaux Enjeux, Prest Presentation. http: //rei. revue. org/document. html? id=6 
Coriat, Benjamin (2004). "Le Nouveau Reme Americain de la Proprietd Intellectuelle". 
In Revue d' Economie Industrielle, No. 99: Les Droits de la Proprietd Intellectuelle: 
Nouveau Domaines, Nouveaux Enjeux, Prest Presentation. 
http: //rei. revue. org/document. html? id=3 
Coriat, Benjamin (1998). Made in Japan: L' Industrie Japonaise au Tournant du Si6cle. 
LGF. 
Coriat, Benjamin (1979). L' Atelier et la Chronometre: Essai sur Ic Taylorismc, Ic 
Fordisme et la Production de Masse. France: C. Burgois. 1979. 
Coriat, Benjamin and Taddei, D (1993). Made in France: L' Industrie Francaise daps la 
Competition Mondiale. LGF. 
269 
Chiu, Stephen Wing-Kai and Ho, K. C. (1997). City-States in the Global Economy: 
Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Cumings, B. (1999). "Webs with no Spiders, Spiders with no Webs: The Genealogy of 
the Developmental State. In Woo-Cumings, M. ed. The Developmental State. pp. 61 - 
92. Cornell University Press. 
Davies, I. (1963). "The Labour Commonwealth". In New Left Review, December 
1963. pp. 75 - 94. 
Delia, Emmanuel P. (2002). Papers on Malta's Political Economy. Santa Venera, Malta: 
Midsea Books. 
Development Plan for the Maltese Islands (1981). Malta: Guidelines for Progress: 1981 
- 1985. Government of Malta. 
Development Plan for the Maltese Islands: 1973 - 1980. Government of Malta. 
Development Plan for the Maltese Islands: 1969 - 1974. Government of Malta. 
Development Plan for the Maltese Islands: 1964 - 1969. Government of Malta. 
Development Plan for the Maltese Islands: 1959 - 1964. Government of Malta. 
Diamanti, I1vo (2003). Rosso, Verde e Azzurro: Mappe e Colori dell' Italia Politica. 
Bologna: 11 Mulino 
Dicken, Peter (2003). Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st 
Century. Fourth Edition. London: Sage. 
270 
Diggines, Christopher E. (1985). "The Problems of Small States. " In The Round Table, 
295, pp. 191 - 205. 
Dommen, Edward (1985). "What is a Microstate? " In Dommen, Edward and Hein, 
Philippe. eds. States, Microstates and Islands. pp. 1- 15. Beckenham, England: Croom 
Helm. 
Dosi, Giovanni (2001). Innovation, Organization and Economic Dynamics: Selected 
Essays. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Drucker, Peter F. (1993). "The Rise of the Knowledge Society" The Wilson Quarterly, 
17 pp. 52 - 71. In Nodoushani, 0, and Nodoushani, A. A Postmodern Theory of 
Industrial Democracy. Journal of Comparative International Management. June 2000. 
Dunn, Robert M. and Mutti, John H. (2000). International Economics. Fifth Edition. 
London: Routledge. 
Dunning, John H (1992). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 
Wokingham: Addison-Wesley. 
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, web page: www. polvtechnique. edu/paRe php2MID=17 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (28 November 1995). Declaration adopted at the first 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27 and 28 November 1995. Barcelona. 
European Commission (20 May 2003). Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2003/361/EC). Brussels: 
Official Journal of the European Union, L124/36. 
European Commission (17 February 1999). Opinion on Malta's Application for 
Membership in the European Union - Updated. Brussels. 
271 
European Economic Community and Government of Malta (5 December 1970). Accord 
creant une Association entre la Communaute Economique Europeene et Malte. Valletta 
and Brussels. 
European Union and Government of Malta (28 April 1998). Council of Association: 
Tenth Meeting. Brussels. 
Esser, Josef and Hirsch, Joachim (1994). "The Crisis of Fordism and the Dimensions of 
a `Post-Fordist' Regional and Urban Structure. " In Amin, Ash ed. Post-Fordism: A 
Reader: Studies in Urban and Social Change. pp. 71 - 98. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Evans, P. B. (2004). Report of a Lecture at UCLA. 25 May 2004. 
http: //www. ison. ucla. edu/article. asp? parentid-11691. 
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, P. B. (1979). Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and 
Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fenech, Dominic (1993). "Birgu during the British Period. " In Bugeja, Lino; Buhagiar, 
Mario and Fiorini, Stanley eds. Birgu: A Maltese Maritime City. Volume 1. pp. 123 - 
188. Msida, Malta: Malta University Services. 
Foucault, Michel (1994). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
New York: Vintage. 
Frank, Andre Gunder (1981). Crisis in the Third World. New Jersey: Holmes and Meier. 
272 
Frendo, Henry (1999). The Origins of Maltese Statehood: A Case Study of 
Decolonization in the Mediterranean. Malta: Henry Frendo. 
Frendo, Henry (1979). Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience. 
Malta: Midsea. 
Frendo, Henry (1972). Birth Pangs of a Nation: Manwel Dimech's Malta, 1860-1921. 
Malta: Mediterranean Publications. 
Friedman, Andrew Lloyd (2000). "Microregulation and Post-Fordism: Critique and 
Development of Regulation Theory. " In New Political Economy, 5: 1, pp. 59 - 76. 
Friedman, Andrew Lloyd (1977). Industry and Labour. London: Macmillan. 
Friggieri, Joe (1994). "Lyotard, Fukuyama u Ahna". In Politika. No. 3, May 1994. pp. 
26 - 30. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Harmondsworth: 
Pengiun. 
Galea, Francis (1999). Is-Sedizzjoni. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti. 
Ganado, Herbert (1977). Rajt Malta Tinbidel. Volum 1. Third Edition. Malta: 
Interprint. 
General Board of Health (1854). Second Report on Quarantine, Appendix V. " Report of 
Dr. W. H. Burrell on the Plague of Malta in 1813. London: General Board of Health. 
Germani, Gino (1965,1981). The Sociology of Modernization : Studies on Its Historical 
and Theoretical Aspects with Special Regard to the Latin American Case. New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers. 
273 
Gerratana, Valentino (1975). Introduction. In Gramsci, Antonio. Quaderni del Carcere: 
Edizione critica dell' Istituto Gramsci a cura di Valentino Gerratana. Volume IV. 
Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 
Giarrizzo, G. (1977). "Il Mezzogiorno di Gramsci". In Ferri, F. ed. Politica e Storia in 
Gramsci, I. pp. 321 - 390. Roma: Editori Riuniti, Istituto Gramsci. 
Giddens, Anthony (1994). Foreword. In Sultana, Ronald G. and Baldacchino, Godfrey 
eds. Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry. pp. xxvi - xxxiv. Msida, Malta: Mireva 
Publications. 
Gramsci, Antonio (1934,1975). In Valentino Gerratana ed, Quaderni del Carcere: 
Edizione Critica dell' Istituto Gramsci. Volume II. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 
Gramsci, Antonio (1934,1975). In Valentino Gerratana ed, Quaderni del Carcere: 
Edizione Critica dell' Istituto Gramsci. Volume III. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 
Granovetter, Mark and Swedberg, Richard ed. (1985,2001). The Sociology of Economic 
Life. Second Edition. Oxford: Westview Press. 
Grant Thornton, Malta (2003). EU Accession, EU Trade Policy and Maltese Industrial 
Incentives: Implications for the Clothing Industry in Malta: A Report for the General 
Workers' Union. Ta'Xbiex, Malta: Grant Thornton. 
Grech, John; Vella, Mario and Zahra, Joseph F. X. (1980). The Maltese Clothing 
Industry. Valletta: Malta Development Corporation. 
Grech, John (1978). Threads of Dependence. Valletta: Malta University Press. 
274 
Gutierrez Garza, Estela (2003). Teorias del Desarrollo en America Laina. Mexico: 
Editorial Trillas. 
Hall, Stuart (1997). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
London: Sage. 
Hall, Stuart (1989). "Brave New World. " In Marxism Today, October 1989. London: 
Communist Party of Great Britain. 
Hillcoat, G. (1986). La crise des modeles de developpement en Amerique Latine, de la 
substitution d'importations ä l'economie tournee vers 1'exterieur. Une discussion theorique 
illustree par 1'experience argentine. Thesis presented at the Universite de Paris- 
Vincennes. 
Hirst Paul and Zeitlin John (1991). "Flexible Specialisation versus Post-Fordism: 
Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications. " In Economy and Society, 20: 1, pp. 1-156. 
Hirst, Paul and Zeitlin, John (1989). "Flexible Specialisation and the Competitive 
Failure of UK Manufacturing. " In Political Quarterly, 60: 3, pp. 164-178. 
Historical outline of ST Microelectronics, The Antique Chip Collector's web page: 
www. antiquetech. com 
Holland, Stuart (1979). "L' Economia Comunista. " In Filo della Torre, Paolo and Levi, 
Arrigo eds. Eurocomunismo: Mito o Realta'? pp. 231 - 281. Milano: Mondadori. 
House, Ernest R. ed. (1980). Evaluating with Validity. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
In-Nazzjon (14 August 1998). Sections IV and V. 
275 
Ingham, B. (1989). "Dudley Seers as a Development Advisor in Ghana and Malta". In 
IDS Bullettin, Volume 20, No. 3. 
Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise (1999). Programmes of Assistance. 
Unbound document. 
It-Torca (14 November 1999). p. 3. 
It-Torca (7 November 1999). p. 1. 
Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Agency web page: www. chuso. meti. go. in 
Jenson, Jane (1987). "Alain Lipietz - Rebel Sons: The Regulation School. " An 
interview. French Politics and Society, 5: 4. 
Jessop, Bob and Sum, Ngai-Ling (2006). The Regulation Approach and Beyond: Putting 
Capitalist Economies In Their Place. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jessop, Bob (1998). Report on my stay in Japan October 20 - December 18 1997. Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science Fellowship. 
http: //members com. home. ne ip/katori/Jessop on Japan. html 
Jessop Bob (1997). "The Governance of Complexity and the Complexity of Governance: 
Preliminary Remarks on some Problems and limits of Economic Guidance. " In Amin, 
Ash and Housner, Jerzy eds. Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and 
Social Complexity. pp. 95 - 128. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Jessop, Bob (1994). "Post-Fordism and the State. " In Amin, Ash ed. Post-Fordism: A 
Reader: Studies in Urban and Social Change. pp. 251 - 280. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Jessop, Bob (1990). State Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 
276 
Jessop, Bob (1991). "Polar Bears and Class Struggle: Less than a Self-Criticism. " In 
Bonefeld, Werner and Holloway, John eds. Post-Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist 
Debate on the Post-Fordist State. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jessop, Bob (1988,1991). "Regulation Theory, Post-Fordism and the State: More than a 
Reply to Werner Bonefeld. " In Capital and Class, 34. Reprinted in Bonefeld, Werner 
and Holloway, John eds. Post-Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on the 
Post- 
Fordist State. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jessop, Bob (1988). "Regulation Theories in Retrospect and Prospect. " In 
Staatsaufgaben, 1. Bielefeld: Zentrum fur Interdisziplinare Forschung, University of 
Bielefeld. 
Jessop, Bob et al (1987). "Popular Capitalism, Flexible Accumulation and Left 
Strategy. " In New Left Review, 165. 
Jessop, Bob [A] (1986). The Economy, the State and the Law: Theories of Relative 
Autonomy and Autopoietic Closure. Florence: European University Institute. 
Jessop, Bob [B] (1986). "Warum es Keinen Kohlismus Gibt. " In Links, 1. 
Jessop, Bob (1985). Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy. London: 
Macmillan. 
Jessop, Bob (1983). "Accumulation Strategies, State Forms and Hegemonic Projects. " 
In Kapitalistate, 10/11. 
Jessop, Bob (1982). The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Meditations. Oxford: 
Martin-Robertson. 
277 
Jessop, Bob; Kastendiek, Hans; Nielsen, Klaus and Pedersen, Ove Kaj (1991). The 
Politics of Flexibility: Restructuring State and Industry in Britain, Germany and 
Scandinavia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Jessop, Bob; Bonnett, Kevin; Bromley, Simon and Ling, Tom (1988). Thatcherism: A 
Tale of Two Nations. London: Polity. 
Johansson, H. and Nilsson, L. (1997). "Export Processing Zones". In World 
Development. No. 12. pp. 2115 - 2128. 
Johnson, C. (1999). "The Development State: Odyssey of a Concept". In Woo-Cumings, 
M. ed. The Developmental State. pp. 32 - 60. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Johnson, C. (1995). Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State. New 
York: W. W. Norton Co. 
Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925 - 1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Jones, Alun (2006 b). "Narrative-based Productin of State Spaces for International 
Region Building: Europeanisation and the Mediterranean". In Annals of the Association 
of American Georgraphers, 96 (2). pp. 415 - 431. 
Jones, Alun (2006 a), "Pax Bruxellensis-Pax Mediterranea: International Region Building 
in the Mediterranean". In Transatlantic Monthly, April-May 2006. pp. 10 -12. 
Jones, Geoffrey (1996). The Evolution of International Business: An Introduction. 
London: Routledge. 
Kenen, Peter B. (2000). The International Economy. Fourth Edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
278 
Kester, Gerard (1980). Transition to Workers' Self-Management: Its Dynamics in the 
Decolonising Economy of Malta. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
Keynes, John Maynard (1936,1997). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. London: Macmillan. 
Koster, Adrianus (1981,1985). Prelates and Politicians in Malta: Changing Power- 
Balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress, 1530-1976. New 
York: Prometheus Books. 
Koziara, E. C. (1975). The Labour Market and Wage Determination in Malta. Valletta: 
University of Malta Press. 
KullHadd (31 October 1999). p. 1. 
KullHadd (17 October 1999). pp. 1 and 3. 
L-Orizzont (31 December 1999. p. 4. 
L-Orizzont (30 December 1999). p. 3. 
L-Orizzont (23 October 1999). p. 7. 
L-Orizzont (28 July 1999). p. 1. 
L-Orizzont (3 July 1999). p. 7. 
L-Orizzont (8 March 1999). p. 9. 
L-Orizzont (7 August 1998). Section 28 
279 
Labord, Cecile (2000). "The Concept of the State in British and French Political 
Thought". In Political Studies, 48 (3). pp. 540 - 557. 
Laclau, Ernesto (1977). Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: NLB. 
Latouche, Serge (1969). The Westernization of the World: The Significance, Scope and 
Limits of the Drive Towards Global Uniformity. Translated by Rosemary Morris. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Laws of Malta (1 November 2000 and amendements). Business Promotion Act: To 
Encourage the Establishment of New Businesses and the Expansion of Existing Ones, 
and to make Ancillary Arrangements in relation thereto. Valletta: Malta Government 
Gazette. 
Laws of Malta (1 July 1997). Customs and Excise Tax Act. Valletta: Malta Government 
Gazette. 
Laws of Malta (28 July 1989 and amendments). Local Manufactures Promotion Act. 
Valletta: Malta Government Gazette. 
Laws of Malta (5 July 1988 and amendments). Industrial Development Act: To 
Encourage the Establishment of New Industries and the Expansion of Existing Ones, and 
to make Ancillary Arrangements in relation thereto. Valletta: Malta Government 
Gazette. 
Laws of Malta (1 January 1959 and amendements). Aids to Industries Ordinance: To 
Encourage the Establishment or Development of Industrial Undertakings and to make 
Provision for various Aids thereto. Valletta: Malta Government Gazette. 
280 
Laws of Malta (2 December 1974 and amendments). National Minimum Wage National 
Standards Order. Valletta: Malta Government Gazette. 
Lee, Y. S. (1999). "Labour Shock and the Diversity of Transnational Corporate Strategy 
in Export Processing Zones". In Growth and Change. No. 30 (Summer). Pp. 337 - 365. 
Lenin Vladimir Ilyich (1917,1964). "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat 
it. " In Collected Works. Volume 25. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
Lipietz, Alain and Slater, Malcolm (1992). Towards a New Economic Order: Post- 
Fordism, Ecology and Democracy: Europe and the International Order. Oxford: Polity 
Press. 
Lipietz, Alain (1987). Mirages and Miracles: Crises in Global Fordism. London: Verso. 
Lipietz, Alain (1985). The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and the World Crisis. 
London: Verso. 
Lovering, John (1991). Bridging the Gap. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
MacLeod, Gordon (2001 a). "New Regionalism Reconsidered: Globalisation and the 
Remaking of Political Economic Space". In International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 25(4). Pp. 804 - 829. 
MacLeod, Gordon (2001 b). "Beyond Soft Institutionalism: Accumulation, Regulation 
and their Geographical Fixes". In Environment and Planning. 33 (7). pp. 1145 - 1167. 
Madami, D. (1999). A Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zone. 
Washington: Trade and Development Research Group, World Bank. 
281 
Malta Chamber of Commerce; Malta Federation of Industry and General Retailers and 
Traders Union (1998). Preliminary Comments and Recommendations [... ] on Two 
Documents Presented by Government on Establishing a Free Trade Area and Industrial 
Restructuring. Unbound document. 
Malta Development Corporation (1998). IPSE Five-Year Strategy. Unbound Document. 
Malta Development Corporation [A] (1997). Strategic Guidelines for Industrial 
Restructuring. Unbound document. 
Malta Development Corporation [B] (1997). Proposed Strategy for a Phased Removal of 
Levies and the Equalisation of Internal Taxes of Locally Produced Goods and Imported 
Products. Unbound document. 
Malta Development Corporation (1972). Malta: Investment Opportunities. Valletta and 
London: Malta Development Corporation. 
Malta Development Corporation (1968 - 2004). Annual Reports. Malta. 
Malta Labour Party (1921 - 2003). Electoral Programmes. Malta. 
Marangoni, G. and Solari, S. (2006). "Flexibile Specialisation 20 Years 0: How the 
`Good' Industrial Districts of Italy have Lost their Momentum". In Competition and 
Change, Volume 10, No. 1. March 2006. pp73 - 87. 
Marek, Miroslaw (1999). Polish Experience in Building up SME Support. Warsaw: 
Polish Ministry of Economy. 
Marx, Karl (1877). Capital: Critique of Political Economy. Volume 3. New Edition 
1990. London: Penguin. 
282 
Marx, Karl (1877). Capital: Critique of Political Economy. Volume 2. New Edition 
1992. London: Penguin. 
Marx, Karl (1877). Capital: Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1. New Edition 
1990. London: Penguin. 
Mason, Joseph R. (2003). "The Political Economy of Reconstruction. Finance 
Corporation Assistance during the Great Depression. " In Explorations in Economic 
History. 40(2). pp. 101 - 121. 
Mayer, Margit (1994). "Post-Fordist City Politics. " In Amin, Ash ed. Post-Fordism: A 
Reader: Studies in Urban and Social Change. pp. 316 - 338. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Meiskins Wood, Ellen (1989). "Discussion on Manifesto for the New Times. " In 
Marxism Today, August 1989. London: Communist Party of Great Britain. 
Ministry for Economic Services (2003). Prosperity in Change: The Way Forward: 
National Industrial Policy. Malta: Ministry for Economic Services. 
Mintoff, Dom (1977). Address to Industrialists from the Confederation of British 
Industry. Photostat copy of the transcription taken from the tape recording of the meeting 
in London on December, 8 1977. Unbound document. 
Miotti, L (1994). "Argentine: Fragilite de 1' Accumulation et Options de la Regulation". 
In Colin-Delavaud A. and Neffa, J. C. eds. L' Argentine a 1' Aube du Troisieme 
Millenaire. Paris: Editions de 1' IHEAL. 
Misurace, Pasquale (1982). "The Theory of Modern Bureaucracy. " In Sasson, Anne ed. 
Approaches to Gramsci. London: Writers and Readers. 
Mjoset, L. (2007). Capitalisms Compared: Comparative Social Research. JP R 2007. 
283 
Mjoset, L. (1993). "The Influence of Regulation Theory on Nordic Studies of Economic 
Policy and Social Development". In La Lettre de la Regulation, No. 6, February 1993. 
Modigliani, Franco and Miller, Merton (1961). "Dividend Policy, Growth and the 
Valuation of Shares. " In Journal of Business, 34, pp. 235 - 264. 
Morris, J. (2007). Life and Times of Thomas Balogh: A Macaw Among Mandarins. 
Sussex: Academic Press. 
Muscat, Joseph (1998). Mandat Gdid. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti. 
National Statistics Office, previously known as Central Office of Statistics (volumes for 
years 1968 - 2004). Abstract of Statistics. Malta. 
National Statistics Office, previously known as Central Office of Statistics (volumes for 
1968 - 2004). Economic Survey. Malta. 
National Statistics Office (2003 - 2004). Labour Market Survey. Malta 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (21 June 
1976 and amendments). Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, C(76)99. Paris: 
OECD. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Rogoff, Kenneth (1996). Foundations of International 
Macroeconomics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Ohara K. and Matsuda H. (2002). "Gramsci Study in Japan: Achievements and 
Problems. " In International Gramsci Society Newsletter, No. 12, February 2002. pp 7- 
17. http: //www. itainet. nd. edu/gramsci/ijzsn/articies/al2 5 shtml 
284 
Olson, James S. (1988). Saving Capitalism: The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and 
the New Deal, 1933-1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ominami, C. (1989). La Insercion de Chile en los Mercados Internacionales. Santiago 
de Chile: Prospel-Cesoc. 
Partit Nazzjonalista (1921 - 2003). Electoral Programmes. Malta. 
Peck, Jamie and Miyamachi, Y. (1994). "Regulating Japan? Regulation Theory versus 
the Japanese Experience". In Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 12(6). 
pp. 639 - 674. 
Peck, Jamie and Tickell, Adam (1994). Searching for a New Institutional Fix: The After 
Fordist Crisis and Global-Local Disorder. In Amin, Ash ed. Post-Fordism: A Reader: 
Studies in Urban and Social Change. pp. 280 - 315. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Peet, Richard and Thrift, Nigel eds. (1989). New Models in Geography: the Political- 
Economy Perspective. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Perkman, M (1996). "Regulation Theory and the Role of Politics: Reconsidering Le 
Statut Epistemologique de la Theorie de la Regulation, ". In La Lettre de la Regulation,, 
No. 16. January 1996. 
Peirce, Charles S. (1931). The Collected Papers Volume V: Pragmatism and 
Pragmaticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Pesenti, Antonio (1972). Manuale di Economia Politica. Volume 1 and Volume 2. 
Rome: Editori Riuniti. 
Pezzani, Fabrizio (1985). Le Imprese Minori: Le Funzioni net Sistema Economico e 
Tipicitä della loro Gestione. Milano: Giuffre. 
285 
Piore, Michael J (1995). Beyond Individualism: How Social Demands on the New 
Identity Groups Change American Political and Economic Life. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Piore, Michael J. and Sabel, Charles F (1984). Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for 
Prosperity. United States: Basic Books. 
Piore, Michael J. (1982). Work and Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry. 
Pirotta, Godfrey A. (1996). The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative 
Politics of a Micro-State. Msida, Malta: Mireva Publications. 
Poltert, Anna ed. (1991). Farewell to Flexibility. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Poltert, Anna (1988). "Dismantling Flexibility. " In Capital and Class, 34, pp. 42-75. 
Portelli, Brian (2006). Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Enterprises and 
Industrial Development: Backward Linkages and Knowledge Transfer in Tanzania. 
Oslo: Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Oslo. 
Portelli, Hugues (1976). Gramsci e il Blocco Storio. Bari: Laterza. 
Porter, Michael E. (2006). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free 
Press. 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1978 a). Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB. 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1978 b). State, Power and Socialism. London: Verso. 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1973). Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB. 
286 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1965). "Preliminaires a 1' Etude de Hegemonie dans 1' Etat". In Les 
Temps Modernes, No. 234. November 1965. pp. 862 - 895 and No. 235. December 
1965. pp. 1048 -1069. 
Price Waterhouse (1987). Make it in Malta: The Revitalisation of Malta's Industrial 
Sector. A Report for the Malta Development Corporation. Unbound document. 
Procacci, Giuliano (1998). Storia degli Italiani. Volume II. Bari: Laterza. 
Psychopedis, Kosmas; Bonefeld, Werner and Gunn, Richard eds. (1991). Open Marxism 
Volume 1: Dialectics and History. London: Pluto Press. 
Pugel, Thomas A. and Lindert, Peter H. (2000). International Economics. Eleventh 
Edition. Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
Queiroz Giumaraes, A. (2004). "State Capacity and Economic Development: The 
Advances and Limits of Import Substitution Industrialisation in Brazil". Paper presented 
at the XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia. Associacäo Nacional dos Centros de Pös- 
graduacAo em Economia. http: //www. anpec. ora. br/ncontro2004/artiRos/AO4020. pdf 
Rambell, Hannemann and Hojlund (1997). Strategy and Action Plan for the 
Restructuring of Malta's Manufacturing Sector: Action Plan. An Addendum to the 
Original Report. Malta: Federation of Industry and Chamber of Commerce. 
Rambell, Hannemann and Hojlund (1996). Strategy and Action Plan for the 
Restructuring of Malta's Manufacturing Sector. Malta: Federation of Industry and 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Reike, Richard and Sillars, Malcolm (1984). Argumentation and Decision-Making. 
Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company. 
287 
Rostow, Walt W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rustin, Michael (1989). "The Politics of Post-Fordism, or The Trouble with New 
Times. " In New Left Review, 175, pp. 54-78. 
Sabel, Charles F. (1996). Local Development in Ireland: Partnership, Innovation and 
Social Justice. Local Economic and Employment Development. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. Online edition: 
http: / /ývwv\v2. law. columbia. edu/sabel/papers /IrelandFinal. pdf 
Sabel, Charles F. (1982). Work and Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sacco, Remig (1986). L-Elezzjonijiet Generali, 1849 - 1986: I1-Grajja Politika u 
Kostituzzjonali ta' Malta. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti. 
Sapir, J. (1990). L' Economie Mobile: Essai sur les Economies de type Sovietique. 
Paris: La Decouverte. 
Sant, Alfred (1996). Malta's European Challenge. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba 
Socjalisti. 
Sant, Alfred (1988). 28 ta' April 1958: I1-Hobz u 1-Helsien. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela 
Kotba Socjalisti. 
Sant, Michael A (1989). `Sette Giugno' 1919: Tqanqil u Tibdil. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela 
Kotba Socjalisti. 
288 
Sayer, Andrew (1989). Microcircuits of Capital: Sunrise Industry and Uneven 
Development. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Sayer, Andrew and Walker, Richard (1992). The New Social Economy: Reworking the 
Division of Labor. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Schmitter, P. C. (1979). "Still the Century of Corporatism". In Schmitter, P. C. and 
Lehmbruch, G. eds. Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation. London: Sage. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical 
Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: MacGraw-Hill. 
Schuster, George E. (1950). Interim Report on the Financial and Economic Structure of 
the Maltese Islands. London: HMSO. 
Scuola di Direzione Aziendale Bocconi, Milano - Area Strategia (1998). 11 Ruolo delle 
Agenzie di Promozione e Gestione dello Sviluppo Economico: I1 Caso Malta 
Development Corporation. Unbound document. 
Serracino Inglott, Peter (1987). Beginning Philosophy. Malta: Media Centre. 
Serracino Inglott, Peter (1980). Alternative Future for Malta. Malta: Media Centre. 
Sivanandan, A (1990). "All that Melts into Air is Solid: The Hokum of New Times. " In 
Race and Class, 31: 3, pp. 1-30. 
Shumway, David (1991). Michel Foucault. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 
Sklair, Leslie (2002). Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives. Third Edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
289 
Skiair, Leslie (1989). Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico 
and the United States. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Smith, Courtney A. (1995). Socialist Transformation in Peripheral Economies: Lessons 
from Grenada. Avebury: Aldershot, Brookfield. 
Spiteri, Edward J. (1997). Malta: An Island in Transition. Malta: Progress Press. 
Spiteri, Lino ed. (1996). Fl-Antiporta tal-Millennju 2: Zvilupp Ekonomiku u Solidarjeta' 
Umana. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti. 
Spiteri, Lino (1969). The Development of Industry in Malta. Malta: Joint Consultative 
Council. 
Spriano, Paolo (1958). Socialism e Classe Operaia a Torino dal 1982 al 1913. Milano: 
Einaudi. 
Stievano, Renzo (2001). Comunicazione Introduttiva: Festa del Centenario della Camera 
del Lavoro di Novara. Novara: CGIL. 
Stolarski, Pawel (2003). Multinational Enterprises; or Money has no Homeland. 
www. globgov. collegium. edu. pl. 
Strategis Canada web page: www. strate ig s. ic. gc. ca 
Sultana, Ronald G. (1992). Education and National Development: Historical and Critical 
Perspectives on Vocational Schooling in Malta. Msida, Malta: Mireva Publications. 
Tato, Antonio (1984). Conversazioni con Berlinguer. Roma: Editori Riuniti. 
The Malta Business Weekly (23 July 1998). p. 36. 
290 
The Malta Independent (1 November 1999). pp. 12 and 14. 
The Malta Independent, 24 October 1999. p. 4. 
The Malta Independent (11 October 1999). p. 4. 
The Malta Independent (10 October 1999). p. S. 
The Malta Independent (2 October 1999). p. 6. 
The Malta Independent (7 August 1999). pp. 1 and 6. 
The Malta Independent (3 August 1999). p. 10. 
The Malta Independent (17 July 1999). p. 11. 
The Malta Independent (13 July 1999). p. 13. 
The Malta Independent (6 July 1999). p. 4. 
The Malta Independent (25 June 1999). p. 5. 
The Malta Independent (24 June 1999). p. 5. 
The Malta Independent (11 May 1999). p. 11. 
The Malta Independent (28 January 1999). p. 5. 
The Malta Independent. (21 August 1998). p. 5. 
291 
The Malta Independent (21 July 1998). p. 5. 
The Malta Independent (8 May 1997). p. 5. 
The Malta Independent on Sunday (24 October 1999). p. 17. 
The People on Sunday (31 May 1997). p. 11. 
The People on Sunday (17 May 1997). p. 11. 
The Sunday Times of Malta (6 June 1999). p. 10. 
The Sunday Times of Malta (27 September 1998). p. 1. 
The Times of Malta, Business (7 October 1999). p. 1. 
The Times of Malta, Business (15 July 1999). p. 1. 
The Times of Malta, Business (8 April 1999). p. 1. 
The Times of Malta (28 October 1999). p. 16. 
The Times of Malta (11 October 1999). p. 12. 
The Times of Malta (29 July 1999). p. 13. 
The Times of Malta (17 July 1999). p. 4. 
The Times of Malta (9 July 1999). p. 12. 
The Times of Malta (28 May 1999). p. 5. 
292 
The Times of Malta (24 April 1999). p. 12. 
The Times of Malta (24 September 1998) p. 16. 
The Times of Malta (11 August 1998). p. 12. 
The Times of Malta (21 October 1997). p. 9. 
The Times of Malta (28 May 1997). p. 1. 
Tickell, Adam and Peck, Jamie (2003). "Making Global Rules: Globalisation or 
Neoliberalisation? " In Peck, J. and Yeung H. eds. Remaking the Global Economy: 
Economic-Geographical Perspectives. pp. 163 - 181. London: Sage. 
Tickell, Adam and Peck, Jamie (1992). "Accumulation, Regulation and the Geographies 
of post-Fordism: Missing Links in Regulationist Research. " In Progress in Human 
Geography, 16, pp. 190-218. 
Tse-Tung, Mao (1956). "Some experiences in our Party's history. Part of a talk with 
representatives of some Latin-American Communist Parties. September 25,1956". In 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Online 
edition http: //www. marxists. org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume- 
5/mswv5 54. htm 
Tolentino, Arturo (1990). Guidelines for the Analysis of Policies and Programmes for 
Small and Medium Enterprise Development. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. 
Tonna, Marika (2000). Relocating as a Strategic Option: The Garment Industry in Malta 
and Tunisia: A Case Study. University of Malta: Unpublished Dissertation for M. B. A. in 
the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy. 
293 
Tove, R (2000). "The Labour Party's External Economic Policy in the 1940s". In The 
Historical Journal, Volume 43. pp. 189 - 215. 
UNECE (SME) web page: http: //www. unece. orR/indust/sme/ece-sme. htm 
UNIDO. A Comparative Analysis of SME Strategies, Policies and Programmes in 
Central European Initiative Countries. www. unido. org 
United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2006. Palgrave. 
Varacca Capello, P and Zattoni, Alessandro (1997). "Criteri per Definire e Classificare le 
Piccole e Medie Imprese. " In Brunetti, G; Mussati, G. and Corbetta, G eds. Piccole e 
Medie Imprese e Politiche di Facilitazione. pp. 453-480. Milano: EGEA. 
Vassallo, Carmel (1998). The Malta Chamber of Commerce, 1848-1979: An Outline 
history of Maltese Trade. Malta: Malta Chamber of Commerce. 
Vella, Mario (2007). Economic Sociology I/II. Department of Sociology, University of 
Malta. Unpublished Lecture Notes. 
Vella, Mario (2006). Political Economy and Sociology of Development. Department of 
Sociology, University of Malta. Unpublished Lecture Notes. 
Vella, Mario (2005 a). Population, Energy and Economic Development in the 
Mediterranean region. ASERI: Graduate School of Economic and International Relations 
of the Universita' Cattolica, Milano, Italy. Master's Degree in Global Politics. 
Unpublished Lecture Notes. 
294 
Vella, Mario (2005 b). Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development. Faculty 
of Law, Universita' di Urbino, Italy. Degree in International Cooperation and 
Development Policies. Unpublished Lecture Notes. 
Vella, Mario (2005 a). Review of Boissevain, Selwyn: 2004. In Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies. Volume 15, No. 2. pp 503 - 506. 
Vella, Mario ed. (1995). Fl-Antiporta tal-Millennju. Marsa, Malta: Sensiela Kotba 
Socjalisti. 
Vella, Mario (1994). "'That Favourite Dream of the Colonies': Limits of Development 
Discourse in Malta. " In Sultana, Ronald G. and Baldacchino, Godfrey eds. Maltese 
Society: A Sociological Inquiry. pp. 55 - 78. Msida, Malta: Mireva Publications. 
Vella, Mario (1989). Reflections in a Canvas Bag: Beginning Philosophy Between 
Politics and History: A Critical Assessment of Peter Serracino Inglotts's `Beginning 
Philosophy' and Beyond. Marsa, Malta: PEG. 
Vella Bonnici, Joe (17 February 1999). Speech at the Malta Federation of Industry 
Annual Conference: Shaping Up for Europe. Unbound document. 
Vitalis, Robert (1995). When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of 
Empire in Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Weiss, Carol and Bucuvalas, Michael (1980). Truth Tests and Utility Tests: Decision- 
Makers' Frame of Reference for Social Science Research. American Sociological 
Review, 24-2, pp. 302-313. 
Welter, Friederike (2001). Promoting SMEs: Reviewing the German Experiences. 
Essen: Rheinish-Westfalisches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung EV. 
295 
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). "Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and 
Development. In Woo-Cumings, M. ed. The Development State. pp. 1- 31. Cornell 
University Press. 
Woods, Wilfrid (1946). Report on the Finances of the Government of Malta. London: 
Colonial Office. 
World Investment Report (2005). Transnational Corporations and the 
Internationalization of R&D. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (2004). The Shift Towards Services. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (2003). FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (2002). Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (2001). Promoting Linkages. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (2000). Cross-Border M&A and Development. Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1999). FDI and the Challenge of Development. Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1998). Trends and Determinants. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1997). Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and 
Competition Policy. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
296 
World Investment Report (1996). Investment, Trade and International Policy 
Agreements. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1995). Transnational Corporations and Competitiveness. 
Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1994). Transnational Corporations, Employment and the 
Workplace. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1993). Transnational Corporations and Integrated 
International Production. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1992). Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth. 
Geneva: UNCTAD. 
World Investment Report (1991). The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment. Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
Zammit, Elias (1949). An Outline for Industrial Development. Malta: Progress Press. 
Zeitlin, M. and Ratcliff, R. E. (1975). "Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal 
Structure of Dominant Classes: The Case of Landlords and Capitalists in Chile. " In Latin 
American Research Review. Volume 10, No. 3. Autumn 1975. pp. 5- 61. 
297 
